Philosophy Of The Human Mind

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Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia

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In this chapter Frank Jackson defends epiphenomenalism. This is the belief that consciousness is caused by, but not the same thing as, brain activity. Brain activity causes consciousness, but consciousness has no affect on physical process. In other words, consciousness has no causal powers.

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Defense of Dualism. Knowledge Argument A

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Knowledge Argument A: Fred1) Imagine a person named Fred who has the ability to distinguish colors more sharply than others. Where we would see apples of the same color of red, Fred could see red1 and red2.2) We can know that there are underlying physical causes for Fred’s ability, say more sensitive cones in his eyes.3) We can know the underlying physical cause of Fred seeing red1 and red 2, but we cannot know what it is like to see red1 or red2.4) Because we can know all the underlying physical facts about Fred’s visual ability but not know the fact of what it is like to see red1 and red 2, there must be more than just physical facts in the world.5) Thus physicalism is false.

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Defense of Dualism Argument B

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Knowledge Argument B: Mary1) Mary knows all the physical facts of how our brain and optic structure perceives the color red.2) Mary has lived in a black and white room all of her life so she has never seen the color red.3) One day Mary walks outside and sees something red.4) Mary has learned a new fact, namely, what it is like to see something red.5) Since Mary already knew all the physical facts of seeing red this knew fact of what it is like to see red must not be physical.6) Thus physicalism is false.

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Defense of Dualsim Modal Argument

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Modal Argument1) It is possible to be skeptical of everyone’s consciousness other than our own.2) This means it is possible for there to be people who act just like humans, but who have no consciousness.3) Therefore, there is more to us than merely our physical bodies.

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Defense of Dualism: What it's like to be?

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1) There is something that it is like to be a bat.2) No amount of physical information can tell us what it is like to be a bat.3) There must be more information rather than physical information.4) Thus, physicalism is false.

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The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism

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Is there any really good reason for refusing to countenance the idea that qualia are casually impotent with respect to the physical world? Jackson thinks the answer is no. He is supporting the idea of epiphenomenalism.

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Reasons for rejecting epiphenomenalism

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Reason 1:It is obvious that the hurtfulness of pain is partly responsible for us avoiding pain.

Response: A can be the cause of B and C, but B could have no causal relationship to A. So, C-fiber stimulation (A) could cause pain (B) and avoidance behavior ( C ). This would make C-fiber stimulation responsible for pain and avoidance behavior leaving pain with no role to play in avoidance behavior.

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Reasons for rejecting epiphenomenalism:Reason 2

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Reason 2: According to natural selection the traits that evolve over time are those conducive to physical survival. We may assume that qualia evolved over time. Thus, conscious events, including qualia, must have some causal role in the survival of humans.Response: Polar bears have thick coats which is conducive to their survival. They are also heavy, which is not conducive to their survival. But the heaviness of the coat comes with the warmth of the coat. So it could be with qualia. Subjective experience happens to come along with certain brain processes whose main function has to do with our survival. Consciousness is a property that comes along with it, even though it has no direct influence on our survival.

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Reason for rejecting epiphenomenalism reason 3

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Reason 3: We know about other minds because of their behavior. That is why we think that stones do not feel and dogs do feel. But how can a person’s behavior provide any reason for believing he has qualia like mine, or indeed many qualia at all, unless this behavior can be regarded as the outcome of the qualia?

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Reasons for rejecting epiphenomenalism response

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Response: The Times reports the Spurs won. This is evidence that The Telegraph has also reported that the Spurs won even though the Times did not cause the Telegraph to report the story. The epiphenomenalist allow that qualia are effects of what goes on in the brain. Qualia cause nothing physical. Hence it can be argued from the behavior of others to the qualia of others by arguing from the behavior of others back to its causes in the brains of others and out again to their qualia.

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Saul's Kripke Naming and Necessity

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Descartes argued that a person or mind is distinct from their body since the mind could exist without the body. Now the one response which Kripke regards a plainly inadmissible is the response which accepts the Cartesian premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Such a response assumes that the relationship between the mind and body is contingent, rather than necessary. Kripke says this is inadmissible. Let “Descartes” be a name, or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let B be a rigid designator of his body. Then if “Descartes” were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity, being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes.This case is not comparable to the alleged analogue, the identity of the first Postmaster General with the inventor of bifocals. True, this identity obtains despite the fact that there could have been a first Postmaster General even though bifocals had never been invented. The reason is that “the inventor of bifocals” is not a rigid designator; a world in which no one invented bifocals is not a world in which Franklin did not exist. The alleged analogy therefore collapses; a philosopher who wishes to refute the Cartesian conclusion must refute the Cartesian premise, and the latter task is not trivial.

