This includes the right to bear arms, the right to vote, and right to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells. Id. In Pendergrass, the court ruled that a female inmate’s Constitutional Due Process Right to raise her child must give way to the right of the state to incarcerate. Id. In that case, a female inmate who gave birth while incarcerated sought to obtain temporary leave to breast feed her baby. Id. The female inmate, argued that the right to retain custody of her child was a part of her Constitutional Due Process Right to rear, and educate her child. Pendergrass, 24 Or.App.719. The court ruled that the exercise of certain constitutional rights is incompatible with incarceration. Id. One of those incompatible rights
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Care & Protection of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. The SJC in Isaac clearly defined the limited role that juvenile courts play once DCF obtains permanent custody, holding that courts do not have authority to overrule a residential placement decision made by DCF unless the judge finds that the decision was arbitrary or capricious, and amounts to an abuse of discretion. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. In that case, DSS sought to remove Isaac, who was placed in the Department’s permanent custody, from the specialty school; he attended, and placed him in a long-term residential facility. Id. Isaac’s treating psychiatrist along with Isaac’s parents, opposed the move. Id. Isaac’s parents argued that DSS abused its discretion when it sought to remove Isaac from the specialty school and place him in a different facility. Id. The court ruled in favor of DSS, holding that DSS did not abuse its discretion, even though the Department’s placement decision was based on saving the Department money. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. In so holding, the SJC observed that Mass. Gen. Laws c. 119 “contain[s] no general grant of authority to a judge to enter an order intended to be in a child's best interest.” *156 Id. at 609, 646 N.E.2d 1034. Thus, “when a child is placed in the permanent custody of the department, decisions related to normal incidents of custody, by the terms of §§ 21, 26, and 32 are committed to the discretion of the department,” and the Juvenile Court may only “offer guidance to the department concerning a child's residence.”
Care & Protection of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. The SJC in Isaac clearly defined the limited role that juvenile courts play once DCF obtains permanent custody, holding that courts do not have authority to overrule a residential placement decision made by DCF unless the judge finds that the decision was arbitrary or capricious, and amounts to an abuse of discretion. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. In that case, DSS sought to remove Isaac, who was placed in the Department’s permanent custody, from the specialty school; he attended, and placed him in a long-term residential facility. Id. Isaac’s treating psychiatrist along with Isaac’s parents, opposed the move. Id. Isaac’s parents argued that DSS abused its discretion when it sought to remove Isaac from the specialty school and place him in a different facility. Id. The court ruled in favor of DSS, holding that DSS did not abuse its discretion, even though the Department’s placement decision was based on saving the Department money. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034. In so holding, the SJC observed that Mass. Gen. Laws c. 119 “contain[s] no general grant of authority to a judge to enter an order intended to be in a child's best interest.” *156 Id. at 609, 646 N.E.2d 1034. Thus, “when a child is placed in the permanent custody of the department, decisions related to normal incidents of custody, by the terms of §§ 21, 26, and 32 are committed to the discretion of the department,” and the Juvenile Court may only “offer guidance to the department concerning a child's residence.”