Decision Making

Front 1

Asked people to assign probabilities to suspects and found the average per suspect remained constant at the expense of added ratings being over 100%; 3 suspects 113.6%, 5 159.1%

Back 1

Teigen (1983)

Front 2

Total probability of 5 were 2.1, but with some training this was avoided

Back 2

Robinson & Hastie (1985)

Front 3

1) Availability

2) Representiveness

3) Anchor-and-adjust

Back 3

Tversky & Kahneman (1974)

1) Judgements based on ease relevant instances come to mind

2) Based on extent an outcome is representative of the process or category in question

3) People adjust away from an initial 'anchor value'

Front 4

Estimate number of US deaths per year fro certain causes; over-estimate rare and underestimate common events (availability due to over-reporting of rare events)

Back 4

Lichtenstein et al. (1978)

Front 5

Participants guess topshop & IKEA prices; estimate for extremes were biased towards the mean (central-tendency effect)

Back 5

Matthews & Stewart (2009)

Front 6

19 famous men, 20 less famous women (and reverse); people recalled more famous names, 80/99 judged famous category more frequent (availability)

Back 6

Tversky & Kahneman (1973)

Front 7

Estimate -ing and -n- words - 13.4 -ing words, 4.7 -n- words. Availability of relevant instances

Back 7

Tversky & Kahneman (1983)

Front 8

People given character descriptions and asked probability they were a lawyer or engineer; ignored the base-rate they were told and judged purely on stereotype

Back 8

Kahneman & Tversky (1973)

Front 9

Gave character character descriptions and 9 subjects and found correlation between participants rating of likeliness and how much the character resembles the typical, but negative correlation between resemblance and estimated percentage chance

Back 9

Tversky & Kahneman (1973)

Front 10

Gave inverse fallacy problem to physicians and 95% gave 0.7-0.8 chance

Back 10

Eddy (1982)

Front 11

Reworded question with frequency and 8% success rate rose to 46%

Back 11

Gigerenzer et al. (1998)

Front 12

Roulette wheel, as run-length increases more likely to bet against it, after run of 6 85% bet against the run (Gambler's Fallacy)

Back 12

Croson & Sundali (2005)

Front 13

Probability of heads judged as less when there has been a streak

Back 13

Matthews (2013)

Front 14

Showed basketballers score probability judged as higher after a streak

Back 14

Gilovich et al. (1985)

Front 15

People believe their roulette bet more likely to win after win-streak

Back 15

Ayton & Fischer (2004)

Front 16

GF: Sampling without replacement generalised to random mechanical process

HH: Generalisation of the fact that human action shows positive recency

Back 16

Ayton & Fischer (2004)

Front 17

Frequency people make inferences tested:

MP 97%, DA 56%, AC 64%, MT 74%

Back 17

Schroyens et al. (2001)

Front 18

Card flipping task, 1/34 choose D & 7

Back 18

Wason (1968)

Front 19

Suggest matching bias: 5, 9, G, 4 and 'if S then ~9' should lead to a selection of 4 but instead participants select 9 - select digits mentioned in question

Back 19

Evans & Lynch (1973)

Front 20

29/40 people respond correctly to 'if a person is drinking beer, they must be over 18'

Back 20

Griggs & Cox (1982)

Front 21

Cheater Detection: 75% success with task of detecting cheat over 25% with digits, 41% with familiar descriptive problem ('if you're going to Boston, you will take the train')

Back 21

Cosmides (1989)

Front 22

75% success with 'if you clear up spilt blood, you must wear gloves'

Back 22

Manktelow

Front 23

Show participants there is a rule on immunisation for travel to some countries - check whether people are following, success. Asked to pretend to be allergic to vaccine and check whether there is a rule that one must be immunised, 47% success. Asked to check if people had been following rule unnecessarily, failure.

Back 23

Girotto et al. (2001)

Front 24

88% success on task 'all A are B, all B are C, what follows', 8% on 'all B are A, all B are C'

Back 24

Roberts & Sykes (2005)

Front 25

Showed more than half said 'all A are C' to 'all B are A, all B are C' meaning we might take it to mean '...and vice versa'. More specific instructions gave a success rate of 94%

Back 25

Provitera et al. (1971)

Front 26

Gave participants syllogistic questions and 4 possible answers to select, 45 of the questions had no answer; strong correlation in mood (90% in particular) i.e. matching universal to universal, negative to negative...

Back 26

Begg & Denny (1969)

Front 27

Mental Models

Back 27

Philip Johnson-Laird: form model of state of world provided by premises, combine these models then search for alternative models consistent with them then validate. Difficult with multiple models

Front 28

Problems with more mental models solved slower and less accurately and those with better working memory did them faster

Back 28

Copeland & Radvansky (2004)

Front 29

Asked participants how many conclusion they considered in multiple-model question and found no more than in single

Back 29

Newstead et al. (1999)

Front 30

Found 71% of people accept invalid syllogism with believable conclusion

Back 30

Evans et al. (1983)

Front 31

Suggested that people try to construct only one mental model for capacity limits, and then if conclusion is believable try to validate, unbelievable refute. If this fails then there is a state of uncertainty, swayed by their belief about the probability conclusion is valid

Back 31

Klauer et al. (2000)

