The Sorites Paradox, or the Paradox of the Heap is a paradox which comes in two forms; the many-premise version, and the two-premise version. Both versions lead to the same conclusions but offer different ways to reach that conclusion. This essay will focus on the workings of the two-premise version.
The paradox arises as a result of vague predicates (Barker, 2009); demonstrating a problem with human language. This is the idea of human language being excessively vague, and that measurements we use every day being unscientific, and unable to be used accurately. This is because of the fact that terms such as heap (in the case of this example), do not define true amounts, and do not appear to set a detailed boundary as to where a reduction or …show more content…
Put simply, if we call premise 1 “P”, and our conclusion “Q”, we recognise that in premise 2, state that if P is true, than Q is also true. When arguments are laid out in this form, it is often argued that if the premises of the argument are true, then the conclusion must also be true. This is where the problems with the Sorites Paradox arise; while the two premises are true, the conclusion appears to be false.
Repeating premise 2 and removing a grain of sand from the heap (reducing the heap from 999,999 to 999,998), doesn’t change the result; the heap is still a heap. This seems to make sense, however repeated application of premise 2 forces one to accept the conclusion that a heap may be composed of just one grain of sand (Dolev, 2004). This seems to be an absurdity, and highlights why a paradox …show more content…
This is dependent upon whether it is true, false, or neither true nor false on all admissible sharpenings. An admissible sharpening was a term which supervaluationists used to define a reasonable value within a grey area of where the period is at which a heap of sand becomes a non-heap. For example, if we say that 1,000,000 grains of sand is certainly a heap, and that 0 grains is certainly not a heap, then the 999,998 grains in between make up the grey area, all values of which appear to be reasonable suggestions (therefore admissible sharpenings) as to where a heap becomes a non-heap or
The paradox arises as a result of vague predicates (Barker, 2009); demonstrating a problem with human language. This is the idea of human language being excessively vague, and that measurements we use every day being unscientific, and unable to be used accurately. This is because of the fact that terms such as heap (in the case of this example), do not define true amounts, and do not appear to set a detailed boundary as to where a reduction or …show more content…
Put simply, if we call premise 1 “P”, and our conclusion “Q”, we recognise that in premise 2, state that if P is true, than Q is also true. When arguments are laid out in this form, it is often argued that if the premises of the argument are true, then the conclusion must also be true. This is where the problems with the Sorites Paradox arise; while the two premises are true, the conclusion appears to be false.
Repeating premise 2 and removing a grain of sand from the heap (reducing the heap from 999,999 to 999,998), doesn’t change the result; the heap is still a heap. This seems to make sense, however repeated application of premise 2 forces one to accept the conclusion that a heap may be composed of just one grain of sand (Dolev, 2004). This seems to be an absurdity, and highlights why a paradox …show more content…
This is dependent upon whether it is true, false, or neither true nor false on all admissible sharpenings. An admissible sharpening was a term which supervaluationists used to define a reasonable value within a grey area of where the period is at which a heap of sand becomes a non-heap. For example, if we say that 1,000,000 grains of sand is certainly a heap, and that 0 grains is certainly not a heap, then the 999,998 grains in between make up the grey area, all values of which appear to be reasonable suggestions (therefore admissible sharpenings) as to where a heap becomes a non-heap or