Moral Argument

Front 1

State the argument.

Back 1

God is the best explanation of objective moral values and duties in the world:

1. If God did not exist, objective moral values and duties would not exist.

2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

Front 2

Can people be good without God?

Back 2

People can be good, form ethical systems, and recognise the existence of objective moral values without belief in God.

But if God does not exist, then morality is just a subjective and non-binding human convention.

Without God/a standard, we can't truly be good.

Front 3

What are objective moral values and duties?

Back 3

V: An action is good or bad independent of people's opinions on it.

D: An action is right or wrong independent of people's opinions on it.

E.g., To say the Holocaust was objectively wrong is to say that it was wrong even though the Nazis thought it was right.

Front 4

What is the relationship between God and objective moral values and duties?

Back 4

God's perfectly good nature (not will) is the absolute standard of moral values, which are expressed in the form of divine commands, and these constitute moral duties/obligations for us.

Vitally, this is a meta-ethical claim about moral ontology, not moral linguistics or moral epistemology.

So, we can affirm the objective goodness and wrongness of people's actions.

Front 5

What is the importance of moral accountability on theism?

Back 5

God holds all persons morally accountable for their actions: wrong will be punished and right will be rewarded.

So, the moral choices we make in this life have eternal significance.

Front 6

Premise 1: What is its support?

Back 6

If God does not exist, then there is no reason to think that humans are valuable, that their morality is objectively valid, or that they have any moral obligations.

Michael Ruse (atheistic philosopher of science) writes: "[On EN], morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, [...] and any deeper meaning is illusory."

Front 7

If EN is true, what is the origin of moral values?

Back 7

On EN, humans have evolved a kind of "herd morality," which aids in survival, but it's not objectively binding.

Some actions, like rape, may not be socially advantageous and in the course of human evolution have become taboo, but on EN there is nothing really wrong with raping someone.

Human beings are just animals, and animals are not moral agents.

Front 8

What is atheistic moral realism and its problems?

Back 8

Objective moral v/d exist but there is no foundation for them (e.g., abstract objects).

1. Even if objective moral values existed independent of God, that doesn't result in moral obligations for me; must be a ground for them.

2. Even if objective moral duties existed independent of God, they are irrelevant because there's no moral accountability. If death is final, it really doesn't matter how one lives.

This view lacks adequate foundation.

Front 9

What is moral nihilism antirealism??

Back 9

N

Front 10

What if moral values are not grounded in God or abstract objects, but are properties of the natural world?

Back 10

Some explanation is required for why moral properties supervene on certain natural states and why such principles are true.

It's insufficient to point out that we do apprehend goodness, for that only establishes the objectivity of moral v/d.

Front 11

Isn't it in our best self-interest to adopt a moral lifestyle?

Back 11

That's not always true; our self-interest is often in conflict with morality.

Especially for powerful people, like Putin; they can easily ignore the dictates of conscience and live in self-indulgence.

So, it's impossible to adopt a truly moral lifestyle out of pure self-interest.

Front 12

Premise 2: What is its support?

Back 12

We apprehend the existence of objective moral values, and there is no more reason to deny their objective reality than the objective reality of the external world.

In the absence of some defeater, we are justified in trusting the deliverances of our senses that tell us that there really is a world with physical objects out there, so in the absence of some defeater we are rational to trust the deliverance of our moral senses.

Louise Anthony (atheist philosopher), 'Any argument for moral scepticism will be based upon premises which are less obvious than the existence of objective moral values themselves.'

For any argument for moral scepticism, I can run a parallel argument for scepticism of the external world.

Front 13

Aren't morals just societal or evolutionary constructs?

Back 13

Genetic fallacy - arguing that a belief is mistaken or false because of the way the belief originated.

At best proves that our subjective perception of objective moral values has evolved, but it has nothing to do with their existence.

Front 14

What is a pragmatic argument for God on the basis of objective moral v/d?

Back 14

It's not an argument that God exists, but that one should believe that God exists.

Without belief in God and, so, moral accountability, moral motivation deteriorates, since our moral choices are ultimately insignificant if our fate and that of the universe will be the same regardless of what we do.

There is nothing more likely to strengthen the moral life of a person than belief they will be held accountable for their actions and that their choices do make a difference.

Theism, therefore, is a morally advantageous belief, and this (absent of any epistemic argument establishing atheism) provides pragmatic grounds to believe in God.

Front 15

What is divine command theory?

Back 15

Morality is dependent upon God, and moral duty is our obligation to obey a just and loving God's commands:

1. Moral requirement: S is required to do A IFF a just and loving God commands S to do A.

2. Moral permission: S is permitted to do A IFF a just and loving God does not command S not to do A.

3. Moral forbiddenness: S is forbidden to do A IFF a just and loving God commands S not to do A.

Front 16

What is the Euthyphro Dilemma?

