Philosophy Key Terms: Philosophy Of Mind

Front 1

Argument from Analogy

Back 1

Mill's argument that we can use the behaviour of others to infer they have minds because they behave as i do and i have a mind

Front 2

Analytical Behaviourism

Back 2

Mental concepts can be reduced to statements about behaviour

Front 3

Logical Behaviourism

Back 3

Talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour- mental states are behavioural states/dispositions

Front 4

Category mistake

Back 4

Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it does not belong to

Front 5

Problem of causal interaction

Back 5

The problem with explaining how mental states or substance can interact causally with physical states or substance (ontological)

Front 6

China Brain

Back 6

Block's objection to functionalism. If the population of China, using radios, duplicated the functioning of the brain would this create conscious experience. If not functionalism is false

Front 7

Clear and distinct ideas

Back 7

A clear idea is present and accessible to the attentive mind, a distinct idea is clear and also separate from other ideas so that every part of it is clear (Descartes)

Front 8

Conceivability argument (Descartes)

Back 8

It is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body, conceivability entails possibility, so it is possible that the mind can exist without the body. Therefore the mind and body are distinct

Front 9

Consciouness

Back 9

The subjective phenomena of awareness of the world and ones mental states

Front 10

Easy problem of consciousness

Back 10

The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness

Front 11

Hard problem of consciousness

Back 11

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences

Front 12

Divisibility argument

Back 12

Bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but the mind has no such parts. Therefore the mind and body are distinct

Front 13

Property dualism

Back 13

The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically basic kinds of property- mental properties and physical properties

Front 14

Substance dualism

Back 14

The theory that two kinds of substances exist, mental and physical substances

Front 15

Eliminative materialism

Back 15

No mental properties, so our mental concepts are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they do not refer to anything that exists

Front 16

Epiphenomenalism

Back 16

Mental states are by-products, the effects of some physical process but with no causal influence of their own

Front 17

Folk Psychology

Back 17

A theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse

Front 18

Functionalism

Back 18

Mental states are reducible to functional states- state of input and output in relation to stimuli

Function of mental states in terms of role they play in a network of causes and effects. A mental state can be realised by any state that plays that causal role

Front 19

Ghost in the machine

Back 19

Substance dualism according to Ryle

Front 20

Idealism

Back 20

Minds are the only kind of substance, all that exists are minds and ideas

Front 21

Indefinitely heterogeneous disposition

Back 21

Dispositions that can be manifested in many ways. Ryle argues that mental states are indefinitely heterogeneous behavioural disposition, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour

Front 22

Indiscernibility of Identicals

Back 22

Leibniz's principle that if two things are identical, then they share all their properties and so are indiscernible

Front 23

Intentionality

Back 23

The property of mental states whereby they are directed towards an object, that is they are 'about' something

Front 24

Introspection

Back 24

Direct, first-personal awareness of one's mental states

Front 25

Argument from introspection

Back 25

The argument that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with knowledge gained from introspection, if mental states do not cause anything then how can i know what mental states i have?

Front 26

Inverted qualia

Back 26

Two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways

Front 27

Knowledge argument

Back 27

Mary the scientist thought experiment (proving she learns something new when seeing the colour red)

Front 28

Materalism

Back 28

The only substance is matter, everything that exist, including the mind, depends on matter to exist

Front 29

Monism

Back 29

Only one kind of substances exists. Both materialism and physicalism are monist theories

Front 30

Multiple Realisability (behaviourism)

Back 30

The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions

Front 31

Multiple Realisability (type-identity theory)

Back 31

The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states

Front 32

Ockham's Razor

Back 32

The principle that we should not put forward a hypothesis that says many different things exist when a simpler explanation will do as well. A simpler explanation is a better one, as long as it is successful

Front 33

Ontologically basic

Back 33

Not dependent on or derivable from some other entity or property e.g property dualism claims that mental properties are ontologically basic as they cannot be derived from physical properties

Front 34

Ontologically distinct

Back 34

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other

Front 35

Ontology

Back 35

The study of what exists

Front 36

Phenomenal consciousness

Back 36

Form of consciousness with subjective experiential quality as involved in perception- qualia!

Front 37

Physicalism

Back 37

Modern form of materialism which claims that everything that exists is physical or depends on something physical. Everything that is ontologically basic is physical and every physical event has a sufficient physical cause

Front 38

Non-reductive Physicalism

Back 38

A form of physicalism that claims that while mental properties depend upon physical properties, they are not reducible to them. e.g Functionalism and Behaviourism

Front 39

Reductive Physicalism

Back 39

Mental properties are physical properties e.g type identity theory

Front 40

Private

Back 40

Mutually exclusive access/ Capable of being experienced by no one other than the subject themselves

Front 41

Problem of other minds (Epistemological)

Back 41

The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds is through behaviour

Front 42

Representational property (intentionality)

Back 42

A property of a mental state that enables it to represent what it does, to be 'about' something.

Front 43

Qualia

Back 43

Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-representational, what-it-feels-like or raw sensation of experience

Front 44

Reducible

Back 44

Can be completely explained in terms of or identified with another property which is considered to be more ontologically basic

Front 45

Solipsism

Back 45

Only one's mind exists, there are no other minds and no mind-independent physical objects

Front 46

Type-Identity theory

Back 46

The theory that mental properties are identical and ontologically reducible to physical properties. Every mental state identical to specific physical state

Front 47

Verification principle

Back 47

All meaningful claims are either analytically or empirically verifiable

Front 48

Zombie argument (Chalmers)

Back 48

The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical property, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness

Front 49

Philosophical Zombies

Back 49

An exact physical duplicate of a person but without any phenomenal consciousness

Front 50

Essence

Back 50

What defines a substance

Front 51

Modes

Back 51

Form an essence can take

Front 52

Nomological dangler

Back 52

Sensation that cannot be explained by science

Front 53

Token identity theory

Back 53

Particular mental states are identical with the accompanying physical process but cannot be identified with a type of physical process just with the general class of mental states

Front 54

Chinese Room (Searle)

Back 54

A.I can manipulate symbols in such a way that mimics understanding but lacks genuine understanding or intentionality (against functionalism)

Front 55

Access Consciousness

Back 55

Aspects of consciousness that relates to cognitive capacities such as thinking

Front 56

Inverted spectra or qualia

Back 56

Proving qualia as non-physical, someone's blue may be my purple