To understand the role of ECP (and, perhaps, neuroscience) in Goldman’s
Epistemology and Cognition, it is necessary to first understand the justificatory structure of his J-rule (justification-based) and R-rule (rule-based) frameworks. Goldman understands that a justification-based framework is needed for three reasons: First, it may be the case that we have a purely intrinsic interest in when a person’s belief is justified.3 Second, an individual may be concerned with refuting skepticism, and because justification itself is often a means of combating skepticism, there is some warrant in determining when one is justified.4 Finally, an interest in justification may derive from an interest in knowledge.5
The
R-rule system is warranted, he claims, on purely semantic grounds insofar as epistemological …show more content…
Without an appropriate R-rule framework, competing theories of justification would fail to resolve relevant disputes between propositions because they would be unresponsive to the competition’s underlying presuppositions regarding the meaning of p. The reason for Goldman’s rule framework is to generate a specific paradigm that will effectively adjudicate between conflicting epistemic, social, and moral evaluative considerations. To do this, however, Goldman needs to
Epistemology and Cognition, it is necessary to first understand the justificatory structure of his J-rule (justification-based) and R-rule (rule-based) frameworks. Goldman understands that a justification-based framework is needed for three reasons: First, it may be the case that we have a purely intrinsic interest in when a person’s belief is justified.3 Second, an individual may be concerned with refuting skepticism, and because justification itself is often a means of combating skepticism, there is some warrant in determining when one is justified.4 Finally, an interest in justification may derive from an interest in knowledge.5
The
R-rule system is warranted, he claims, on purely semantic grounds insofar as epistemological …show more content…
Without an appropriate R-rule framework, competing theories of justification would fail to resolve relevant disputes between propositions because they would be unresponsive to the competition’s underlying presuppositions regarding the meaning of p. The reason for Goldman’s rule framework is to generate a specific paradigm that will effectively adjudicate between conflicting epistemic, social, and moral evaluative considerations. To do this, however, Goldman needs to