I tend to disagree with this sentiment on the grounds that implicit bias is a perfectly fitting example that would seem to completely refute their conception of conscious endorsement. If you consider the way children inherit biases as a result of their environmental surroundings (i.e. parents, peers, role models, etc.), it is far more clear to see that people can (and quite often do) adopt potentially unconscious sentiments from their surroundings. This fundamental aspect of extended mind seems to be unnecessary in its application. In other words, if to consciously endorse a belief is a wholefully necessary component of said belief, then an entire world of implicit (non-consciously endorsed) beliefs then become null to the argument, which I think is not a positive proponent of extended mind theory by any means. Rather, if the fourth component was done away with, then the social extension model would apply just as fitting as their primary example, that is, of Otto’s mind
I tend to disagree with this sentiment on the grounds that implicit bias is a perfectly fitting example that would seem to completely refute their conception of conscious endorsement. If you consider the way children inherit biases as a result of their environmental surroundings (i.e. parents, peers, role models, etc.), it is far more clear to see that people can (and quite often do) adopt potentially unconscious sentiments from their surroundings. This fundamental aspect of extended mind seems to be unnecessary in its application. In other words, if to consciously endorse a belief is a wholefully necessary component of said belief, then an entire world of implicit (non-consciously endorsed) beliefs then become null to the argument, which I think is not a positive proponent of extended mind theory by any means. Rather, if the fourth component was done away with, then the social extension model would apply just as fitting as their primary example, that is, of Otto’s mind