I will do this on the following assumptions; that the infant …show more content…
A person is not merely a membership of the specie Homo sapiens. What make a being a person are the functional features of “self consciousness and rationality,” which are lacking in all infants. Infants are potential persons because they have the capacity to acquire human functional characteristics of “consciousness and rationality.” Since infants are not persons but potential persons, infants cannot have any serious right to life. Infants cannot be said to have the same moral standing with actual persons and thus cannot have equal right to life as actual persons. Hence, killing infants is in and of itself not as morally wrong as killing actual persons.
Thus it will be wrong to assume that just because “a being is a human being in the sense of a member of the Species Homo Sapiens” it is wrong to kill it. In her essay “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” Warren argues that an organism must possess these fundamental characteristics of “consciousness and the ability to feel pain, reasoning, a self-motivated activity, ability to communicate; and the existence of a self-concept and self-consciousness” to qualify as a …show more content…
In his book The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, McMahan argues that adult dementia patients prior to losing their mental capacities were “autonomous” persons with “autonomous preference” that may still be binding on us, and sometimes these autonomous preferences extend beyond their death. For instance, when a person dies with a living Will about how his estates should be distributed, or how his lifeless body should be treated (either buried or cremated), we usually feel obligated to respect these wishes sometimes referred to as the wishes of the