As Kennedy and his managerial “whiz kids” took office, they challenged traditionally accepted policies and sought a wider range of diplomatic options. Significantly impacted by crises in both Berlin and Cuba, Kennedy and his acolytes deplored the dearth of Eisenhower’s military force alternatives. Very little diplomatic maneuvering room existed within massive retaliation’s “all or nothing construct.” Among Kennedy’s criticisms, Eisenhower’s nuclear policy rested upon the flawed fundamental premise that a thermonuclear war was winnable. After staring down the barrel of Armageddon, many in the administration, particularly Defense Secretary McNamara, came to agree with Eisenhower’s personally held belief deeming the offensive use of nuclear
…show more content…
From a Kuhnian perspective, the crisis of the Vietnam War enabled the Air Force to transform its strategic bombing paradigm. As a result, civilian and military leaders rightly devalued the significance of strategic air power. Ultimately, strategic bombing was a means rather the means to achieve a specified strategic effect. Following the Vietnam War, the doctrine and tailored equipment of AirLand Battle replaced the Air Force’s strategic bombing paradigm. In the twilight of the Cold War, AirLand Battle succeeded in Desert Storm confirming the effective adaptation of air power and further justifying the response to …show more content…
During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations birthed SAC which, driven by Lemay, improved the tool’s performance and thereby its effectiveness. By redefining the tool’s workspace, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations rendered it largely ineffective. A recalcitrant toolmaker exacerbated the severity of the tool’s ineffectiveness. At its most effective, air power functioned much like the Cessna landing in Red Square. It was the correct tool to achieve the desired strategic effect. As demonstrated, policy changes colored civilian perceptions of air power, which did not match military reality. Unfortunately, this tendency has not been confined to the Cold
From a Kuhnian perspective, the crisis of the Vietnam War enabled the Air Force to transform its strategic bombing paradigm. As a result, civilian and military leaders rightly devalued the significance of strategic air power. Ultimately, strategic bombing was a means rather the means to achieve a specified strategic effect. Following the Vietnam War, the doctrine and tailored equipment of AirLand Battle replaced the Air Force’s strategic bombing paradigm. In the twilight of the Cold War, AirLand Battle succeeded in Desert Storm confirming the effective adaptation of air power and further justifying the response to …show more content…
During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations birthed SAC which, driven by Lemay, improved the tool’s performance and thereby its effectiveness. By redefining the tool’s workspace, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations rendered it largely ineffective. A recalcitrant toolmaker exacerbated the severity of the tool’s ineffectiveness. At its most effective, air power functioned much like the Cessna landing in Red Square. It was the correct tool to achieve the desired strategic effect. As demonstrated, policy changes colored civilian perceptions of air power, which did not match military reality. Unfortunately, this tendency has not been confined to the Cold