Recalling the definition of democracy in the beginning of this paper, it is evident that the majority rule creates oppression on the minority, because their will cannot be realized in the country. For instance, when a bill is passed in parliament by the opposition party, no matter how much it benefits the marginalized people in the country, there is a high tendency that it will be rejected in parliament. On the contrary, if a ruling party passes a bill in parliament, it goes through even if the minority disagrees. For example, the parliament in Uganda voted and scrapped off the presidential term limits from the constitution in 2005, which allows president Museveni to be in power unlimitedly (Nebo, 2016). Similarly, in 2010, the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos had parliament approved a new constitution that allows the leader of the party that wins most of the parliament seats becomes the president (Nebo, 2016). Equatorial Guinea’s president Teodoro Obiang Nguema like dos Santos of Angola, changed the constitution in 2011 that allowed him to rerun for presidency after the age of seventy-five and, also select his successor (Nebo, 2016). From the above examples, it is evident that majority rule in Africa supports the prolongation of regimes and, also the establishment
Recalling the definition of democracy in the beginning of this paper, it is evident that the majority rule creates oppression on the minority, because their will cannot be realized in the country. For instance, when a bill is passed in parliament by the opposition party, no matter how much it benefits the marginalized people in the country, there is a high tendency that it will be rejected in parliament. On the contrary, if a ruling party passes a bill in parliament, it goes through even if the minority disagrees. For example, the parliament in Uganda voted and scrapped off the presidential term limits from the constitution in 2005, which allows president Museveni to be in power unlimitedly (Nebo, 2016). Similarly, in 2010, the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos had parliament approved a new constitution that allows the leader of the party that wins most of the parliament seats becomes the president (Nebo, 2016). Equatorial Guinea’s president Teodoro Obiang Nguema like dos Santos of Angola, changed the constitution in 2011 that allowed him to rerun for presidency after the age of seventy-five and, also select his successor (Nebo, 2016). From the above examples, it is evident that majority rule in Africa supports the prolongation of regimes and, also the establishment