I. Formula of Humanity (FOH): False Promises Fail to Value Humanity as an End in Itself: Promises are invitations of trust involving two reasoners: promisors and promisees. Promisors offer trust by uttering “I promise”. Promisees are recipients of promises that accept trust and reason accordingly. Deceitful promises are false invitations of trust. Deceitful promisors falsely offer trust. Deceived promisees unknowingly accept false invitations of trust and reason accordingly. Kant argues that FOH shows that deceitful promising fails to value humanity as an end in itself. Through an analysis of Kant’s FOH, this section demonstrates that: (I) Humanity is valued an end in itself; (II) Honest promises treat humanity as a means but not merely as
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Reasoners necessarily think of themselves as beings who should be treated in a certain kind of way—namely, we conceive of ourselves as authoritative reasoners. We can exist as an end in itself either: as a subjective regulative end, or as an objective regulative end. The difference is that the former values one’s own humanity as an end in itself, whereas the latter values humanity itself as an end in itself. He argues that humanity is an end in itself as an objective regulative end—it applies for all reasoners (4:428). Hence, we recognize that part of our humanity contains a principle that’s authoritative for us. Humanity is not self-centered, rather, it is universal. Hence, humanity as a regulative end provides us with objective standards of correctness for its own use. Humanity is a regulative end because: (i) all rational beings necessarily have this end; (ii) it is properly connected to the CI principle; (iii) it is an existing end; and (iv) it is an end in itself (4:428). So, valuing humanity as an end itself means that reasoners value the authoritative reasoning of all beings that are classified under the …show more content…
Promisees cannot contain the end of the actions of deceitful promisors because the promisors’s transparency prevents promisees from being reasoners (4:430). There is one end that promisors have that promisees absolutely cannot have themselves—namely, the end of being treated merely as a means (4:430). Hence, promisees cannot contain that promisors are subordinating the value of their humanity to their own self-interest. Promisors are subordinating promisees’s humanity because they are using it merely as a tool of conditional value from self-interest. Deception is not the problem, rather, it is the failure of having mutual consent of deception. So, promisees’s lack of end containment, and promisors’s subordination of humanity to self-interest makes deceitful promises fail to value humanity as an end in
Reasoners necessarily think of themselves as beings who should be treated in a certain kind of way—namely, we conceive of ourselves as authoritative reasoners. We can exist as an end in itself either: as a subjective regulative end, or as an objective regulative end. The difference is that the former values one’s own humanity as an end in itself, whereas the latter values humanity itself as an end in itself. He argues that humanity is an end in itself as an objective regulative end—it applies for all reasoners (4:428). Hence, we recognize that part of our humanity contains a principle that’s authoritative for us. Humanity is not self-centered, rather, it is universal. Hence, humanity as a regulative end provides us with objective standards of correctness for its own use. Humanity is a regulative end because: (i) all rational beings necessarily have this end; (ii) it is properly connected to the CI principle; (iii) it is an existing end; and (iv) it is an end in itself (4:428). So, valuing humanity as an end itself means that reasoners value the authoritative reasoning of all beings that are classified under the …show more content…
Promisees cannot contain the end of the actions of deceitful promisors because the promisors’s transparency prevents promisees from being reasoners (4:430). There is one end that promisors have that promisees absolutely cannot have themselves—namely, the end of being treated merely as a means (4:430). Hence, promisees cannot contain that promisors are subordinating the value of their humanity to their own self-interest. Promisors are subordinating promisees’s humanity because they are using it merely as a tool of conditional value from self-interest. Deception is not the problem, rather, it is the failure of having mutual consent of deception. So, promisees’s lack of end containment, and promisors’s subordination of humanity to self-interest makes deceitful promises fail to value humanity as an end in