While there have been numerous perspectives and pathways to explain what causes wars, some theories are more substantial than others. Of the three different levels of analysis, the domestic level, followed by the systemic level of analysis, is much more coherent and compelling at explaining what causes major war than the individual or small group level of analysis. According to Copeland, major wars are, “wars that involve a vast majority of powers in a system and where there is a possibility that a great power may be eliminated form a system in its sovereignty.” This essay will illustrate that the strengths of the domestic and systemic levels of analysis, not only outweigh the weaknesses of both, but also the strengths and weaknesses of
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This level assumes, “that a certain national attribute (or some combination of attributes) influences the way in which states behave,” (Cashman 124). In all three cases, the initiator of the war had ulterior motives and propelling factors that led to the respective initiation. Perhaps the strongest theories within this level are John Kershaw’s intentionalist and structuralist theories of war. The former theory lays out the idea that the state initiated war with, “fixed ideas in the sphere of foreign policy,” while the latter focuses more on “opportunity and improvisation,” (Kershaw 132). The combination of these two theories presents the most compelling over-encompassing explanation for causes of war, as fixed plans can be aided and improved by aking advantage of different …show more content…
“Before 1914, Germany sought a wider sphere of influence or empire,” partially, in order to limit Russia’s potential power, thus proving Germany’s initial intentions for aggression to achieve what they want (van Evera 66). They had fixed plans for a European war, as seen in the Schlieffen Plan, but a localized one. Before the Great War, the two Balkan Crises left central Europe in unrest, especially Serbia (Schurman 6). In both of these crises, Austria-Hungary had the opportunity to take advantage of the unrest in neighboring Serbia, but an Austro-Serbian war presented obstacles to Germany’s own plans and caused them more problems, thus proving why Germany urged Austria-Hungary to wait (Copeland Lecture). At a certain point in this time period, the German authorities were able to see that the British would likely get involved, which they had hoped would not be the case. Since this aspect was not initially part of their plan, they needed to improvise. They had already tried to test the relatively new Anglo-French alliance with the Moroccan Crises, but it was no use; the British would likely get involved in their conflict. In order to effectively go up against the British, the Germans needed a strong navy (Copeland Lecture). They were in the process of building the Kiel Canal, but without its completion,
This level assumes, “that a certain national attribute (or some combination of attributes) influences the way in which states behave,” (Cashman 124). In all three cases, the initiator of the war had ulterior motives and propelling factors that led to the respective initiation. Perhaps the strongest theories within this level are John Kershaw’s intentionalist and structuralist theories of war. The former theory lays out the idea that the state initiated war with, “fixed ideas in the sphere of foreign policy,” while the latter focuses more on “opportunity and improvisation,” (Kershaw 132). The combination of these two theories presents the most compelling over-encompassing explanation for causes of war, as fixed plans can be aided and improved by aking advantage of different …show more content…
“Before 1914, Germany sought a wider sphere of influence or empire,” partially, in order to limit Russia’s potential power, thus proving Germany’s initial intentions for aggression to achieve what they want (van Evera 66). They had fixed plans for a European war, as seen in the Schlieffen Plan, but a localized one. Before the Great War, the two Balkan Crises left central Europe in unrest, especially Serbia (Schurman 6). In both of these crises, Austria-Hungary had the opportunity to take advantage of the unrest in neighboring Serbia, but an Austro-Serbian war presented obstacles to Germany’s own plans and caused them more problems, thus proving why Germany urged Austria-Hungary to wait (Copeland Lecture). At a certain point in this time period, the German authorities were able to see that the British would likely get involved, which they had hoped would not be the case. Since this aspect was not initially part of their plan, they needed to improvise. They had already tried to test the relatively new Anglo-French alliance with the Moroccan Crises, but it was no use; the British would likely get involved in their conflict. In order to effectively go up against the British, the Germans needed a strong navy (Copeland Lecture). They were in the process of building the Kiel Canal, but without its completion,