The concepts of Mission Command as proposed in U.S. ARMY's Field Manuals is a relatively new concept and has the focus on the Commander's interaction with subordinates and how both conducts operations in the complex scenario of modern combat. Although it is a new doctrine, traces of the employment and the characteristics that consecrate this theory was present in the actions of many leaders of the past.
One example of other time that enshrines and exemplifies the philosophy of Mission Command was the Brazilian military Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, known as "Duque de Caxias". Born on August 25, 1803, he had his baptism of fire in the War of Independence of Brazil against Portuguese rule in some regions of the Empire (1822-1825). Throughout his …show more content…
Divided into two attacking columns, the Paraguayans advanced through northern Argentina and western Brazil, plundering cities and decimating the few militaries resistances they encountered. As the result of this aggression and the constant advance of the Paraguayan forces, on May 1, 1865, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed the treaty of the Triple Alliance, aiming the enemy's defeat.
The first task performed was to interrupt the Paraguayan forward and the troops formed by soldiers from allied countries, under the command of Argentine President, Bartolomeu Mitre, managed to stop the force of enemy attacks. With that, the first phase of the war, the Paraguayan Offensive (1864-1865) ends. The second stage, “Allies’s Counterattack” (1865-66), characterized by the Triple Alliance offensive, pushed the Paraguayans into the interior of their …show more content…
The King's orders were clear, the Field Marshal should create conditions to regain the initiatives of the actions and search for a final defeat of the enemy. The terms for this would be the taken of the Paraguayan capital and the withdrawal of Solano Lopes of power.
When he reached the battlefield, Caxias became surprised by what he saw. He found a complete chaos. After the initial two years of conflict the troops was worn out, with few resources, without proper instruction, plagued by diseases, with practically no animals for Cavalry and for the transport of supplies and with a completely disarticulated chain of supply.
In the subject of operations planning, he saw that Gen Mitre had given vague guidelines about upcoming actions and that there was a complete ignorance of some of the decision factors such as terrain, enemy and how the weather could influence in the military operations. Exacerbating the situation, the only knowledge about the enemy was that the Paraguayan troop’s occupied successive defensive positions and that their headquarters was inside a site almost impenetrable, the fortress of
One example of other time that enshrines and exemplifies the philosophy of Mission Command was the Brazilian military Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, known as "Duque de Caxias". Born on August 25, 1803, he had his baptism of fire in the War of Independence of Brazil against Portuguese rule in some regions of the Empire (1822-1825). Throughout his …show more content…
Divided into two attacking columns, the Paraguayans advanced through northern Argentina and western Brazil, plundering cities and decimating the few militaries resistances they encountered. As the result of this aggression and the constant advance of the Paraguayan forces, on May 1, 1865, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed the treaty of the Triple Alliance, aiming the enemy's defeat.
The first task performed was to interrupt the Paraguayan forward and the troops formed by soldiers from allied countries, under the command of Argentine President, Bartolomeu Mitre, managed to stop the force of enemy attacks. With that, the first phase of the war, the Paraguayan Offensive (1864-1865) ends. The second stage, “Allies’s Counterattack” (1865-66), characterized by the Triple Alliance offensive, pushed the Paraguayans into the interior of their …show more content…
The King's orders were clear, the Field Marshal should create conditions to regain the initiatives of the actions and search for a final defeat of the enemy. The terms for this would be the taken of the Paraguayan capital and the withdrawal of Solano Lopes of power.
When he reached the battlefield, Caxias became surprised by what he saw. He found a complete chaos. After the initial two years of conflict the troops was worn out, with few resources, without proper instruction, plagued by diseases, with practically no animals for Cavalry and for the transport of supplies and with a completely disarticulated chain of supply.
In the subject of operations planning, he saw that Gen Mitre had given vague guidelines about upcoming actions and that there was a complete ignorance of some of the decision factors such as terrain, enemy and how the weather could influence in the military operations. Exacerbating the situation, the only knowledge about the enemy was that the Paraguayan troop’s occupied successive defensive positions and that their headquarters was inside a site almost impenetrable, the fortress of