The two most significant obstacles to effective Allied innovation during the interwar period were 1) social, political and economic constraints, and 2) different interpretations of lessons learned from WWI.
“General revulsion for warfare and all things military” following WWI resulted in social, political and economic constraints that inhibited innovation. The bloodshed was so great that no one throughout Europe or in America wanted a repeat of WWI. In 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, formally renouncing war, “except in national self-defense.” This new anti-war environment had political and economic implications, making it all but impossible to be able to justify additional funding for military research and development …show more content…
French General Jean-Baptiste Estienne and Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle were adamant proponents of the effectiveness of Armor on the battlefield. In 1920, Estienne proposed increasing France’s tanks to over 4,000, and other mechanized vehicles to 8,000. De Gaulle took Estienne’s ideas even further by proposing a “pure Armor Brigade” to advance independently, followed by mechanized Infantry. Both men were immediately struck down by the politicians of the day who believed they were too “[militarily] radical… [And] too offensively minded.” Some even feared that such an offensively capable militarily might preemptively start a war with Germany, or worse, support a military coup d’état of the …show more content…
They argued that this “limited liability” had allowed Britain to become a superpower by both influencing and avoiding continental wars throughout history. The British also believed that the focus on naval supremacy versus a large army provided the best way to economically defend Britain, as well as protect and expend its colonies. This shift in focus allowed Britain to make significant innovations in naval warfare, but at the expense of the development of armored and mechanized forces. Unfortunately, it was not until 1932, fourteen years after the end of WWI, that Britain established a committee to examine the lessons learned from the previous war. By 1937, on the eve on WWII, the British army was nothing more than a “colonial police force.” It was not until 1938, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, that Britain’s lack of armor, and significant deficiencies in artillery and anti-tank guns, was
“General revulsion for warfare and all things military” following WWI resulted in social, political and economic constraints that inhibited innovation. The bloodshed was so great that no one throughout Europe or in America wanted a repeat of WWI. In 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, formally renouncing war, “except in national self-defense.” This new anti-war environment had political and economic implications, making it all but impossible to be able to justify additional funding for military research and development …show more content…
French General Jean-Baptiste Estienne and Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle were adamant proponents of the effectiveness of Armor on the battlefield. In 1920, Estienne proposed increasing France’s tanks to over 4,000, and other mechanized vehicles to 8,000. De Gaulle took Estienne’s ideas even further by proposing a “pure Armor Brigade” to advance independently, followed by mechanized Infantry. Both men were immediately struck down by the politicians of the day who believed they were too “[militarily] radical… [And] too offensively minded.” Some even feared that such an offensively capable militarily might preemptively start a war with Germany, or worse, support a military coup d’état of the …show more content…
They argued that this “limited liability” had allowed Britain to become a superpower by both influencing and avoiding continental wars throughout history. The British also believed that the focus on naval supremacy versus a large army provided the best way to economically defend Britain, as well as protect and expend its colonies. This shift in focus allowed Britain to make significant innovations in naval warfare, but at the expense of the development of armored and mechanized forces. Unfortunately, it was not until 1932, fourteen years after the end of WWI, that Britain established a committee to examine the lessons learned from the previous war. By 1937, on the eve on WWII, the British army was nothing more than a “colonial police force.” It was not until 1938, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, that Britain’s lack of armor, and significant deficiencies in artillery and anti-tank guns, was