Jeremy Black Indecisiveness Analysis

Deciding on Indecisiveness In Warfare and History: European Warfare, 1600-1815, Jeremy Black address the history and advancement of military capabilities from the 17th century to the Napoleonic wars. The chapter titled “Decisiveness” delves into defining the scope of eighteenth-century warfare. David Chandler argued that the capabilities and warfare of this time period “were undoubtedly ‘limited’ in a very real sense.” Furthermore, military leaders were unable to execute the extensive goals of the government. Most historians claim that the ancient régime is classified by indecisiveness. Jeremy Black defines this interpretation as “the standard view.” However, Mr. Black does not agree with this standard view and therefore makes claims of his own …show more content…
Throughout Frederick’s campaign, he “could not spare the time for a lengthy pursuit of a single enemy.” For example, during the Battle of Leuthen, Frederick devastated the enemy by killing 10,000 Austrians and taking 12,000 more as prisoners.” However, Frederick had lost 6,000 of his own and could not effectively pursue and destroy the retreating Army. In most battles however, Frederick “usually lost more men than his enemies.” The time-consuming aspect of siege warfare further inhibited the Prussians from executing a decisive campaign. Even in situations where the Allies defeated the Prussians, they failed to exploit the victory. The battle of Kunersdorf caused 19,000 Prussians to be killed or wounded and another 26,000 to scatter. Frederick’s army was absolutely devastated and had no means to defend itself. However, instead of pursuing Frederick and creating a decisive battle, “the Russian and Austrian commanders debated strategy and operations.” The Allied commanders’ lack of determination and willpower allowed Frederick to rebuild and renew his