Follesdal & Hix recognize numerous holes in Moravcsik’s arguments. Though the policies of the EU and voter preferences tend to always align, this is insufficient. Democrats, particularly libertarians, want strong safeguards to ensure that government will be accountable. They want reliable mechanisms to ensure there will be no misuse of power (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Secondly, they stress that Moravcsik underestimated the importance of the deliberative and pluralist conception of democracy. Voter’s preferences are not always fixed, so it is imperative that there always be a meaningful communication between the decision-makers and citizens. The lack of citizen connection to the EU policies results in the lack of mobilisation evident through the
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If the views of the majority were ignored the EU could devolve into arbitrary rule by supranational technocrats. However, in my opinion, Moravcsik is correct in saying that there are simply too many checks and opportunity for scrutiny in the decision-making process for the EU to be a gross democratic deficit. The manner in which the EU’s constitution has reformed the decision-making process, using innovations like the principle of subsidiarity, which is a principle that the EU will not act where it is best for the member states to act, ensures that the national parliaments are there to police the union’s legislations. This negates any allegation of lack of …show more content…
(Follesdal & Hix, 2006). They oppose Majone’s assertion that the policies that are Pareto-efficient do not generate losers. Normatively, his idea appear sound but when considered empirically it is clear that even purely regulative policies, like the food safety regulations, yield winners and losers (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Secondly, Follesdal & Hix challenged Majone’s classification of the EU as a regulatory state. Not all of its policies and legislation are regulative, it is a continuum, some are also re-distributive. For example, the ECJ plays its adjudicatory role in ensuring the various actor adhere to the union’s constitution (Arzheimer, 2012). In my judgement, the EU is not solely a regulatory state because even the decision-making process that created the regulations is political and involves bargaining. Therefore, Majone’s contention that the EU’s decision-making process should not be democratic it is not convincing. On the surface, it is easy to align w/ Majone because it seems attractive to have a system of decision-making that only yields winners but I am more persuaded by Follesdal & Hix’s argument. Even supposing, the EU was solely classed as regulatory state this does not invalidate the necessity for EU to work for all citizens to achieve the democratic values promised in its constitution such as equality, solidarity and
If the views of the majority were ignored the EU could devolve into arbitrary rule by supranational technocrats. However, in my opinion, Moravcsik is correct in saying that there are simply too many checks and opportunity for scrutiny in the decision-making process for the EU to be a gross democratic deficit. The manner in which the EU’s constitution has reformed the decision-making process, using innovations like the principle of subsidiarity, which is a principle that the EU will not act where it is best for the member states to act, ensures that the national parliaments are there to police the union’s legislations. This negates any allegation of lack of …show more content…
(Follesdal & Hix, 2006). They oppose Majone’s assertion that the policies that are Pareto-efficient do not generate losers. Normatively, his idea appear sound but when considered empirically it is clear that even purely regulative policies, like the food safety regulations, yield winners and losers (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Secondly, Follesdal & Hix challenged Majone’s classification of the EU as a regulatory state. Not all of its policies and legislation are regulative, it is a continuum, some are also re-distributive. For example, the ECJ plays its adjudicatory role in ensuring the various actor adhere to the union’s constitution (Arzheimer, 2012). In my judgement, the EU is not solely a regulatory state because even the decision-making process that created the regulations is political and involves bargaining. Therefore, Majone’s contention that the EU’s decision-making process should not be democratic it is not convincing. On the surface, it is easy to align w/ Majone because it seems attractive to have a system of decision-making that only yields winners but I am more persuaded by Follesdal & Hix’s argument. Even supposing, the EU was solely classed as regulatory state this does not invalidate the necessity for EU to work for all citizens to achieve the democratic values promised in its constitution such as equality, solidarity and