In this paper, I will investigate Harry Frankfurt’s arguments and discuss his concepts concerning freewill and determinism as presented in "Freedom of Will and the Concept of Person". Frankfurt presents as well as makes justifiable assertions on several of his arguments, however a few of his reasoning seem to be problematic. I will argue that his arguments are not cogent and are shown to be contradictory. Additionally, I will demonstrate that we are not caused to have freewill or to be free as well as illustrate how his claims on the relationship between freewill and moral responsibility contravenes each other. Frankfurt begins by introducing several crucial definitions. He defines the term ‘first-order desires’ as a desire to act or do
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If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys free will (pg.20). Frankfurt argues that one can be casually determined to have the second-order desires they have and still be considered as having freewill and being free. However, I do not agree with this argument and do not believe that we can be caused to have a freewill or to be free. My position can be defended by focusing on Frankfurt’s definition of freedom of the will, which according to him is when a person is able to will what they want to will and become who they want to be. Nonetheless, if another individual or natural forces or any other external factor influences and manipulates the person’s second-order volitions, then that person’s desires do not become their own and full desires. Thus, the person cannot possess any freewill since their will have been affected by different types of factors and they are unable to choose or will freely on their own values and …show more content…
I demonstrated that we are not caused to have freewill or to be free, due to the fact that according to Frankfurt’s definition of obtaining freewill, we should be able to have the will that we want and is best for us. Therefore freewill should not be influenced by other factors and our wills should come from our own selves. In addition, I illustrated how Frankfurt’s claims on the relationship between freewill and moral responsibility contravenes each other since he states that an individual can be held morally responsible even if they could not have done otherwise. His argument is contradicting because despite the fact that the individual has no freewill and cannot control his will, he is held morally responsible as a result of having second-order desires. Thus, Frankfurt proves to have insufficient reasoning in his arguments when he discusses freewill and determinism with the concept of a
If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys free will (pg.20). Frankfurt argues that one can be casually determined to have the second-order desires they have and still be considered as having freewill and being free. However, I do not agree with this argument and do not believe that we can be caused to have a freewill or to be free. My position can be defended by focusing on Frankfurt’s definition of freedom of the will, which according to him is when a person is able to will what they want to will and become who they want to be. Nonetheless, if another individual or natural forces or any other external factor influences and manipulates the person’s second-order volitions, then that person’s desires do not become their own and full desires. Thus, the person cannot possess any freewill since their will have been affected by different types of factors and they are unable to choose or will freely on their own values and …show more content…
I demonstrated that we are not caused to have freewill or to be free, due to the fact that according to Frankfurt’s definition of obtaining freewill, we should be able to have the will that we want and is best for us. Therefore freewill should not be influenced by other factors and our wills should come from our own selves. In addition, I illustrated how Frankfurt’s claims on the relationship between freewill and moral responsibility contravenes each other since he states that an individual can be held morally responsible even if they could not have done otherwise. His argument is contradicting because despite the fact that the individual has no freewill and cannot control his will, he is held morally responsible as a result of having second-order desires. Thus, Frankfurt proves to have insufficient reasoning in his arguments when he discusses freewill and determinism with the concept of a