Belshaw (XXXX-1) argues that death is a misfortune when it cuts short a live that one wanted to live. He agrees that death can be bad in absence of this requirement, but only bad in a way that does not matter. That is, death can be had as rust is bad for a tractor. The rust deteriorates the general condition of the tractor, and in that sense, it is bad for the tractor. However, the tractor does not suffer this badness, and thus it is not harmed by the rust. Consequently, the rust is bad for the tractor in a way that does not matter. Belshaw goes as far as to add that the tractor has an interest in preventing the rust. Nonetheless, this is interest is not a morally relevant one.
In the same way, death can be bad for a non-human animal, but …show more content…
Mainly, there is no justification of why desires hold for life as a whole are the only relevant ones to assess the badness of death. Whilst it could be easily argued that the frustration these desires make death worse, it proves difficult to justify that only these desires contribute to the badness of death. Belshaw argues that the simple version of the deprivation account, where the badness of death is a function of the future well-being lost, renders counter-intuitive implications and thus needs to be modified. Namely, he considers the fact that babies are the ones most harmed by death cannot be accepted. For this reason, he argues that a desire for your whole life is needed. Nevertheless, even if we accept, for the sake for the argument, that the deprivation account needs to be modified to accommodate the idea that death is worse for adults than for babies, it does not mean that it needs to be modified in this way. Other justifications have been offered to justify that death is a greater misfortune for adult human beings. Moreover, this requirement for the badness of death appear to have estrange implications. Harman (XXXX) imagines the case of a young woman that is depressed and thus has no long term plans or hopes for the future. Nonetheless, if she recovers, she will enjoy a happy life. It would be, therefore, bad for her to die now, even if she lacks a vision of her life as a
In the same way, death can be bad for a non-human animal, but …show more content…
Mainly, there is no justification of why desires hold for life as a whole are the only relevant ones to assess the badness of death. Whilst it could be easily argued that the frustration these desires make death worse, it proves difficult to justify that only these desires contribute to the badness of death. Belshaw argues that the simple version of the deprivation account, where the badness of death is a function of the future well-being lost, renders counter-intuitive implications and thus needs to be modified. Namely, he considers the fact that babies are the ones most harmed by death cannot be accepted. For this reason, he argues that a desire for your whole life is needed. Nevertheless, even if we accept, for the sake for the argument, that the deprivation account needs to be modified to accommodate the idea that death is worse for adults than for babies, it does not mean that it needs to be modified in this way. Other justifications have been offered to justify that death is a greater misfortune for adult human beings. Moreover, this requirement for the badness of death appear to have estrange implications. Harman (XXXX) imagines the case of a young woman that is depressed and thus has no long term plans or hopes for the future. Nonetheless, if she recovers, she will enjoy a happy life. It would be, therefore, bad for her to die now, even if she lacks a vision of her life as a