Authorization to Deploy Troops to Afghanistan In December of 1979, the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and KGB Chairmen who were three key figures within the Politburo (the Soviet leadership’s highest policy-making government authority under the Communist Party), drafted a memorandum authorizing the use of a large contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This memorandum was quickly signed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee authorizing the use of Soviet combat troops. I contend the Soviets had a Grand Strategy, however; the decision to deploy Soviet troops was in essence the result of the three key influential leaders mentioned above disregarding the counsel of their senior military officers, respected academia,
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The following is a list of the primary reasons that the three key figures considered prior to committing to a large scale military action in Afghanistan: The first reason was the request from the Communist Government of Afghanistan for help from the Soviets because an Afghanistan Army Division had mutinied against the Afghanistan Communist Party in the city of Herat. Although the request was not immediately fulfilled with a large deployment of troops, this incident came into consideration months later when the survival of the communist regime in Afghanistan came into question. Secondly, was the lack of ratification by the United States of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II during the summer of 1979, which the Soviets perceived as a turning away from détente (release from tension) by the United States. Thirdly, NATO was planning to introduce medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The fourth reason was the murder of Nor Taraki the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Afghanistan by Hafixullah Amin, who took power and was considered untrustworthy by the Soviets because he might turn to the Americans. The fifth reason was the thought that a Western-oriented Afghanistan had the possibility of becoming a base for short-range missiles aimed at the Soviets. The sixth reason was that a loss of Afghanistan would be a substantive setback to Soviet standing in the world and a gain for the West. Finally, the General Secretary did not seek other viewpoints to the military internvetion in Afghanistan nor did his three key leaders allow many opposing viewpoints to make it to the General Secretary. There are clearly a number of substantive reasons that led the three key leaders to consider deploying troops. With the exception of one of the seven reasons they all either directly or indirectly tie back to keeping Afghanistan from western affiliation and thereby keeping
The following is a list of the primary reasons that the three key figures considered prior to committing to a large scale military action in Afghanistan: The first reason was the request from the Communist Government of Afghanistan for help from the Soviets because an Afghanistan Army Division had mutinied against the Afghanistan Communist Party in the city of Herat. Although the request was not immediately fulfilled with a large deployment of troops, this incident came into consideration months later when the survival of the communist regime in Afghanistan came into question. Secondly, was the lack of ratification by the United States of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II during the summer of 1979, which the Soviets perceived as a turning away from détente (release from tension) by the United States. Thirdly, NATO was planning to introduce medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The fourth reason was the murder of Nor Taraki the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Afghanistan by Hafixullah Amin, who took power and was considered untrustworthy by the Soviets because he might turn to the Americans. The fifth reason was the thought that a Western-oriented Afghanistan had the possibility of becoming a base for short-range missiles aimed at the Soviets. The sixth reason was that a loss of Afghanistan would be a substantive setback to Soviet standing in the world and a gain for the West. Finally, the General Secretary did not seek other viewpoints to the military internvetion in Afghanistan nor did his three key leaders allow many opposing viewpoints to make it to the General Secretary. There are clearly a number of substantive reasons that led the three key leaders to consider deploying troops. With the exception of one of the seven reasons they all either directly or indirectly tie back to keeping Afghanistan from western affiliation and thereby keeping