R. v. Fearon, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13
Facts
Compelling evidence obtained from a warrantless search incident conducted by law enforcement authorities linked Kevin Fearon to a robbery of a jewelry merchant at a Toronto market in July 2009.
The accused and his associate, F and C, seized numerous bags, one of which contained jewelry, and escaped in a black vehicle. Police authorities momentarily became involved. F and C were arrested incident to the locating of the vehicle. When the pat-down procedure was conducted on F, a cell phone was found and retained as evidence for the trial against the accused. The police subsequently conducted a search of the cell phone and once more within two hours of the arrest. Text messages and images were found that corresponded with evidence that was found in the vehicle. The law enforcement authorities did have a warrant to search the car however, they were only granted a warrant to search the cell phone months posterior. The court of Appeal dismissed an appeal because the trial judge deemed that s. 8 of the Charter had not been breached with the search of F’s mobile device. The information collected from the cellular device was permitted for the trial as evidence. Issue Was the law enforcement authority member’s search allowable or an invasion of privacy? Should the information retained from the mobile phone be used as evidence in the trial? Decision The common law power to search devices subsequent to an arrest is allowable, as long as it meets necessary conditions that prevent invasion of privacy. Search of private information is unconstitutional if it is conducted prior to arrest or with wrongful reason. Therefore, while s. 8 of F’s rights was breached, the gathered information was still permitted as evidence because the search was conducted with purposeful intentions that did not severely invade F’s privacy. Opinion Law enforcing authorities must bring attention to the power that they possess as it may be pursued under invalid conditions, thus making searches unconstitutional. Fearon’s particular situation had permitted conditions that did not severely violate his privacy but did however violate s. 8 of his rights. This fact was considered during the making of the court’s decisions and was therefore reasonable. If police have valid justifications for a search then a warrant should not be necessary. Evidence found without a warrant should not be used in a trial. The police officer was granted a permit months later and was consequently able to use the retained information as evidence in the trial. Case ACQUITTAL OR FACT FRAUD? R. v. Chaisson, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415, 2006 SCC 11 Facts The accused, C, was sitting in a dimmed car with another individual when a law enforcing authority member spotted them. The officer subsequently remarked the shock visible in the features of both individuals at the sight of him. The officer noted that C seemingly tossed something to the opposite end of the auto. The law enforcer assumed that C and his associate possessed drugs and this resulted in him asking the accused and his associate to step out of the car. The accused was arrested when the police officer discovered a sac containing marijuana in the car. The officer failed to read them their rights at the time of the arrest. The rights were …show more content…
1985, c. C‑46. These provisions breach the rights of prostitutes under s.7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom because they criminalize several activities that are linked to the profession.
S. 210 of the Criminal Code criminalizes the concept of prostitution houses; s. 212(1) (j) makes it in offence to live on the benefits of the profession; s. 213(1) (c) prohibits public communication for the reasons of prostitution.
They claimed that the safety and the lives of prostitutes were in jeopardy due to these provisions. These restrictions set limitations on certain safety measures that should be considered. These restrictions also disregard the freedom of expression, specifically s.213 (1)(c), because they prevent frontal conversation about their profession. Freedom of expression is protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. S.1 does not protect any of the provisions.
Issue
Should prostitutes be entitled to the same rights as other professions?
Can the judicial system make exceptions for this