This qualification for personhood is not related to specie membership, properties, attributes, identities or potentialities as mentioned in earlier cases, but simply rests on the actual possession of the morally significant characteristics. If one can recognize the particular set of characteristics for being considered as a person in an individual entity, then the decision of conferring personhood on that individual entity is straightforward. There are several arguments based on this criterion which propose the kind of characteristics one should look out for in a person. These arguments have one thing in common: foetuses are not person from the beginning but they acquire personhood and become a person at certain point in time. Below, we are going to address six examples how foetuses’ personhood can be interpreted in terms of acquired personhood. Then we propose two versions of personhood argument by Warren and Tooley, following with the Boonin's improved desire
This qualification for personhood is not related to specie membership, properties, attributes, identities or potentialities as mentioned in earlier cases, but simply rests on the actual possession of the morally significant characteristics. If one can recognize the particular set of characteristics for being considered as a person in an individual entity, then the decision of conferring personhood on that individual entity is straightforward. There are several arguments based on this criterion which propose the kind of characteristics one should look out for in a person. These arguments have one thing in common: foetuses are not person from the beginning but they acquire personhood and become a person at certain point in time. Below, we are going to address six examples how foetuses’ personhood can be interpreted in terms of acquired personhood. Then we propose two versions of personhood argument by Warren and Tooley, following with the Boonin's improved desire