Ndeumeni further avers that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of Kemogne’s witnesses where Kemogne failed to adequately disclose the witnesses and the contents of their testimony in discovery. Maryland Rule 2-433(a) bestows upon the trial court broad discretion in remedying discovery violations. Md. Rule 2-433(a). Critically, Rule 2-433(a) employs a permissive, but not mandatory, “may” where the rule provides that “the court . . . may enter such orders in regard to the [violation] as are just . . .” Id. Accordingly, “[o]ur review of the trial court’s resolution of a discovery dispute is quite narrow; appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess the decision of a trial judge to impose sanctions for a failure of discovery.” Sindler
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In this appeal, Nduemeni argues specifically that it was error to admit the testimony of Fouzing, the realtor that allegedly brokered the deal between Nduemeni and Kemogne. After hearing Fouzing’s and Ngeugaum’s voir dire testimony, Nduemeni again moved the court to exclude his testimony. Having given Nduemeni an opportunity, albeit brief, to ascertain the content of the proposed witnesses’ testimony, the trial court denied Nduemeni’s motion to exclude the witnesses from testifying. In denying Ndeumeni’s motion with regard to Fouzing, the court said, in part:
THE COURT: All right, fine. The Court finds that the testimony of even Mr. Fouzing which may be probative and relevant is clearly foreseeable and not surprising and his actual name was given sufficiently in advance for him to have been investigated. Even if deposition -- even if not deposed, a telephone call to Mr. Fouzing would have been just an act of diligence on the part of the defendant and there was sufficient information to have done that -- the motion to quash his testimony is also denied at the discretion of the
In this appeal, Nduemeni argues specifically that it was error to admit the testimony of Fouzing, the realtor that allegedly brokered the deal between Nduemeni and Kemogne. After hearing Fouzing’s and Ngeugaum’s voir dire testimony, Nduemeni again moved the court to exclude his testimony. Having given Nduemeni an opportunity, albeit brief, to ascertain the content of the proposed witnesses’ testimony, the trial court denied Nduemeni’s motion to exclude the witnesses from testifying. In denying Ndeumeni’s motion with regard to Fouzing, the court said, in part:
THE COURT: All right, fine. The Court finds that the testimony of even Mr. Fouzing which may be probative and relevant is clearly foreseeable and not surprising and his actual name was given sufficiently in advance for him to have been investigated. Even if deposition -- even if not deposed, a telephone call to Mr. Fouzing would have been just an act of diligence on the part of the defendant and there was sufficient information to have done that -- the motion to quash his testimony is also denied at the discretion of the