Phil 149

Front 1

What is Anscombe’s account of acting intentionally? Why does she frame it in terms of responses to ‘why-questions?’ Why not just say that to act intentionally is to act for a reason?

Back 1

For Anscombe to act intentionally a certain sense of the question “why?” must have application. She frames it in this way because the question “why?” is a good way to reveal whether or not someone acted on purpose. The question can only be applied if the person A) knew they were doing X and B) Did X on purpose. In other words if the agent rejects the question, then it can be assumed that the action was not intentional. For example when Bob asks Janet why she is snoring, and she says she didn’t know she was, then this action does not fit the sense of “why?” Anscombe is referring to, and is thus unintentional. In a case where someone knocks a cup off a table after seeing a face in the window, they answer the question “why?” with something like because they were startled also does not answer the question in the appropriate sense. Knocking something over because one is startled is an accident and the explanation of being startled is a rejection of the question. The question “why?” allows us to work out whether or not an agent acted intentionally by way of these types of answers. Saying that to act intentionally is to act for a reason does not address these sort of rejections. In the case where one is startled and they knock the cup off the table, they had a reason for acting. They jumped, knocking the cup off the table for the reason that they were startled by a face in the window, to say that this reason describes an intentional action of knocking a cup off of a table, is inaccurate. It is obvious in a case like this that the action was accidental. Anscombe’s account eliminates these sort of cases of mere cause.

Front 2

What is Davidson’s account of acting intentionally (in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes")? Explain how the concept of intention plays no real role in the account. Explain Davidson’s idea that although there are of course unintentional actions, the concept of intentional action is more fundamental. What is Davidson’s account of acting (in the sense of ‘acting’ in which both intentional and unintentional actions count as acting), as given in “Agency?”

Back 2

Davidson’s account of acting intentionally:Davidson’s account of acting intentionally (in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes) involves an agent’s belief and desire to provide a primary reason, which gives rational cause to an intentional action. So if agent, A is hungry, and so eats an apple, she has the desire to satisfy her hunger, and the belief that eating an apple will do so. This belief and desire give rational cause to the intentional action of eating an apple. Why does the concept of intention play real no role? Intention is not necessarily important in his account because intentions do not necessarily lead to actions. One can intend to do something, but never do it, so intention does not provide a reason for acting. It simply describes a type of action. What makes an action intentional are the pro-attitudes, which give reason and play an explanatory role as cause for an intentional action. Intention necessarily follows from this, and is basically useless in explaining action, according to Davidson. What is Davidson’s account of acting (in the sense of ‘acting’ in which both intentional and unintentional actions count as acting), as given in “Agency?”In “Agency,” Davidson wants show how a person is the agent of an action whether or not the action is intentional. He argues that one is the agent if the action can be described as intentional under some description. So, P is an agent, in respect to an event, if and only if there is some description of the event where the action is intentional. An action must be rationally and causally linked to an agent’s beliefs and desires. If an agent pours out their cup of coffee, mistakenly believing it is tea, it could be said that they unintentionally poured out the coffee. Another description of the same action, however, can describe the action as intentional. For example, “the agent intentionally poured out the contents of the cup.” The agent’s beliefs and desires are rationally and causally linked to the action. They believe the cup contains tea, and they desire coffee, this gives reason and provides a rational cause for the action. This rational and causal connection of belief and desire show how the agent acted intentionally in some sense. It makes no difference whether the connected belief is true or not, only that it plays a role in the agents rationalization for acting.

Front 3

Explain how Anscombe differentiates between the original pumper example she gives, and the variant who is just doing his regular job and so not poisoning the inhabitants intentionally. Explain how in the third variant, the pumper who is hired to kill the inhabitants, he is doing this intentionally even if there is a sense in which he does not want to do this. Explain how the differences can be expressed in terms of the different satisfaction conditions of their intentions.

Back 3

The original pumper is completely unaware that they are poisoning the inhabitants. The 2nd pumper, knows he is poisoning the inhabitants, but does not want to intervene because he needs the money and so simply continues on with his job. According to Anscombe because the second pumper is able to reject the question why and also does not alter the normal activities of his job to aid in the poisoning, he too unintentionally poisons the inhabitants. The third pumper is hired specifically to poison the inhabitants by pumping them poisoned water. It is a condition of his job. Because he cannot get away with claiming he is just doing his job, as that is to poison the inhabitants he is acting intentionally. Satisfaction conditions can be applied here because the only person who alters their actions based on whether or not the inhabitants are being poisoned is pumper three. The other two meet their satisfaction conditions of doing their job regardless of if the people are poisoned.

Front 4

What is Descartes’s volitionist theory of intentional action? Explain how the theory seems to entail, impossibly, that whenever one does anything one performs infinitely many separate acts, each of which precedes and causes the next. Explain how Hornsby’s theory of action as involving tryings can be regarded as a more plausible version of a volitionist theory. Explain why Hornsby’s theory does not entail the impossible consequence above.

