One large argument for dimensional models is that they reduce the overlap of the various symptoms and disorders that is currently a problem in diagnosis. The American Psychiatric Association’s DSM IV (2000) states that “there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no mental disorder.” In this quote, the APA notes that while they separate disorders, their categories are far from separate. Comorbidity (the occurrence of more than one mental disorder at the same time) is extremely prevalent with the categorical approach (Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Comorbidity may not seem like a big deal at first, but to put it simply, too much comorbidity implies that the categories the DSM proposes are not highly accurate (Kendall & Jablensky, 2003). Some disorders, like Down syndrome, have a clear cause and symptoms and can fit well in a categorical classification. But many others, like the groups of anxiety disorders or personality disorders, can be incredibly hard to differentiate and categorize. And when so many disorders have so many similar symptoms, an individual can qualify for many more mental disorders by the DSM’s standards than is necessary or even
One large argument for dimensional models is that they reduce the overlap of the various symptoms and disorders that is currently a problem in diagnosis. The American Psychiatric Association’s DSM IV (2000) states that “there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no mental disorder.” In this quote, the APA notes that while they separate disorders, their categories are far from separate. Comorbidity (the occurrence of more than one mental disorder at the same time) is extremely prevalent with the categorical approach (Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Comorbidity may not seem like a big deal at first, but to put it simply, too much comorbidity implies that the categories the DSM proposes are not highly accurate (Kendall & Jablensky, 2003). Some disorders, like Down syndrome, have a clear cause and symptoms and can fit well in a categorical classification. But many others, like the groups of anxiety disorders or personality disorders, can be incredibly hard to differentiate and categorize. And when so many disorders have so many similar symptoms, an individual can qualify for many more mental disorders by the DSM’s standards than is necessary or even