Essay on The Failure of the Allies to Act during the Holocaust

First, by January 1944, the United States had strong evidence about the concentration camps and their purpose to destroy the Jews. Additionally, the German air defenses were weakened, and the Allies’ bombing accuracy was getting better, providing the U.S. and the Allied countries with the perfect opportunity to bomb the concentration camps and save thousands of Jews (Berenbaum). However, the Allied countries did not bomb the concentration camps, as they did not know the fate of the concentration camps, and did not want to bomb a camp with thousands of imprisoned Jews. Also, on August 8, 1944, Ernest Frischer of the “Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile” in London stated, “I believe that destruction of gas chambers and crematoria in Oswieczim by bombing would have a certain effect now.” Nonetheless, on August 14, Frischer’s request was disallowed by John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, who insisted, “The operation proposed could only be executed by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations elsewhere” (Gilbert, 303). In other words, John McCloy did not accept this plea because it required substantial air support, while the U.S. was using most of their air forces in additional, more significant battle operations.
Furthermore, when asked about the United States refusal to bomb the Auschwitz concentration camp, David Wyman, the author of The