McDonald goes on to agrue why Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning are wrong. Here is what McDonalds found, Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning was using the 1988 presidential election to measure the competitiveness of the 1990 district and then used the 1992 presidential election to measure the competitiveness of the 1992 district. The problem with this is that in 1988 there was two candidates George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis, while in 1992 there where three candidates Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot. Perot ended up with 18.9 percent of the votes, swaying the race between Clinton and Bush seven percent. This has conflicting evidence and therefore cannot be correlated with each other. Looking at both McDonald’s research and Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning’s research it show that redistricing reduces the number of competitive congressional districts and should be …show more content…
In Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning’s Drawing the Line on District Competition: A Rejoinder; on page 96, they have these two contradictory sentences: According to McDonald’s data, the number of competitive districts decline by almost as much during non-redistricting cycles as it did during redistriction cycle. Regardless of whether one uses the 45-55 percent standard or the 48-52 percent standard for idneifying competitive disticts between 1990 and 2002 that can be attributed to redisticting was approximatley five districts.
With these two sentences there is no support on how the authors came to this conclusion. The authors could claim that competitive elections are declining because of the redistricting cycle. It is a given that competititve disticts would decline during the redisticting cycle but typically electoral competition will rise. “The competitiveness of a district is related to the competitiveness of the election held within” (McDonald