In this essay I will critically evaluate J.J.C. Smart’s, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, and his argument for mind-brain identity theory. As I explain in my essay, Smart maintains that to report a sensation is to report a brain state. I will argue against this hypothesis and demonstrate that Smart fails to establish a necessary connection between a sensation and brain state, using Paul Churchland’s “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes”. To conclude, I will suggest that though Smart fails to explore certain objections and aspects in the mind-brain identity theory, he maintains a strong argument when explaining that reporting a sensation is reporting a brain state.
In his article, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, J.J.C Smart …show more content…
Smart believes that when we talk about our sensations, we talk about our brain states; we report on them. I cannot agree with Smart knowing that scientific theories about sensations are constantly changing (Smart 1959, 147). If we report a sensation x in the year 2015, for example, that sensation may scientifically advance and no longer mean the same thing in the year 2020. As neuroscience constantly changes, we are forced to eliminate our old thoughts, ideas and perceptions on sensations, and replace them with new ones. Thus, reporting a sensation cannot be sufficient enough to report a brain stat because a sensation fails to be concretely defined. Paul Churchland further objects Smart’s hypothesis. In his paper, “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes”, Churchland introduces eliminative materialism. He explains that this doctrine helps us conclude that our normative concerns will have to be reconstituted at a more revealing understanding as neuroscience matures (Churchland 1981, 84). If our understanding of sensations, in scientific terms, is constantly developing it is difficult for Smart to maintain that when we talk about our sensations, we talk about our brain states. Hence, we when we talk about sensations we cannot be talking about brain …show more content…
Smart doesn’t deny the fact the science is constantly developing, but he emphasizes that this objection does not prove that to report a sensation is to not report a brain process. Churchland’s objection shows that sensations and brain processes are not the same thing. Smart agrees and describes, “if the meaning of an expression were what the expression named, then of course it would follow from the fact that ‘sensation’ and ‘brain process’ have different meaning that they cannot name one and the same thing” (Smart 1959, 148). Take for example the statement “I see rain”. “I see rain” and “I see condensation” do not mean the same thing. If the meaning of the expression “rain” meant, “rain”, droplets of liquid from the clouds, then it could not mean “condensation”, even if the two expressions are theoretically the same. This objection however only supports that the two do not have the same meaning; it does not rule out that reporting a sensation is possibly reporting a brain process, which is ultimately Smart’s thesis. I believe that Smart develops his thesis in response to these objections; emphasizing that to report a sensation is to report a brain
In his article, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, J.J.C Smart …show more content…
Smart believes that when we talk about our sensations, we talk about our brain states; we report on them. I cannot agree with Smart knowing that scientific theories about sensations are constantly changing (Smart 1959, 147). If we report a sensation x in the year 2015, for example, that sensation may scientifically advance and no longer mean the same thing in the year 2020. As neuroscience constantly changes, we are forced to eliminate our old thoughts, ideas and perceptions on sensations, and replace them with new ones. Thus, reporting a sensation cannot be sufficient enough to report a brain stat because a sensation fails to be concretely defined. Paul Churchland further objects Smart’s hypothesis. In his paper, “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes”, Churchland introduces eliminative materialism. He explains that this doctrine helps us conclude that our normative concerns will have to be reconstituted at a more revealing understanding as neuroscience matures (Churchland 1981, 84). If our understanding of sensations, in scientific terms, is constantly developing it is difficult for Smart to maintain that when we talk about our sensations, we talk about our brain states. Hence, we when we talk about sensations we cannot be talking about brain …show more content…
Smart doesn’t deny the fact the science is constantly developing, but he emphasizes that this objection does not prove that to report a sensation is to not report a brain process. Churchland’s objection shows that sensations and brain processes are not the same thing. Smart agrees and describes, “if the meaning of an expression were what the expression named, then of course it would follow from the fact that ‘sensation’ and ‘brain process’ have different meaning that they cannot name one and the same thing” (Smart 1959, 148). Take for example the statement “I see rain”. “I see rain” and “I see condensation” do not mean the same thing. If the meaning of the expression “rain” meant, “rain”, droplets of liquid from the clouds, then it could not mean “condensation”, even if the two expressions are theoretically the same. This objection however only supports that the two do not have the same meaning; it does not rule out that reporting a sensation is possibly reporting a brain process, which is ultimately Smart’s thesis. I believe that Smart develops his thesis in response to these objections; emphasizing that to report a sensation is to report a brain