This paper will center on the nature of diachronic personal identity; specifically, bodily continuity personal identity as my stance. I will define a person, and explain the difference between synchronic and diachronic thoughts of personal identity. Next, I will analyze Lock’s stance on synchronic and diachronic personal identity. Afterward, I will analyze Reid’s perspective & objections against Lock’s view of diachronic personal identity. Per the objections outlined by Reid, I will explicate the objection involving our inability to remember events of our earliest childhood and the objection from the old general analysis. Last, I will expand on my stance on what is necessary in diachronic personal identity for a person and I will conclude my
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To clarify, we might seem to recall things that did not actually happened to us; hence, this may be inform of dreams or illusions (Green, 2015). This aspect of experience of remembering something that happens in dream is excluded in the perspective of diachronic personal identity; hence, this kind of memory from dreams might be classified as apparent memory, while the real memory we can recall is termed genuine memory (Green, 2015). Considering the Lock’s theory of diachronic personal identity below:
“Person stage P1 is a stage of the same person as person-stage P2 if and only if P2 can genuinely remember experiences had by P1” (Green, …show more content…
Here I would consider Reid’s question and objection irrelevant, so long as the theory illustrates the concept of memory links. Furthermore, Reid may ask, how would you describe somebody who had conceived a brain disease that he barely remembers anything, let alone making connections over the stages of his life be regarded as the same person with regard to memory links over time? Indeed, the question above seems to pose a problem for diachronic personal identity. This question maybe answered by including body and nervous system in the definition of the diachronic personal identity, which goes this way: if the person with a brain damage had possessed the same body and nervous system; therefore, both individuals’ stages are classified as one person. for instance, to identify a criminal case, we generally use finger print, to tender justice; so, if his finger print shows the same biological marker, as the earlier stage, surely the present stage of the criminal is still the same person irrespective of any condition. Vividly, the theory below summarizes the bodily continuity personal
To clarify, we might seem to recall things that did not actually happened to us; hence, this may be inform of dreams or illusions (Green, 2015). This aspect of experience of remembering something that happens in dream is excluded in the perspective of diachronic personal identity; hence, this kind of memory from dreams might be classified as apparent memory, while the real memory we can recall is termed genuine memory (Green, 2015). Considering the Lock’s theory of diachronic personal identity below:
“Person stage P1 is a stage of the same person as person-stage P2 if and only if P2 can genuinely remember experiences had by P1” (Green, …show more content…
Here I would consider Reid’s question and objection irrelevant, so long as the theory illustrates the concept of memory links. Furthermore, Reid may ask, how would you describe somebody who had conceived a brain disease that he barely remembers anything, let alone making connections over the stages of his life be regarded as the same person with regard to memory links over time? Indeed, the question above seems to pose a problem for diachronic personal identity. This question maybe answered by including body and nervous system in the definition of the diachronic personal identity, which goes this way: if the person with a brain damage had possessed the same body and nervous system; therefore, both individuals’ stages are classified as one person. for instance, to identify a criminal case, we generally use finger print, to tender justice; so, if his finger print shows the same biological marker, as the earlier stage, surely the present stage of the criminal is still the same person irrespective of any condition. Vividly, the theory below summarizes the bodily continuity personal