The extended mind hypothesis argues that processes external to our physical brain can still constitute as part of our cognitive and mental practices, thereby breaking down the barriers which maintain that cognition is solely internal to our self. The main thrust of the extended mind hypothesis is that if the only distinction between two practices is that one is internal to the mind and the other is external, then they should be correlated as cognitively equivalent. This is because the internality or externality of a mental process is not vital to the actual 'function' of a procedure or to any of its fundamental characteristics. Clark and Chalmers define extended cognition as a 'coupled system' (Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind
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One such example may be the claim that the features of extended cognition, such as Otto's notebook, are not 'conscious', (Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.10) whereas the mind is. But this criterion for cognition cannot hold as there are cases in which the mind is not necessarily conscious, but can still cognise. Another example is the argument that the instruments used in extended cognition are not actually part of you and therefore not 'portable', (Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.10) this ultimately recedes into an argument that extended cognition is not as reliable1 and as easily accessible.(Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.15) In contrast to internal cognition in which one can access their cognitive capacities wherever and whenever, extended cognition can be more difficult to access, if the instruments are distinct from you, therefore making it less dependable. However, this seems dependent on some kind of contingency scale of things which are more or less likely to be with you at all times, but if your extended apparatuses have been with you whenever necessary, …show more content…
(Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.58) Although Clark and Chalmers easily discredit certain refutations of the extended mind hypothesis as unimportant, there are several fine-grained differences between internal and external processes. If we focus on the example of Otto and Inga a number of differences appear, for example, Inga is able to deduce the location of the museum without reference to any external or socially 'derived' (Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.55) notions, such as language or symbols, whereas Otto does. Otto's notebook, which supposedly plays the same role as Inga's memory, are clearly not equivalent in their mental states (desires and beliefs) and Otto's actual mental states are derived in a way which is very different from Inga's. Also, the process of resurfacing the belief of the location of the Museum involves motor actions in Otto's case, but not in Inga's case.(Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.56) Although the ultimate behavior may be the same, as are the functions of Inga's memory and
One such example may be the claim that the features of extended cognition, such as Otto's notebook, are not 'conscious', (Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.10) whereas the mind is. But this criterion for cognition cannot hold as there are cases in which the mind is not necessarily conscious, but can still cognise. Another example is the argument that the instruments used in extended cognition are not actually part of you and therefore not 'portable', (Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.10) this ultimately recedes into an argument that extended cognition is not as reliable1 and as easily accessible.(Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind Hypothesis, 1998, Oxford University Press, p.15) In contrast to internal cognition in which one can access their cognitive capacities wherever and whenever, extended cognition can be more difficult to access, if the instruments are distinct from you, therefore making it less dependable. However, this seems dependent on some kind of contingency scale of things which are more or less likely to be with you at all times, but if your extended apparatuses have been with you whenever necessary, …show more content…
(Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.58) Although Clark and Chalmers easily discredit certain refutations of the extended mind hypothesis as unimportant, there are several fine-grained differences between internal and external processes. If we focus on the example of Otto and Inga a number of differences appear, for example, Inga is able to deduce the location of the museum without reference to any external or socially 'derived' (Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.55) notions, such as language or symbols, whereas Otto does. Otto's notebook, which supposedly plays the same role as Inga's memory, are clearly not equivalent in their mental states (desires and beliefs) and Otto's actual mental states are derived in a way which is very different from Inga's. Also, the process of resurfacing the belief of the location of the Museum involves motor actions in Otto's case, but not in Inga's case.(Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken; The bounds of cognition; Philosophical Psychology, 2001, p.56) Although the ultimate behavior may be the same, as are the functions of Inga's memory and