Hart thus engages with this thought and successfully forces the reader to consider his or her view of God and goodness in relation to evil. Hart earned his BA from University of Maryland, and went on to earn an MA and PhD from the University of Virginia in philosophy. Since, he as taught at the University of Virginia, the University of St. Thomas (Minnesota), Duke Divinity School, and Loyola College in Maryland. The book in review is his second full work, though he has written many articles. In fact, The Doors of the Sea is an expansion on articles he wrote; one for the Wall Street Journal, Tremors of Doubt, and the other for First Things, Tsunamis and Theodicy. Though his places of employment are not religious in nature, he himself is of the Eastern Orthodox faith. Thus, some of his works have been questioned by Protestant philosophers and thinkers. The Doors to the Sea could be considered such work as he does write from a strong Eastern Orthodox viewpoint. This is to his advantage and disadvantage. The Eastern Orthodox tradition has a specific canon to call upon, making the argument …show more content…
Hart presumes a knowledge of him and his works, especially The Brothers Karamazov. For those interested in further reading, this book is worthwhile despite the near 1,000 pages; Hart is not writing for the layman but for the educated. The premise of Ivan Karamazov’s argument, though as Hart argues is profoundly Christian, is a rejection of creation as to say: existence is not worth the evil one endures, calling upon the young girl who is beaten by her parents; it would be better for her not to live. This is the incorrect response according to Hart. He thus engages with Mackie’s argument and, though not explicitly stated, Plantinga’s, in regards to the idea of free will and evil coexisting with a, presumably good, God. Christianity equates perfect goodness (God) to perfect love (God), yet the church insufficiently addressed what the former meant and thus perverted what the latter means. Hart engages with the thought that God can will evil to bring about his own goodness and renders the argument useless. God is perfect goodness and is infinitely free, therefore he cannot will evil: “it is impossible for the infinite God of love directly of positivelt to will evil (physical or moral), even in a provisional or transitory way: and this is because he is infinitely free” (70). But he cannot render one course of action impossible since that