Frances House Case

Not yet finished, Plaintiffs then claim Frances House did not “tell the reader” what its “purpose” was in challenging certain allegations in paragraph in counts L and LIV. Plaintiff again quotes long passages from its Seventh Amended Complaint and then concludes that paragraph 25 of Counts LII and LVI is “merely a statement of medical fact.” (Pls. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at 29.) Instead of recognizing the obvious, i.e., that alleging “certain actions are indicative” of emotional distress represents an opinion, Plaintiffs reiterate their argument that somehow complying with section 2-603 of the Code and Illinois’ fact-pleading requirements would somehow undermine the ID/DD Community Care Act. Plaintiffs also quarrel with Frances House’s argument that Counts LI and LV are deficient because they fail to allege the timeframe in which Frances House allegedly obtained signed consent forms from Leitzen. These allegations involve a written instrument, yet, Plaintiffs did not attach any signed consent forms to their Seventh Amended Complaint or allege the timeframe in which the signed consent was allegedly obtained. Plaintiffs appear to fail to appreciate, or perhaps wish to ignore, that the timeframe relating to consent is critical in this case in that the duties that the law imposes upon Frances House can be determined by when consent was given in relation …show more content…
Indeed, in Neade v. Protes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 443 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Plaintiffs’ exact argument. There, the plaintiff sued a doctor for both medical negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty. Id. at 438. The supreme court declined to hold up the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim, finding that the claim was merely a “re-presentment” of her medical negligence claim. Id. at