Back 4

The Volitionist Theory: Descartes volitionist theory is a strictly inward looking theory. Volitionism says that our perceptions of the world (whether caused by an evil demon or not) are entirely passive. An agent has nothing to do with it. His theory however does allow an agent to have agency, because according to Descartes we have control over our own thoughts. So this acting is not on the world but in our own minds. In order for an agent to act in the world he/she must mentally will their body to move, and that causes their body to move, and the world to change. There is a separation of mind and body where all the agent’s agency is contained in the mind. One acts in their mind and the world responds. The problem: This theory that every intentional action requires a separate mental action seems to entail an infinite regress. In other words, if we assume that the mental action is itself intentional then it also needs an act of willing, so to move one’s legs would require the agent to will the act of moving their legs, and will the act of willing their legs, and will the act of willing to will their legs... ad infinitum. How Hornsby’s theory is more Plausible: Hornsby claims that the basic description of an action should be in terms of trying. This sounds very similar to Descartes volitionism in that intentional action requires some mental action. However, her claim avoids the infinite regress problem because she is not committed to the idea that every act is preceded by an act of will. In her model if one acts by trying to act, the act simply is the trying to act. The trying to act is where the regress ends and the action begins. Because it is always best to avoid infinite regress, her theory is more plausible than Descartes’ volitionism.

Front 5

Explain Stout’s idea the deviant causal chain cases are really a just a specific instance of a much more widespread problem in the metaphysics of causal processes. Use the ‘electrofink’ concept to illustrate the idea that genuine solubility of a substance does not just consist in the truth of the conditional, “if it is put in water, it will dissolve.” Explain Stout’s “Aristotelian” theory of acting intentionally, according to which a true intentional action is the actualization of a capacity to do the thing in question, where this involves a “sensitivity” to the situation and the intended goal.

Back 5

Stout argues that the problem of DCC is only one example of the metaphysical problem of causal processes. Defining intentional action by way of causation, has the consequence of deviant causal chain cases (Like the uncle example). However, there is always the possibility of a third party intervention in a causal process. Stout uses the example of the electrofink and solubility to demonstrate this point. Suppose we had a magic genie, and we wished that when we put salt in water it would not dissolve. Normally, one could say: “if I put the salt in the water it will dissolve,” but because there is an intervening party this changes the truth of the conditional. Stout argues that it is better to understand causation in Aristotelian terms. Rather than describe something as a causal process, describe it as the realization of a special kind of potentiality. There are underlying states that ground the potentiality and the structure of the stages which characterize or carry out that potential. The characteristic structure of stages follow if the grounds for the potentiality are present, and they are not interfered with. Stout’s argument looks like this: Ag intentionally does A if and only if A is a process that is the realization of a potentiality. This avoids the DCC cases because in those cases the process is interrupted, and so it cannot be a realization of one’s own power.

Front 6

Explain how Davidson’s later theory of intention and action was motivated by his recognition that he couldn’t explain pure intending in terms of acting, together with his desire for a unified account of intention in all its three manifestations. What is the new theory of intentional action? What is it to intend to do something, according to the new theory? Explain the role of Davidson’s mini-theory of practical reason in the new theory, and how this helps the theory solve the problem of deviant causal chains.

Back 6

The three manifestations of intentions are acting intentionally, acting with a further intention, and the third is explained as a mental state or in other words the intention may never be realized in action. So for acting intentionally can be seen as “I intend to go the market” so I walk to the market. Intention with a further intention can be seen as “I intend to go to the market in order to buy groceries, in order to have food to bring home”. The difference here is simply an intention is causing another intention. Then there is the mental states. So I may intend to go to the market and then change my mind and take a nap. Nobody would can realize that initial intention because there was no action completed after it.

Front 7

What is Greg Kavka’s “Toxin Puzzle?” What conclusions about intending, reasons, and acting, and about intentional attitudes more generally, can be drawn from this thought experiment?

Back 7

The toxin puzzle: There is a mildly toxic substance which will cause a 24hr sickness of drank. Some eccentric billionaire asks Bob to drink it. He tells Bob that he will give him $1mill at 8 am if he intends to drink the poison at 6pm. The puzzle is that Bob doesn’t have to drink the poison, but only has to have the intention to drink it. But this sort of scenario is not possible. Bob isn’t going to have the intention to drink the toxin unless he actually plans on drinking it. So there is no reason for forming the intention to F (drink the poison) that isn’t also a reason to F (drink the poison) Bob doesn’t have a reason to intend. He only has a reason to do something that will cause him to have the intention (like taking a mind altering drug or something) So a reason for intending to F must also be a reason for F…ing. In general, reasons for forming or persisting in a propositional attitude must be reasons that are appropriately related to the satisfaction condition of that attitude. In other words Bob’s reason for forming the intention to drink the poison must be related to the satisfaction or attempt to satisfy the intention of drinking the poison.

