Hobart’s Conditional Analysis of Power:
At the beginning of the article, Hobart establishes that he does not intend to tamper with the meaning of free will or determinism for it would be “unpardonable”. However, it is my belief that his efforts result in adjusting the definition of free will (intentionally or accidentally), which he defines …show more content…
If determinism is true, then it means that each and every action is ultimately caused by past events in such a way where, according to the laws of nature, they lead to one and only one effect - as is suggested by D’Holbach in the above example. With Hobart’s argument for power, this person who chooses not to drink the water has demonstrated free will because he is capable of drinking of the water even though, given the state of the universe and the laws of nature, he could never have made that decision. If our actions are determined by reasons as determinists claim, then I see no reason to believe that having the power to do something is sufficient to prove that he has free will as this man could not have been compelled to any other choice in the current state of the …show more content…
As a final twist on our poisoned water scenario, let’s presume that this man is determined to purify the water and return it to being drinkable, yet has none of the necessary resources. Based on the standard form of the conditional analysis of power, it is clear that this person does not have the power to purify the water. This scenario also raises question to the reliability of treating power as a natural law as there is no longer a direct correlation between the wish--will--act series as Hobart claims.
Conclusion:
Hobart’s argument for the conditional analysis of power presents a solid foundation in support of compatibilism, though it is not without its flaws. I believe he makes a strong argument in favor of a natural law of power that aligns with both free will as well as determinism. However, his arguments have not convinced me that the conditional analysis of power is an accurate representation of what it means to have free will and is not sufficient enough to justify compatibilism between free will and