Back 16

Is something good because God wills it or does God will something because it is good?

Former: Morality is arbitrary (God could have willed that anything be good or obligatory), which makes the claim, 'God is good,' vacuous.

Latter: moral values aren't based in God but exist independently of Him (and are imposed on Him too, so He is not sovereign or asé).

Front 17

What it the solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma?

Back 17

False dilemma; God is essentially good, and His commandments are reflections of His own character.

So, they are not arbitrary, meaning we needn't trouble ourselves with counterpossibles like "If God were to command child abuse..."

Front 18

What are moral ontology, linguistics, and epistemology?

Back 18

O: the

L:

E:

Front 19

If God does not fulfill moral duties, since they are not imposed on Him, how can one claim He is good?

Back 19

Since God does not issue commands to Himself, He is not bound by moral duties.

Instead, God is good in the sense that He essentially possesses all moral virtues, and to the maximal degree (He is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, etc.).

So, God's perfect goodness shouldn't be understood in terms of duty-fulfillment, but in terms of virtue.

Front 20

Isn't God immoral for killing innocent people?

Back 20

The fact God has no duties means that He may well have prerogatives (exclusive privileges) that are forbidden for us, like taking innocent human life at His discretion.

Front 21

How can God command sinful actions, like telling Abraham to kill Isaac, if He's all good?

Back 21

The fact God has no duties means that He can command a person to perform an action that would be sinful if they undertook it on their own initiative, but that is their moral duty in virtue of God's command.

Abraham's act would have been murder in the absence of God's command, but which became Abraham's moral duty in light of the divine command given him.

This is not to say that God can bring about that murder be good, but that He can command an act that would have been murder had it been undertaken in the absence of a divine command.

This is not to say that God could have brought it about that it be a general moral duty for people to kill eachother. Issuing such a command would be contrary to God's nature, but in this exceptional case, it was not unloving of God to test Abraham's devotion, and God has good reasons for testing Him so severely

Front 22

Why should God's nature be taken to be the standard of goodness?

Back 22

If objective moral values exist, then we have to recognise some ultimate standard for them, and God seems to be the least arbitrary stopping point.

And by definition, God is a being worthy of worship, and only a begin that is the source of all value is worthy of worship. As a being worthy of worship, God is singularly appropriate to serve as the ultimate standard of value.

Front 23

Objective morality cannot be founded in God, since objective means "mind-independent."

Back 23

Yes, objective does mean 'mind-independent.'

The problem is, on this view, everything becomes mind-dependent, because even objective realities like people and planets are depend upon God for their existence.

When we say that something is mind-dependent in the sense of being subjective, we mean that it's generated by a mind’s activity; that is, it is either a mental phenomenon (like a pain or a dream) or is made up by a mind (like a fiction or imaginary object).

But something that is mind-dependent merely in the sense that its existence entails the existence of a mind doesn’t qualify as subjective. Something that is mind-dependent merely in the sense that its existence entails that a mind exists may still be an objective reality because it is not a mental phenomenon or made up.

God's being the ground for moral values does not mean that values are mind-dependent in the sense of subjective, even though they entail that a mind (God) exists.

Front 24

Isn't the argument circular, since if moral values are grounded in God's nature, then (2)': God's nature and actions that reflect His nature does exist?

Back 24

That's to confuse moral ontology with moral semantics; the aim of this argument is to provide an ontological grounding for objective moral v/d.

I'm not offering a definition of good or value in theistic terms; I'm simply using their usual meanings.

So, when I say, 'God is good,' I'm making an ontological claim (about essential properties), not a semantical one.

Front 25

Morality can't be objective since everyone has a subjective perspective on what they claim is objective morality.

Back 25

Confuses moral ontology with moral epistemology.

Front 26

Does the fact that homicide, which God forbids, is sometimes morally permissible undermine the idea of objective values?

Back 26

No, as there is a difference between objective moral values and absolute moral values.

Absolute means regardless of the circumstances; relative means varying with the circumstances (in some cases killing may be morally justified and even obligatory - e.g., capital punishment).

Universal

Objective means independent of people's opinions, there is a right and a wrong action in any circumstance, but which might vary with the circumstances.

Front 27

If God has reasons for His commands, then morality is entirely a function of divine command, rendering morality whatever he wills it to be, which is to say it is altogether arbitrary. If God were to have reasons for his commands, then those reasons, rather than God’s commands, would be why we have the obligations we do.

Back 27

Assumes that moral obligation arises from God's having certain reasons for commanding what he does.

Rather, it's the command itself that imposes an obligation upon us; obligations arise from imperatives issued by a qualified authority, and if those imperatives are not issued then no obligation arises.

Imagine that God had reasons to command something but he just kept those reasons to himself and never actually commanded anything. Would we be under obligation in that case to do it? I can't see that we would. The notion of a command is essential for the reality of obligation.