Front 8

Explain and illustrate the difference between transitive and intransitive bodily movements. Explain how Hornsby uses the principle: Ag Vt’s b entails Ag’s action of Vt-ing b causes b to Vi, to argue that Davidson is wrong in claiming that the most basic or primitive description of an action is a bodily movement description. Explain how this principle entails the view that all actions take place inside the body. Explain how Hornsby uses the concept of trying to stop the regress. What features of trying are needed to stop the regress?

Back 8

Ag Vt’s b entails Ag’s action of Vt-ing b causes b to Vi= Joe moves his arm entails Joe’s action of moving his arm and causes the arm moving (I think)Hornsby is the one that says muscle contractions and neurons are the cause of actions. Inward bodily movements. Shooting someone example: Davidson says that the action stops at the moving of finger, but hornsby says why stop there and look at the causes of the moving of the finger Transitive bodily movement: According to Davidson, a transitive bodily movement is when you as the agent move your body. For example you causally raising your hand. Intransitive bodily movement: According to Davidson, an intransitive bodily movement is when your body moves in a certain way, not involving the agent, just a result of the agent. When raising your hand, the movement of your hand raising. According to a causal approach to body movements, when you (transitively) move your body, your body (intransitively) moves as a result of your agency. So, in moving your body in a certain way you are causing your body to move in that way.You raising your hand = transitive and the movement of your hand raising = intransitive Common Sense says that trying is associated with difficulty. So if I’m trying to ice skate but have no experience associated with that activity it's going to be very difficult to achieve. Also when you try to do something, you usually succeed in doing something. So if ice skating is standing and covering a distance by moving your body in a certain way and reaching a destination. Common sense believes that even if only the first step is completed by standing then there was trying taken place.Hornsby however disagrees with the first part of trying being associated with difficulty. This creates a misconception. For example someone may be observing someone else and say he is trying to write on a piece of paper or trying to walk across the room. This just sounds ridiculous because they are basic actions and for the vast majority don’t even have to think while performing those acts. You just do it. Also with the second part with when someone is trying to do something he or she usually succeed in doing something. Hornsby believes instead of usually it’s not always the case. But still agrees with the second part from common sense in respect that even though the act may not be completed there was trying something. So from the same example with ice skating, just being able to stand up was still trying to ice skate.

Front 9

Explain Hornsby’s idea that there are really two distinct notions of basic action, both legitimate but not to be confused. What are the two notions, and how are they different? Explain how the teleological notion of basicness is related to practical knowledge of how to do things. Explain how Davidson’s response to the tying shoelaces example in “Agency” is arguably a confusion between these notions.

Back 9

There are two different notions of practical knowledge. One being “knowing how to do something” and the other “knowing how one does something”. So for the first if you really know how to do it then you actually know how. So for example someone were to claim they can drive a stick shift then others need to see him or her drive one. For the second one could be doing something becomes second nature. So I know how and have been driving a stick shift. I don’t tell myself every time I drive “okay, push the clutch in then start the car, put it into first, release the clutch, give it gas, and repeat for each gear”, I just do it. I don’t need to explain it.

Front 10

Anscombe, Stout, and Davidson in his later work all recognize that the three categories of intention blend into one another, so that really there is always present an intention to do the thing in question that persists right through the action itself. Explain how Anscombe uses the example of making tea to illustrate this point.

Back 10

Making tea example: I’m making tea(intentional action), I’m going to make tea(intention for future action), I’m boiling water to make some tea(acting with a further intention). All of these intentions overlap or blur together. You can think of the forming of unity of intention and action like a tree. intention is the roots. intentional action is the trunk. further action (Acting with further intention) are the branches

Front 11

Bratman does not accept the unified concept of intention mentioned in the previous question. Explain how his video game example is meant to argue against it. What is Stout’s response to the example?

Back 11

Bratman example - man playing games with left and right hands - would not be correct to say that he intends to hit both targets. if he hits right target, he hit the target intentionally, even though he did not intend to hit it.the point: your intentions have to be consistent; have to be logically consistentStouts response - what the man did intentionally was hit one of the targets - he hit the right target. but the action is not intentional under that description that bratman gave - bc the man does not want to hit them. if he suceeds in hitting one or the other, we should not say he did it intentionally. There was luck involved, and luck drives out intentional-ness.Man hit one of the targets intentionally - he that ONE of the targets intentionally. it does not follow that he hit the RIGHT/LEFT target intentionally. The action is ONLY intentional under the general description (he hit the target intentionally), NOT under the specific desc (he hit the right/left target)