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41 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Two views of Monism |
Physicalism and Idealism |
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Substance Dualism |
2 kinds of substances mental and material |
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Lebnz's law of identicals |
if a and b are identical then a and b share all their properties |
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george |
taylor |
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Intensional fallacy (sub dualism) |
confusion between what something really has and what something has only under one description |
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Princess elizabeths objection to descartes dualism |
How could a mind which is nonphysical interact with a body that is physical |
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Consciousness |
the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world |
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Intentionality |
power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and state of affairs |
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The mind-body problem |
The things in the mind (thoughts, knowledge, etc..) are fundamentally different from the things of the brain/body/matter |
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Problem of Mental causation |
Mental events cause physical events, but how can mental events have any casual effects on physical events |
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Qualia |
properties that make experiences feel different (pain qualia, taste qualia, etc..) |
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Inverted Spectrum |
People can be the same with respect to their physical property, but can have different qualia for one thing (e.g. the color red). Qualia must be nonphysical |
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A philosophical zombie |
A thing that shares all my physical properties and behaviors but lacks my qualia. If this is conceivable then qualia are nonphysical |
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Property dualism |
Mental properties are a distinct kind of property, a kind of property, a kind of property not identical to or "reducible" to any kind of physical property |
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Epiphenomenalism |
Mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Muscles, neurons, etc... cause behavior, not mental events |
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Solipsism |
everything you take to be real is actually just an idea in your own mind. Life is a long dream |
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Panpsychism |
Everything has a mind, even innate objects like a grain of sand |
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Psychological behaviorism |
Behaviors are learned through positive and negative reinforcements |
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Philosophical behaviorism |
You can use logic and prior events to determine what a person will do in a specific situation |
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Mind-brain identity theory |
The states and processes of the mind are identical to the states and processes of the brain |
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Qualitative identity |
Shares all or most properties -If a and b are qualitative identical, then you would have two things that are identical |
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Numerical identity |
Strictly one in the same - If a and b are numerically identical, then you would only have one thing with two names |
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A priori |
knowable prior to experience or observation |
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A posteriori |
Knowable only through an experience or observation |
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Type-token distinction |
distinction between a general sort of thing and its particular concrete instances |
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Multiple realization |
single mental kind (property, state, event) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds -pain is a good example. Pain can have a relation to many physical kinds of pain, although there is only one mental kind which is pain. |
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Functionalism |
Mental states are identified by what they do rather than what they are. brains are physical devices with neural substrate that perform computations on inputs which produce behaviors |
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Descartes argumetn for dualism using leibniz's law |
Physical bodies are spatial, minds aren't, therefore the mind and body are seperate. And to prove the mind isn't physical he says that minds can think and physical bodies cannot, therefore minds aren't physical |
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Descartes Conceivability argument for dualism |
I can conceive that my mind exists without my body. I cannot conceive that my body exists without my mind. My mind is different from my body |
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Princess Elizabeth's objeciton to descates dualism |
If the mind is not physical, how can it interact with a physical body? |
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An argument for dualism via the inverted spectrum |
-I can imagine that someone shares all my physical properties, but different qualia -If it's possible for me to conceive this then it's possible for there to be such a being -if this such being is possible, then qualia are not physical properties -Qualia are not physical |
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The knowledge argument |
Mary in the b&w room has all physical facts about red. She leaves and sees red and gains new knowledge. Physicalism is false not all properties are physical |
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Qualia Objection to Behaviorism |
Possible to conceive someone with all the same behaviors and dispositions but have different qualia from each other
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Arguments for and against the mind brain identity theory |
? |
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The Turing Test |
computer have an intelligent conversation without the person knowing it is a computer |
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Searle's Chinese room argument |
you know this |
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Arguments for and against functionalism |
? |
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Sellar's objection to behaviorism |
1. it is part of our very concept of a mental state like a belief that it is the cause or explanation of certain behaviors. 2. Genuine casual explanations cannot be circular. 3. Behavorism would make the resulting casual explanation circular |
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Geach-Chiholm objection to behavorism |
Mental states cannot be individually connected with behaviors, but can only be connected to behaviors in concert with other mental states in a way that makes behaviorism an in actable complex theory. |
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arguments agains functionalism |
zombie argument, chinese room argument |
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Zombie argument against functionalism |
if functionalism is true then it is impossible for there to be 2 beings exactly the same functionally but differing in that only one of them is a zombie |