Zhiyuan Li
Philosophy 2367
Accepting Non-Human Animals as Our Moral Equals
In her essay Speaking of Animal Rights, Warren (1987) argues for the weak animal rights position, which holds that non-human animals have weaker rights than us human beings because they do not have the same moral status as us (383-4). This is due to their lack of ability to “reason well enough to function as autonomous moral agents” (385), which she believes is a requirement for being moral equals of human beings (384-5). In this essay, I will argue that Warren’s weak animal rights position indeed misses the entire point about speaking of animal rights by basing moral equality and rights merely on rationality and assigning only some moral rights to non-human animals. …show more content…
Of course, it does not mean that non-human animals are our morally superiors; the only possible answer is that they are our morally interiors – this is morally problematic in two ways. First, since non-human animals are morally interior than human beings, it follows that when the interests of non-human animals and human beings come into conflicts, it is always morally right to sacrifice the interests of non-human animals for the interest of human beings. This undermines Warren’s own view that non-human animals “should not be killed without good reason” (388), because one good reason to kill non-human animals may well be the needs and interests of human beings. Each year, billions of non-human animals are killed for food, clothing and other purposes, and if we are to accept Warren’s position, it’s hard to identify any reason to alter people’s practice of mass slaughtering – such practice may even be morally preferable as non-human animals are just moral interiors of human …show more content…
I believe what’s wrong with Warren’s position is that she mistakenly regards the capability to reason as the necessary condition for non-human animals to acquire the same moral status as human beings. Instead, just like human beings, non-human animals are entitled to dignified existence because they are born with desires to fulfil, and more importantly, with certain central capabilities to perform, which go beyond the mere capability to reason. Nussbaum (2006) gives a famous list of these capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one's environment (393-400). It will be seriously bad if any entity, including both human beings and non-human animals, does not have the opportunities to carry out her or its inherent capabilities, and is therefore unable to live a life that is worthy of its dignified existence. In this way, we can and should accept non-human animals as our moral equals in virtue of their entitlement to dignified existence just like us. It follows that we ought to grant them full moral rights so that they will be able to pursue their desires and realize their central capabilities to live such a life worthy of dignified existence just as we
Philosophy 2367
Accepting Non-Human Animals as Our Moral Equals
In her essay Speaking of Animal Rights, Warren (1987) argues for the weak animal rights position, which holds that non-human animals have weaker rights than us human beings because they do not have the same moral status as us (383-4). This is due to their lack of ability to “reason well enough to function as autonomous moral agents” (385), which she believes is a requirement for being moral equals of human beings (384-5). In this essay, I will argue that Warren’s weak animal rights position indeed misses the entire point about speaking of animal rights by basing moral equality and rights merely on rationality and assigning only some moral rights to non-human animals. …show more content…
Of course, it does not mean that non-human animals are our morally superiors; the only possible answer is that they are our morally interiors – this is morally problematic in two ways. First, since non-human animals are morally interior than human beings, it follows that when the interests of non-human animals and human beings come into conflicts, it is always morally right to sacrifice the interests of non-human animals for the interest of human beings. This undermines Warren’s own view that non-human animals “should not be killed without good reason” (388), because one good reason to kill non-human animals may well be the needs and interests of human beings. Each year, billions of non-human animals are killed for food, clothing and other purposes, and if we are to accept Warren’s position, it’s hard to identify any reason to alter people’s practice of mass slaughtering – such practice may even be morally preferable as non-human animals are just moral interiors of human …show more content…
I believe what’s wrong with Warren’s position is that she mistakenly regards the capability to reason as the necessary condition for non-human animals to acquire the same moral status as human beings. Instead, just like human beings, non-human animals are entitled to dignified existence because they are born with desires to fulfil, and more importantly, with certain central capabilities to perform, which go beyond the mere capability to reason. Nussbaum (2006) gives a famous list of these capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one's environment (393-400). It will be seriously bad if any entity, including both human beings and non-human animals, does not have the opportunities to carry out her or its inherent capabilities, and is therefore unable to live a life that is worthy of its dignified existence. In this way, we can and should accept non-human animals as our moral equals in virtue of their entitlement to dignified existence just like us. It follows that we ought to grant them full moral rights so that they will be able to pursue their desires and realize their central capabilities to live such a life worthy of dignified existence just as we