Front 32

Calculator jacket with walk for £5 off. 68% walk for first, 29% for latter

Back 32

Tversky & Kahneman (1981)

Front 33

Magazine subscriptions: 84% choose online and hard-copy when priced the same as hard-copy, without that option 68% choose only online

Back 33

Ariely (2009)

Front 34

80% of £4000, or certain £3000 - 80% choose the certain option

Back 34

Tversky & Kahneman (1979)

Front 35

Prospect Theory

Back 35

Focus on change in wealth with respect to a reference point from which there is a diminishing sensitivity to gains and a (steeper) diminishing sensitivity to loss (loss aversion)

Front 36

Endowment Effect; 50% preference between chocolate and mug, give participant one and ask if they want to switch 90% don't switch

Back 36

Knetsch (1989)

Front 37

Certainty effect: 82% choose certain £2400 over 0.6x£2400, 0.33x£2500, 0.01x£0. But 83% choose 0.33x£2500 over 0.34x£2400.

Back 37

Tversky & Kahneman

Front 38

showed 75% say an increase in chance from 5% to 10% is more significant than 30% to 35%

Back 38

Gonzalez & Wu (1999)

Front 39

Shown bets like 0.95x£2.5,0.05x-£0.75 vs 0.4x£8.5, 0.6x-£1.5 and asked to select which they prefered. Later told they have tickets for the bets and asked to value how mucht hey'd sell them for; 73% valued the latter on every bet which they had chosen the former

Back 39

Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971)

Front 40

Peanuts Effect: People less risk averse with low stakes. However, showed this effect was smaller with lower probabilities & prospect theory cannot deal with this

Back 40

Weber & Chapman (2005)

Front 41

A model where decisions are made by sampling and valuing money by pairing it with other amounts retrieved from memory

Back 41

Stewart et al. (2006)

Front 42

Categorical Theory of Emotions

Back 42

Darwin (1872), Ekman (1992); basic emotions with rapid onset, brief duration; cross-cultural facial expressions

Front 43

Dimensional view

Back 43

Emotions lie on orthogonal axes

Front 44

Injection of placebo, adrenaline and then put in room with happy or angry person. 0.98 informed, 1.78 ignorant in happy v 1.91 informed, 1.39 ignorant in angry, where score correlates to level of happiness

Back 44

Schachter & Singer (1962); cognitive labelling

Front 45

1) Bilateral amygdala damage meant impairment in 'fear' recognition

2) Lesions reduce/abolish acquisition of fearful response to neutral stimulus paired with aversive outcome

Back 45

1) Calder et al. (1996); DR and SE

2) Blancherd (1972)

Front 46

1) Controls show better memory for evocative images than others, Amygdala damage patients do not

2) Superior recall of emotionally arousing picture correlates with amygdala activation

Back 46

1) Adolphs et al. (1997)

2) Hamann et al. (1999)

Front 47

1) vmPFC lesion shows increased emotional reactivity but reduced emotionality

2) Show no SCR with socially-evocative image

3) More likely to pick Utilitarian response over emotionally charged sacrifice

Back 47

1) Anderson et al. (2006)

2) Damasio et al. (1990)

3) Koenigs et al. (2007)

Front 48

Iowa Gambling Task; vmPFC patients choose A&B more often.

2) Show lower anticipatory SCR

3) Same with amygdala patients but they also lose reward & punishment SCRs

Back 48

Bechara et al. (1994)

2) 1996

3) 1999

Front 49

Ask questions after 20 trials about what participants think is going on. Pre-punishment, pre-hunch (controls have SCRs and no idea), hunch (anticipatory SCRs for A and B, patients don't) and conceptual (7/10 explain why A&B are worse, patients show no SCR and favour A&B)

Back 49

Bechara et al. (1997)

Front 50

Somatic Marker Hypothesis

Back 50

vmPFC take role in 're-living' emotional and somatic experiences associated with responses and these play a part in biasing decision process

Front 51

Patients with Pure Autonomic Failure (giving no SCRs) more likely to pick good decks

Back 51

Heims et al. (2005)

Front 52

Show that decks A&B also involve larger sums of money; performed IGT with more loss in A&B but higher sums in C&D and found SCR larger preceding C&D but still chose C&D

Back 52

Tombs et al. (2002)

Front 53

Suggest that as the first trials always win vmPFC patients form response tendencies which are difficult to overcome; if the failures are made clear earlier then 68% patients choose C&D and 72% controls

Back 53

Farah & Fellows (2005)

Front 54

Intuitive Reasoning Task (IRT); more pressing questions, found patients had good explicit knowledge so no need for unconscious knowledge

Back 54

Maia & McClelland (2005)

Front 55

Pick from a deck and guess if colour would match randomly appearing card; rigged so 60% guess correct with A&B and 40% correct with C&D; outcome magnitude not confounded with goodness of deck, questions show no overt knowledge - people pick from good decks more, larger anticipatory SCRs = better picking

Back 55

Dunn et al. (2010)

Front 56

Indicate food preferences weeks before then asked to imagine items on a menu and asked which they would choose. Found PET scans show activity in left amygdala & left mOFC for high incentive items; amygdala activity correlates with incentive, OFC with choice difficulty (as reported after)

Back 56

Arana et al. (2003)