The following year a plan written to outline strategies and goals for the conflict was written. The plan, named NSAM highlighted that the U.S. would support Vietnam as long as needed, however it included this major key point, “the South Vietnamese must win their own fight [emphasis added]” (274). Even though it seemed to be a major focus point, McNamara adds that this policy in the later years of Vietnam was continually failed to be upheld (274). Seasoned Vietnam combat veteran Philip Beidler lamented in “The Invisible ARVN: The South Vietnamese Soldier in American Representations of the Vietnam War” that while they are never much mentioned in historical accounts, the ARVN; the South Vietnamese forces, once totaled double the amount of U.S.
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It never happened. I can’t recall what happened with our line infantry battalions; but in Delta troop we never saw a single ARVN soldier on the ground during the whole continuous jungle-busting combat time we were there. (308)
His account shows the complete ineffectiveness of the ARVN and the subsequent programs ran by the United States thought to benefit them. Smith finds record of two mid-level state department employees, Mr. Cottrell and Mr. Jordan, agreeing that the ARVN “[was] disappointing and generally is characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is devoid of a sense of urgency (109).” The dissatisfying reviews arriving from the jungles of Vietnam began to cause a stir in officials and politicians who called for a change in …show more content…
McNamara describes how in 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to discuss that instead of continuing or improving ARVN training programs, congress should deport more American combat forces (109). By the fall of 1964 politicians asked McNamara for release from the adherence of the Kennedy and Johnson Administration policy that emphasized the South Vietnamese fighting their own battles (159). Even as Washington bickered amongst themselves, never producing a clear decision, in 1965 a battalion of ARVN as well as their reinforcements were completely decimated (419). Butterfield finds that in the beginning of 1966 officials began to see a substantial drop in performance. He attributes this to the fact that as troops begin to tire, the better conditions offered to them in the VC would have been tempting (483). E. W. Kenworthy another investigator of the Pentagon Papers, uncovered a quote from Johnson admitting “[that] as currently led, motivated, and influenced at the top” the South Vietnamese would never be able to restore peace (614). Early on the leadership training and motivation supposedly originated in the U.S. ranks. All though there are many contributors to the eventual failure of Vietnam, the means by which they dealt with indigenous forces caused large holes in U.S. policy unable to be
It never happened. I can’t recall what happened with our line infantry battalions; but in Delta troop we never saw a single ARVN soldier on the ground during the whole continuous jungle-busting combat time we were there. (308)
His account shows the complete ineffectiveness of the ARVN and the subsequent programs ran by the United States thought to benefit them. Smith finds record of two mid-level state department employees, Mr. Cottrell and Mr. Jordan, agreeing that the ARVN “[was] disappointing and generally is characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is devoid of a sense of urgency (109).” The dissatisfying reviews arriving from the jungles of Vietnam began to cause a stir in officials and politicians who called for a change in …show more content…
McNamara describes how in 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to discuss that instead of continuing or improving ARVN training programs, congress should deport more American combat forces (109). By the fall of 1964 politicians asked McNamara for release from the adherence of the Kennedy and Johnson Administration policy that emphasized the South Vietnamese fighting their own battles (159). Even as Washington bickered amongst themselves, never producing a clear decision, in 1965 a battalion of ARVN as well as their reinforcements were completely decimated (419). Butterfield finds that in the beginning of 1966 officials began to see a substantial drop in performance. He attributes this to the fact that as troops begin to tire, the better conditions offered to them in the VC would have been tempting (483). E. W. Kenworthy another investigator of the Pentagon Papers, uncovered a quote from Johnson admitting “[that] as currently led, motivated, and influenced at the top” the South Vietnamese would never be able to restore peace (614). Early on the leadership training and motivation supposedly originated in the U.S. ranks. All though there are many contributors to the eventual failure of Vietnam, the means by which they dealt with indigenous forces caused large holes in U.S. policy unable to be