The negotiations with M-19 were successful because of the widespread desire for reform of the two-party monopoly on the government. The goal of M-19 was political reform from the outset, so the cost of resistance was low. For the government, the cost of toleration was high, but not compared to the cost of suppression of the rebels. If it were not for eventual disorganization of the party, M-19AD would have been more successful politically because of their grassroots beginnings. The rise of the party, however, was possible because of that bottom-up institutionalization versus top-down integration. Lessons that the FARC can take away from the M-19 are mainly how to become relevant in Colombian politics. Having a strong party platform that
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With the growing strength of the Colombian military and the implementation of Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota, the number of rebel members has decreased significantly, effectively limiting their military strength. As for President Santos and the current government, it is recognized that the cost of suppression has been high yet successful. Even the cost of toleration of political competition is not all that high. While the FARC might have the support of rural peasants, the FARC has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Colombian people due to the drug trade, human rights violations and other forms of violence. Without that bottom-up support, the viability of the FARC as a successful political party is unlikely. Although Colombia’s proportional representation electorate system allows for minority parties, a relevant party needs money to continue to thrive. Assuming the rebels hold up to the agreement to end narco-trafficking, finding funds to run campaigns under the new FARC party might prove …show more content…
The disillusionment of the Colombian people will hurt the future of the current political party in power, the Social Party of National Unity. The approval rating of President Santos is already at an all-time low for his presidency at 29% (Alsema 2016). By the same token, if this peace negotiation is successful, the opposite can occur. In the end, there is a lot of healing left to do for all sides of the negotiations, especially for the Colombian people. While they may have missed the March 23rd deadline, it is in the best interest of all parties- the government, FARC and the Colombian people- to continue working towards an
With the growing strength of the Colombian military and the implementation of Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota, the number of rebel members has decreased significantly, effectively limiting their military strength. As for President Santos and the current government, it is recognized that the cost of suppression has been high yet successful. Even the cost of toleration of political competition is not all that high. While the FARC might have the support of rural peasants, the FARC has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Colombian people due to the drug trade, human rights violations and other forms of violence. Without that bottom-up support, the viability of the FARC as a successful political party is unlikely. Although Colombia’s proportional representation electorate system allows for minority parties, a relevant party needs money to continue to thrive. Assuming the rebels hold up to the agreement to end narco-trafficking, finding funds to run campaigns under the new FARC party might prove …show more content…
The disillusionment of the Colombian people will hurt the future of the current political party in power, the Social Party of National Unity. The approval rating of President Santos is already at an all-time low for his presidency at 29% (Alsema 2016). By the same token, if this peace negotiation is successful, the opposite can occur. In the end, there is a lot of healing left to do for all sides of the negotiations, especially for the Colombian people. While they may have missed the March 23rd deadline, it is in the best interest of all parties- the government, FARC and the Colombian people- to continue working towards an