Rene Descartes was …show more content…
There are traditionally two answers to this problem that have been widely accepted. The first one by Descartes is that the sameness of person over time is the sameness in soul over time. The soul is essentially a non-physical thinking substance that is distinct from the body. For person A and B to be the similar to person B “it is necessary for A and B to have the same soul. Sameness of the body is not relevant to personal identity. Person A could have a completely different body than B but still be the same if they share the same soul. I agree with because, like the saying goes it’s not what’s on the inside but the outside that counts. Now Locke was completely revolutionary, he essentially rejected Descartes theory and came up with a completely different account. Locke said that to be the same person you do not have to have the same soul or body but the same consciousness. Locke is famous for his concept of “tabula rasa” which means clean slate, he is saying that a child is born into the world innocent and forms his/her personal identity through experiences in their life. What Locke means by sameness of consciousness is that a later person B must exhibit the same consciousness as person A did and this only applies if the later person can remember person A’s thoughts and actions. We can see the different accounts that made both Descartes and Locke famous …show more content…
That being said, I do not completely disagree with Locke, but he does have some flaws with his theory and Thomas Reid raised some concerns for Locke. Reid used the example of a young lieutenant in the military, which could remember what he did as a child. Let’s say that when he was younger, he remembers cheating on a test, but then when he became a general, he remembers what he did as a lieutenant but cannot remember his childhood. He had completely forgotten the time when he cheated on the test. So if memory constitutes personal identity, then the lieutenant is the same person as the child and the general is the same person as the lieutenant but the old general is not the same person as the child. This happens to be a contradiction because if identity is a transit of memories, then A is identical with B and B is identical with C, A is then also identical with C. This is why I argue with Locke’s theory because if you cannot remember what you did as a child, a year ago, six months ago, yesterday; does this mean you are not the same person because we may sometimes forget