Here is why it is not trivial: Some philosophers say that the relationship between the mind and the body is analogues to the relationship between heat and molecular motion. But it isn’t analogous. We first learn of heat from our sensation of heat. But our sensation of heat is only contingently related to actual heat. Heat it turns out, is the same thing as molecular motion. This is necessarily true, not contingently true. In other words, there are possible worlds where there is heat without the sensation of heat. Just consider the universe before creatures who had heat sensation. So, the sensation of heat is contingently related to the heat. But heat is necessarily related to molecules in motion.So, we have 1) heat sensation, and 2) heat, and 3) molecules in motion. 1) is contingently related 2). 2) is necessarily related to 3). This explains why heat and molecular motion seem like they are contingently related, but their relationship is necessary.This is NOT the case with pain and C-fiber stimulation in the brain.So, we have 1) pain sensation, and 2) pain, and 3) C-fiber stimulation 1) is NECESSARILY related to 2). We have no reason for our intuition that pain could exist without C-fiber stimulation. We have no reason for our intuition that this relationship is contingent.

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Rodrick Chisholm Intentional Inexistence

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Brentano believed that psychological phenomena are characterized by intentional inexistence. This can be described as a relation to a content, direction upon an object. This is unique to mental phenomena. Physical things do not have intentionality.

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Brentano's Thesis in three parts

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Brentano’s thesis in three parts:1) Mental phenomena are intentional states. Intentionality has to do with being directed toward something. The idea is that mental phenomena are the result of a subject attending to, or directed toward an object. 2) Mental phenomena exhibit intentional inexistence. That is to say the object of our attention do not exist in the external world. Mental phenomena are not physical. 3) Only mental phenomena exhibit such intentional inexistence. This distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena.

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Intentional states

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Psychological attitudes such as desiring, hoping, wishing, seeking, believing, and assuming. When Brentano said that these attitudes “intentionally contain an object in themselves,” he was referring to the fact that they can be truly said to “have objects” even though the objects which they can be said to have do not in fact exist.

Diogenes could have looked for an honest man even if there hadn’t been any honest men. A horse can desire to be fed even though the horse won’t be fed. James could believe there are tigers in India, and take something in India to be a tiger, even if there aren’t any tigers in India. But physical phenomena cannot intentionally contain objects in themselves. In order for Diogenes to sit in his tub there must be a tub for him to sit in. In order for the horse to eat his oats, there must be oats for him to eat. In order for James to shoot a tiger there must be a tiger for him to shoot. These two groups of statements are relational, but the relations described in the psychological group are of a different sort than those in the physical group. The relations in the psychological group can be exist even though one of their terms does not exist. It seems that a person can be intentionally related to something that does not exist. A declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a substantive expression—a name or description -in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn’t anything to which the substantive expression truly applies. “Diogenes looked for an honest man,” does not imply that there are, or are not honest men. “I looked for the Loch Ness Monster,” does not say that the Loch Ness Monster does, or does not exist.

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Chisholm reexpression of Brentano's thesis

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We do not need to use intentional sentences when we describe nonpsychological phenomena. But when we wish to describe perceiving, assuming, believing, knowing, wanting, hoping, and other such psychological attitudes, then we must use terms that are intentional.

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Failed attempts to eliminate intentional language in psychological attitudes

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Linguistic Behaviorism: A.J. Ayer tried to define the locution “thinking of x” by reference to the use of symbols which designate x. A person is thinking of a unicorn if the person is disposed to use symbols which designate unicorns. A person BELIEVES that there are unicorns if the person is disposed to utter sentences containing words which designate unicorns. Problem with linguistic behaviorism: Meaning is not intrinsic in a sentence where it might be discovered. Meaning must be bestowed upon the sentence.

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Sign Behavior: A person may be said to perceive an object X to have a certain property F provided only that there is something which signifies X is f to the person. Problem with sign behavior: But what does “signify” mean? We cannot be satisfied with the traditional descriptions of “sign behavior,” for these define such terms as “sign” by means of intentional concepts.