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18 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Mapp v. Ohio
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The exclusionary rule applies to the states through the 14th amendment
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Katz
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2 prong test - 1) person has manifested actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and 2) expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as (objectively) reasonable
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Illinois v Gates
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totality of the circumstances determines whether an Informants tip is sufficient basis for probable cause
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Chimel v California
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Search Incident to Arrest - police may search area within the suspects immediate control (wingspan) from which he may draw a weapon or destroy evidence
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California v. Carney
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diminished expectation of privacy - the court held that a search of a parked motor home without a search warrant was valid based on probable cause that marijuana was inside
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California v. Acevedo
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court held that closed containers in the trunk of a car may be searched based on probable cause that they contain particular evidence of a crime. Note-this overrides the container doctrine which requires warrant to search closed containers that are not in an auto.
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Whren
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Any traffic offense committed by a driver is a legitimate legal basis for a traffic stop
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Arizona v. Hicks
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if police officer, while lawfully in the suspects home, sees what he has probable cause to believe is contraband or evidence of a crime, the officer may seize the object
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Colorado v. Bertine
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the court allowed a warrantless search of an entire vehicle, including closed containers pursuant to an inventory search after impound of a vehicle - the "special needs" were the safety of the officers in the impound and the need to dispel accusations of theft against officers
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Massiah
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"Deliberate elicitation" of incriminating remarks by government agent is unconstitutional in the absence of counsel once formal adversarial proceedings have begun.
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US v Henry
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statements made in violation of the right to counsel are inadmissible for ANY purpose - contrast with statements made without Miranda warnings which are admissible for impeachment purposes. Court - statement made in jail cell where informant paid on contingency, implied he definitely deliberately elicited.
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Miranda
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All statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the suspect is given these (or substantially similar) four warnings: 1) right to remain silent 2) right to attorney 3) anything you do or say will be held against you 4) if poor, attorney provided
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Edwards v. Arizona
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Suspect may retract his waiver of attorney at any time and interrogation must them immediately cease until counsel is present.
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Davis v. US
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the problem is that the police initiated the conversation, suspect must "unambiguously" request counsel
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Moran v Burbine
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a waiver is NOT invalid even though it is made without consulting a lawyer, and even where the police do not inform the suspect that the lawyer is trying to reach him, and even when the police prevent the lawyer from accessing the client
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Illinois v Perkins
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Statements made to an undercover agent while in jail on an unrelated charge were admissible because there can be no coercion if the suspect doesn't know that he is talking to police
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Rhode Island v. Innis
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interrogation - words or actions on the part of the police that a reasonable police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. (Massiah was deliberate and this is likely to)
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Oregon v. Elstad
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court held that a second (Mirandized) admission, made after the first (non-Mirandized) admission was admissible as long as it was knowingly and voluntarily made.
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