The events and decisions leading up to the failure at Anzio illustrate why risk management should be conducted throughout the planning and execution phases. In the course of preparing for a major operation such as the amphibious assault at Anzio, there are hundreds of decisions which all have some degree of risk associated with them and Anzio is no exception. The risk associated with continuing an only frontal assault with a lack of mass that can change the battle at the Gustav Line was identified, deemed too high, and other plans to take Italy had been investigated. The plan chosen was to send VI Corps, formed from the Fifth Army, as an amphibious force around the German's right flank. The availability of landing craft and sealift capability, however, limited the size of the amphibious force to only one reinforced division and an execution date of no later than 20 December 1943. Planners assessed the risk of the operation and determined that the one division limit could provide the required mass to take and establish the beachhead if the Fifth Army was able to progress far enough north to immediately support the VI Corps landing. The risks of the limited logistics and sealift capability of delivering the force and supplies for the initial Anzio plan was also correctly identified, assessed, and dealt with when Churchill rallied support for the required landing craft. By 10 December it had become apparent to General Alexander, Fifteenth Army Group Commander, that the Fifth Army had not advanced far enough north to affect a satisfactory link-up. Since sufficient landing craft could not be extended in the theater due to Operation OVERLORD being in effect, Alexander determined the risks were now too high and scrapped the original Anzio plan. However, since the risk of Fifth Army's indecisive mass against the strongly fortified Gustav Line remained, General Clark recommended conducting Operation SHINGLE with a larger amphibious support element which would then
The events and decisions leading up to the failure at Anzio illustrate why risk management should be conducted throughout the planning and execution phases. In the course of preparing for a major operation such as the amphibious assault at Anzio, there are hundreds of decisions which all have some degree of risk associated with them and Anzio is no exception. The risk associated with continuing an only frontal assault with a lack of mass that can change the battle at the Gustav Line was identified, deemed too high, and other plans to take Italy had been investigated. The plan chosen was to send VI Corps, formed from the Fifth Army, as an amphibious force around the German's right flank. The availability of landing craft and sealift capability, however, limited the size of the amphibious force to only one reinforced division and an execution date of no later than 20 December 1943. Planners assessed the risk of the operation and determined that the one division limit could provide the required mass to take and establish the beachhead if the Fifth Army was able to progress far enough north to immediately support the VI Corps landing. The risks of the limited logistics and sealift capability of delivering the force and supplies for the initial Anzio plan was also correctly identified, assessed, and dealt with when Churchill rallied support for the required landing craft. By 10 December it had become apparent to General Alexander, Fifteenth Army Group Commander, that the Fifth Army had not advanced far enough north to affect a satisfactory link-up. Since sufficient landing craft could not be extended in the theater due to Operation OVERLORD being in effect, Alexander determined the risks were now too high and scrapped the original Anzio plan. However, since the risk of Fifth Army's indecisive mass against the strongly fortified Gustav Line remained, General Clark recommended conducting Operation SHINGLE with a larger amphibious support element which would then