Eisenhower did not effectively establish and issue his intent for two reasons. First, planning for HUSKY commenced while he was still prosecuting the TORCH campaign as Commander, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). His chief of staff thus led the early planning effort but with limited authority and no experience in the Mediterranean theater of operations (MTO). Second, Eisenhower’s component commanders for HUSKY were likewise still engaged in TORCH and geographically dispersed around the MTO, making communication and coordination difficult in the important early planning stages. The distracted and disjointed arrangement of AFHQ and its components just months prior to HUSKY’s D-day limited Eisenhower’s ability to adequately develop and issue his intent. This contributed to his subordinate commander’s inability to develop a clear understanding of the campaign’s purpose and desired end state. Understanding, as a by-product of effective mission command, fosters decentralized decision making which further increases operational tempo and the ability to exploit success. Intense disagreement by senior U.S. and British leaders over Allied intentions for Sicily and the MTO hindered the development of clear understanding by field commanders of HUSKY’s desired end state. The U.S. viewed HUSKY as the culminating operation in the Mediterranean, while Britain wanted it to be a stepping stone to subsequent operations in Italy and the rest of southern Europe. This lack of clarity at the strategic level flowed down to the AFHQ commanders and muddled the planning effort. General Alexander, as the ground component commander, further compounded the confusion by neglecting to develop plans for his two armies once they were established ashore. This led General Patton to make assumptions about the employment of his Seventh Army that turned out to be false as Alexander eventually issued orders that vastly changed the initial plan. The cascading effects of disjointed and poor planning prohibited subordinate commanders from developing the necessary understanding of the objectives. Mutual distrust between U.S. and British forces further hindered planning and execution by the AFHQ and component command staffs. Trust between allies, services, and components enables the unified, focused application military force at the appropriate time and place. Mutual distrust between U.S. and British staffs had …show more content…
The climate fostered by AFHQ leadership significantly contributed to the disjointedness and confusion in very linear environment and opposed by an inferior force. Command and control and integration shortcomings may not as easily be overcome in the increasingly complex and uncertain environment within which joint forces will operate today. Current doctrine has captured the hard-earned lessons from HUSKY and mitigates many of the issues encountered in that campaign. For example, land, air, and maritime forces do not operate autonomously but instead are integrated into joint force component commands (JFLCC, JFACC, and JFMCC) under a joint force commander. Best practices such as mission command and integration of joint functions are essential for the Joint Force to fight and win in today’s operating