The ‘problem of induction’ has proven to be one of the most enduring problems of epistemology. Since it was first conceived by David Hume in the eighteenth century, numerous philosophers have grappled with the challenge laid before them by Hume, resulting in a splendid amount of attempts to solve or dissolve the problem.The basic problem of induction can be summarized as follows: suppose that we observe a large number of objects with characteristic “A”,noting that all of them also possess characteristic “B”. It is natural for us to conclude that, in all probability, all objects with the trait “A” will also carry trait “B” — including those objects with “A” that have yet to be observed or are not able to be observed. One example to consider
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The inductive inference from 1* to C does seem to be a reasonable inference because given the sorts of observations provided in 1*, C seems very likely to be true (page 101). However, there seems to fault in this case as pointed out by Hume-leading to the problem of induction. The question raised by Hume is: What rational justification is there for making this inference? In a broader aspect, what reason do we have to believe that our conclusions about observed instances may be spread out, even with all probability considered, to include the unobserved instances? The same basic question is most frequently composed in mundane terms: What reason do we have to think that we can draw reliable conclusions about future unobserved instances on the basis of past …show more content…
The fatal weakness with a pragmatic justification of induction is just that it is a pragmatic justification and not an epistemic justification. While it may motivate us to employ a certain strategy of reasoning inductively, it gives us no indication of the actual likelihood of its success meaning whether the inductive principle is true. A true solution to the problem of induction requires an epistemic justification — a reason for believing that induction is reliable — yet Reichenbach’s solution, for all its ingenuity, offers no such
The inductive inference from 1* to C does seem to be a reasonable inference because given the sorts of observations provided in 1*, C seems very likely to be true (page 101). However, there seems to fault in this case as pointed out by Hume-leading to the problem of induction. The question raised by Hume is: What rational justification is there for making this inference? In a broader aspect, what reason do we have to believe that our conclusions about observed instances may be spread out, even with all probability considered, to include the unobserved instances? The same basic question is most frequently composed in mundane terms: What reason do we have to think that we can draw reliable conclusions about future unobserved instances on the basis of past …show more content…
The fatal weakness with a pragmatic justification of induction is just that it is a pragmatic justification and not an epistemic justification. While it may motivate us to employ a certain strategy of reasoning inductively, it gives us no indication of the actual likelihood of its success meaning whether the inductive principle is true. A true solution to the problem of induction requires an epistemic justification — a reason for believing that induction is reliable — yet Reichenbach’s solution, for all its ingenuity, offers no such