The problem of evil arises in both of the philosophical arguments by Gottfried Leibniz and J. L. Mackie, as they attempt to argue for and against the existence of God. The title of Leibniz’s book, Theodicy, translates into “the vindication of God’s power and goodness despite the existence of evil,” and so Leibniz attempts to solve the problem of evil through his work (Martin 313). Mackie’s work, Evil and Omnipotence, sets forth a strong thesis in his argument challenging religious belief in God. Despite the problem of evil in the world, it is still rational to believe in the existence of God. Mackie argues the problem of evil in his philosophy, as he believes God cannot exist in the way theists believe him to be. While he maintains this belief,
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In Leibniz’s answer to Objection I’s prosyllogism, he claims evil complements a greater good. Mackie finds fault with the argument, which he argues against in his first fallacious solution that states there is no good without evil or good and evil are counterparts. It puts a limit on what an omnipotent being can do, and denies good and evil as logical counterparts, meaning God could have created an all good world if everything does not need a counterpart. Moreover, Leibniz goes on to say in the same passage that small wounds and imperfections must happen in order to bring about a larger victories and greater perfection. Mackie refutes this in his second fallacious solution, which says evil must occur so good can happen. This too puts a restriction of God’s power because if good is the result of evil then God would be subject to the laws of nature, or causal laws. Leibniz claims the allowance of evil in the world bring about a greater good. Mackie uses his third fallacious solution: a world would be better with some evil, over a world with no evil in it at all, to object to Leibniz. He asserts evil must happen first in order to make good look better, but a good and omnipotent being would not let …show more content…
He accomplishes this by proving that it is at least possible for each of the three claims in Mackie’s thesis to be consistent with one another. Leibniz concedes to the premise that the world contains evil created by God and that a world without evil or no world at all is dependent on God’s own free will. Thus, the best plan may not include the absence of evil, as it remains possible that evil may complement a greater good. This demonstrates how causal law does not restrict God, since it is possible for smaller wounds and imperfections lead to greater victory and perfection. For this reason Leibniz references a comment made by fellow philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas, “that the permitting of evil tends to the good of the universe” (317). His argument then stands to show that a world created by God with evil in it might be better than a world where evil ceases to exist. Moreover, since the existence of evil in this world leads to an even greater good it can be proven possible that this world is better than any other possible world. The validity of each of these answers given by Leibniz speaks to the possibility of consistence between God’s omnipotence and goodness and the problem of evil objected by Mackie’s thesis and first three fallacious solutions, and supports rational belief in the existence of
In Leibniz’s answer to Objection I’s prosyllogism, he claims evil complements a greater good. Mackie finds fault with the argument, which he argues against in his first fallacious solution that states there is no good without evil or good and evil are counterparts. It puts a limit on what an omnipotent being can do, and denies good and evil as logical counterparts, meaning God could have created an all good world if everything does not need a counterpart. Moreover, Leibniz goes on to say in the same passage that small wounds and imperfections must happen in order to bring about a larger victories and greater perfection. Mackie refutes this in his second fallacious solution, which says evil must occur so good can happen. This too puts a restriction of God’s power because if good is the result of evil then God would be subject to the laws of nature, or causal laws. Leibniz claims the allowance of evil in the world bring about a greater good. Mackie uses his third fallacious solution: a world would be better with some evil, over a world with no evil in it at all, to object to Leibniz. He asserts evil must happen first in order to make good look better, but a good and omnipotent being would not let …show more content…
He accomplishes this by proving that it is at least possible for each of the three claims in Mackie’s thesis to be consistent with one another. Leibniz concedes to the premise that the world contains evil created by God and that a world without evil or no world at all is dependent on God’s own free will. Thus, the best plan may not include the absence of evil, as it remains possible that evil may complement a greater good. This demonstrates how causal law does not restrict God, since it is possible for smaller wounds and imperfections lead to greater victory and perfection. For this reason Leibniz references a comment made by fellow philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas, “that the permitting of evil tends to the good of the universe” (317). His argument then stands to show that a world created by God with evil in it might be better than a world where evil ceases to exist. Moreover, since the existence of evil in this world leads to an even greater good it can be proven possible that this world is better than any other possible world. The validity of each of these answers given by Leibniz speaks to the possibility of consistence between God’s omnipotence and goodness and the problem of evil objected by Mackie’s thesis and first three fallacious solutions, and supports rational belief in the existence of