Introduction / Thesis Statement The purpose of this paper is to apply critical reasoning techniques to Operation Barbarossa, which was a German offensive in 1941 during World War II (WWII) against the Soviet Union. I will identify the events leading up to the operation, and a brief overview of the operation itself. I will also identify alternative intelligence assets which could have been employed by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to develop alternative courses of action / outcome to this operation. In addition to these alternative courses of action, I will identify second and third order effects that could have changed the outcome of WWII and potentially the world as we know it today.
Background
Prior to WWII, Nazi Germany and …show more content…
Joseph Stalin, the dictator of the Soviet Union believed that Hitler would not carry out two wars on two fronts and if Germany was to conduct an attack against Russia it wouldn’t be until he defeated France and Great Britain. Additionally, Stalin believed that information coming from Great Britain and the United States was a ploy to trick Russia into attacking its ally and forcing Russia to enter the war on the side of Great Britain (Jewish Virtual Library, 2015). Thus, the warning issued to Russia regarding Operation Barbarossa was not heeded.
Operation Barbarossa On 22 June 1941, Operation Barbarossa officially started after being stalled for a month over complications experienced in Yugoslavia and Greece. Germany deployed 150 divisions from Poland into western Russia, in total around three million personnel, 19 Panzer divisions (about 3,000 tanks), 7,000 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft took part in the initial invasion. Germany was also reinforced with more than 30 divisions from Finland and Romania (Taylor, 2013). Germany utilized a three axis approach to simultaneously assault …show more content…
Halder and Walter Von Brauchitish (Army Commander in Chief) attempted to change Hitler’s mind in July, by presenting an intelligence summary which showed that the majority of Soviet forces were encamped around Moscow and not in Ukraine as Hitler had assessed. Hitler discounted this report and issued Directive 33A, which shifted armored forces away from Moscow halting the advance on the city and reinforced the operational principles of Directive 33(Taylor, 2013). By late July, Hitler issued Directive 34, which postponed Directives 33 and 33A, by 10 days, enabling forces at Smolensk (southwest of Moscow) to conduct resupply. However, the directive also pushed a Panzer group from the center group to the northern group and reallocated air support from the center group to support operations against Leningrad in the south. Hitler justified his decision to focus efforts on Leningrad and the Baltic area due to the fact that Russia’s main naval base was positioned on the Baltic Sea, and Leningrad was Russia’s only heavy tank production center (Taylor,
Background
Prior to WWII, Nazi Germany and …show more content…
Joseph Stalin, the dictator of the Soviet Union believed that Hitler would not carry out two wars on two fronts and if Germany was to conduct an attack against Russia it wouldn’t be until he defeated France and Great Britain. Additionally, Stalin believed that information coming from Great Britain and the United States was a ploy to trick Russia into attacking its ally and forcing Russia to enter the war on the side of Great Britain (Jewish Virtual Library, 2015). Thus, the warning issued to Russia regarding Operation Barbarossa was not heeded.
Operation Barbarossa On 22 June 1941, Operation Barbarossa officially started after being stalled for a month over complications experienced in Yugoslavia and Greece. Germany deployed 150 divisions from Poland into western Russia, in total around three million personnel, 19 Panzer divisions (about 3,000 tanks), 7,000 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft took part in the initial invasion. Germany was also reinforced with more than 30 divisions from Finland and Romania (Taylor, 2013). Germany utilized a three axis approach to simultaneously assault …show more content…
Halder and Walter Von Brauchitish (Army Commander in Chief) attempted to change Hitler’s mind in July, by presenting an intelligence summary which showed that the majority of Soviet forces were encamped around Moscow and not in Ukraine as Hitler had assessed. Hitler discounted this report and issued Directive 33A, which shifted armored forces away from Moscow halting the advance on the city and reinforced the operational principles of Directive 33(Taylor, 2013). By late July, Hitler issued Directive 34, which postponed Directives 33 and 33A, by 10 days, enabling forces at Smolensk (southwest of Moscow) to conduct resupply. However, the directive also pushed a Panzer group from the center group to the northern group and reallocated air support from the center group to support operations against Leningrad in the south. Hitler justified his decision to focus efforts on Leningrad and the Baltic area due to the fact that Russia’s main naval base was positioned on the Baltic Sea, and Leningrad was Russia’s only heavy tank production center (Taylor,