Field Manuel 3-24 was put into practice when the US’s commitment to COIN was confirmed in 2007 when US President George W. Bush announced “The New Way Forward”, or the infamous “surge” of troops in Iraq by 30 000 soldiers to protect civilians and occupy new positions in 4GW. Under the objective of providing security for civilians and building democracy and government infrastructure (as studied in Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro), the main goal of COIN was focused on protecting civilian populations and building their trust. In other words, the aim was to “win the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people through relationship building with local populations alongside providing economic opportunities for insurgent defectors and security for civilians from insurgents. The premise of COIN was based off a central belief of Gen. Patreus in Field Manuel 3-24, which supported the idea that a long-term presence of US troops in Iraqi communities could improve the security situation and allow for trust to develop between the locals and US military.…
However, despite what some would consider major problems like mistrust between senior leaders and an inability to integrate the air component operationally, the allied command achieved pre-determined objectives. While the Axis Force was provided a small victory in their successful withdrawal of troops and equipment, it was mitigated by the Allied gains in training and battle experience. The cautious and conservative approach by Strategic Leaders was likely due in part to their pre-operation understanding of their challenges with mission command and joint…
In January of 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new campaign strategy on the war against terror. The surge was a way forward to a more unified, democratic federation that can sustain, govern, and defend itself in future generations. His plan involved the deployment of 28,000 additional U.S. troops to the Anbar Province and Baghdad Area of Influence (AOI). The AOI strategy was based on six essential elements that derived from a proposal meeting with senior Iraqi officials; let the Iraqis lead, help Iraqis protect the population, isolate extremists, create space for political progress, diversify political and economic efforts, and situate the strategy in a regional approach (Mansoor 2013). The rapid deployment of five additional Brigades, in support of surge operations, spanned over a five-month period, from January to May of 2007.…
The operations process drives the commanders use of troop leading procedures ensuring that they are “envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future (ADP 5-0.”) It is the commander’s responsibility to drive the operations process and to ensure that his subordinates maintain a complete situational understanding. The operations process helps to build a template in which to use the troop leading procedures that also encourages “collaboration and dialogue (ADP 5-0.) from the soldiers he commands. It is the combination of these principles that enables an effective means of planning, preparing and ultimately, leading American soldiers as an…
The events and decisions leading up to the failure at Anzio illustrate why risk management should be conducted throughout the planning and execution phases. In the course of preparing for a major operation such as the amphibious assault at Anzio, there are hundreds of decisions which all have some degree of risk associated with them and Anzio is no exception. The risk associated with continuing an only frontal assault with a lack of mass that can change the battle at the Gustav Line was identified, deemed too high, and other plans to take Italy had been investigated. The plan chosen was to send VI Corps, formed from the Fifth Army, as an amphibious force around the German's right flank. The availability of landing craft and sealift capability, however, limited the size of the amphibious force to only one reinforced division and an execution date of no later than 20 December 1943.…
The USEASTCOM Joint Planning Group (JPG) recently completed course of action (COA) development for the Defense of Tunisia contingency plan (CONPLAN). As the JPG prepared the COAs, the commander’s initial intent served to anchor the different concepts towards achieving the same purpose. I support the JPG’s initial commander’s intent, as it provides a solid basis to continue planning. This paper continues by explaining how the JPG developed the initial commander’s intent, and then provides the rationale for supporting the key elements within the intent. Enclosure 1 to this paper provides the complete narrative of the initial commander’s intent.…
policy, seeing the potential for disaster on a drawn-out and inconclusive occupation. Moreover, unpleasant experiences in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia are major reasons why we have such a cautious attitude toward placing U.S. forces in harm’s way. Furthermore, Defense Department thinking reflected the “Weinberger Rules” for using military force. Under those rules force should only be used for the following five reasons: 1. when all other alternatives had been exhausted, 2.…
Commanders and staff planners use the operational approach to organize lines of effort, defeat and stability mechanisms, objectives, and end state conditions, as we demonstrated during our recent practical exercise; formulation of the initial commander’s intent-…
Current joint doctrine addresses some of the lessons learned, including inadequate command planning collaboration and insufficient ongoing assessment and evaluation of the campaign’s progress. II Policy Guidance, the Operational Environment and Defining the Problem While there has been considerable retrospective evaluation of the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Joint Force Commander and his planners adequately evolved their understanding of the operational environment based upon their interpretation of pre-invasion civilian policy guidance to define the problem. According to current doctrine,…
Franks planning deficiency only start with incorrect interpretation of national strategic ends. He added risk by failing to conduct an independent operation design before planning. He or his planners never examine the current operational environment or attempted to define the current problem the invasion would solve; nor conduct dialog between other stakeholders like the State Department. (site) Without understanding of the operational environment, they never identified the tendencies of current Iraqi society. Without these tendencies CENTCOM planners did not understand the true complexity of Iraqi society so they never incorporated these complexities into their plan.…
Thus the strategists both scholars and the practitioners look towards the senior military leadership for the strategic leadership and formulation or upgradation or amendments to the military theories. One such military leader who personally was engaged in battle, commanded and then led the country’s armed forces into the combat and who subsequently rose to be the secretary of the state is General Colin Powell. This paper intends to evaluate the general’s contribution on the yardstick provided by Prof. Thomas P. Galvin and subsequently reflect upon my own self as to what have I accomplished so far and what I want to achieve in my military…
Future armed conflict will be complex, in part, because threats, enemies, and adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and elusive. State and nonstate actors employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies that threaten U.S. security and vital interests. The complexity of future armed conflict is due to increasing momentum of human interaction, threats emanating from dense and weakly governed urban areas, the availability of lethal weapon systems, and the proliferation of CBRNE threats. Enemies and adversaries will challenge U.S. competitive advantages in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. What all Army operations will have in common is a need for innovative and adaptive leaders that thrive in conditions…
Again, a more concise and structured chain of command would have mitigated much confusion and disorder. Allowing a clearly defined ground force commander and air commander working in concert would have been the most advantageous approach to this operation. Clearly the command of air support should’ve been delegated to a single Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Moseley. Lieutenant General Moseley should’ve had a clear line of contact with a single ground forces commander.…
On May 17th, 2015, the Islamic State seized the Iraqi city of Ramadi. The loss of city and regional control will be a major setback to the United States’ effort to stop the spread of ISIS. With control over Ramadi, which is approximately 110 kilometers from Baghdad, ISIS is poised to continue its spread into the Iraqi heartland. In the eyes of the American public, responsibility will almost solely fall upon the President and his administration for failing to keep the city out of the control of ISIS (Voeten & Brewer, 2006, p. 811). However, the loss of Ramadi will not make a major impact on the President’s approval.…
These three factors provide the commander and soldier a clear direction to understand which part they must attack and which part they need to protect including friend and enemy. During the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, for example, the Commander, US Central Command, identified the coalition itself as a friendly operational COG and took appropriate measures to protect it. In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the supported commander must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are vulnerable to hostile actions and then plan…