Able Archer was a simulated operation organized and conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which spanned a ten day period, from November 2nd to November 11th 1983. It simulated a time of conflict escalation, leading up to a coordinated nuclear attack, and involved an influx of communication, and the participation of several heads of government.
The steady weakening of US-Soviet relations prior to Able Archer, as well as the realistic nature of the exercise, led several members of the Soviet Politburo to believe that Able Archer was a prelude to genuine nuclear confrontation. In response, Soviets prepared ICBM silos and put aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland on alert. These units later disengaged the same day …show more content…
This was both an exercise in psychological warfare, testing the limits of Soviet radar detection and a demonstration of the US’s military capabilities. PSYOPS thus heightened the Soviet fear, and has been argued as a primary reason for the establishment of Operation Ryan.
Other events that deteriorated relations further between the US and USSR was the shooting down of Korean Arilines Flight 007 in mid 1983, a commercial aircraft that the Soviets believed was actually a US measurement and spatial (MASINT) spy plane, as well as Reagan’s establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which the USSR perceived as furthering the “space race.” The events listed previously all aid in understanding the Soviet response to Able Archer. However, the factors that ultimately prompted the Soviets to ready their military assets was the participation of key allies, such as Britain and West Germany, represented by Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl respectively, as well as an influx of coded communication between the US and Britain. This burst of communication one month before Able Archer was thought to be about the operation, but was actually regarding the US invasion of Grenada. Despite the heightening tensions and possibility of Soviet “retaliation”, Able Archer proceeded without escalating to an all-out nuclear confrontation. …show more content…
Both sides did not have a clear understanding of the others intentions and mindset. With the USSR, the biggest error was over estimating the US’s eagerness to participate in a confrontation in the first place. According to Oleg Gordievsky, an ex-KGB agent who defected and worked as a British SIS asset, this perception was influenced by “Communist dogmas, and lethal Soviet paranoia.”
Even without the Soviets defensive stance/As well as this, Operation Ryan was solely focused on intelligence collection, not analysis. Many Soviet analysts, including Gordievsky, were skeptical of the operation, and the chances of a potential nuclear war. However, none of them wanted to risk challenging this overarching view, and were thus required to submit alarming intel, even if they themselves did not see US actions as legitimate
The steady weakening of US-Soviet relations prior to Able Archer, as well as the realistic nature of the exercise, led several members of the Soviet Politburo to believe that Able Archer was a prelude to genuine nuclear confrontation. In response, Soviets prepared ICBM silos and put aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland on alert. These units later disengaged the same day …show more content…
This was both an exercise in psychological warfare, testing the limits of Soviet radar detection and a demonstration of the US’s military capabilities. PSYOPS thus heightened the Soviet fear, and has been argued as a primary reason for the establishment of Operation Ryan.
Other events that deteriorated relations further between the US and USSR was the shooting down of Korean Arilines Flight 007 in mid 1983, a commercial aircraft that the Soviets believed was actually a US measurement and spatial (MASINT) spy plane, as well as Reagan’s establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which the USSR perceived as furthering the “space race.” The events listed previously all aid in understanding the Soviet response to Able Archer. However, the factors that ultimately prompted the Soviets to ready their military assets was the participation of key allies, such as Britain and West Germany, represented by Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl respectively, as well as an influx of coded communication between the US and Britain. This burst of communication one month before Able Archer was thought to be about the operation, but was actually regarding the US invasion of Grenada. Despite the heightening tensions and possibility of Soviet “retaliation”, Able Archer proceeded without escalating to an all-out nuclear confrontation. …show more content…
Both sides did not have a clear understanding of the others intentions and mindset. With the USSR, the biggest error was over estimating the US’s eagerness to participate in a confrontation in the first place. According to Oleg Gordievsky, an ex-KGB agent who defected and worked as a British SIS asset, this perception was influenced by “Communist dogmas, and lethal Soviet paranoia.”
Even without the Soviets defensive stance/As well as this, Operation Ryan was solely focused on intelligence collection, not analysis. Many Soviet analysts, including Gordievsky, were skeptical of the operation, and the chances of a potential nuclear war. However, none of them wanted to risk challenging this overarching view, and were thus required to submit alarming intel, even if they themselves did not see US actions as legitimate