Prior to a foreclosure sale, “a party to the lien instrument . . . may file in [a foreclosure] action a motion to stay the sale of the property and dismiss the foreclosure action.” Md. Rule 14-211(a)(1); Thomas, supra, 427 Md. at 444 n.5. Indeed, prior to the sale, Sucklal filed a litany of motions to either dismiss or stay the foreclosure proceedings. The gravamen of Sucklal’s serial filings was that the lenders had no right to foreclose. Unlike Sucklal’s post-sale motions, her pre-sale motions were timely, though, otherwise without merit because Sucklal was estopped from denying GSMC’s and Ocwen’s interest in the note. The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists “‘based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch
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Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 (2012). Furthermore, “[c]ollateral estoppel may be used offensively or defensively.” Garrity v. Md. State Bd. of Plumbing, 221 Md. App. 678, 685 (2015). Additionally, the fact that the parties in the instant case have failed to raise the issue of collateral estoppel is of no consequence. See Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 59 (1983) (applying the doctrine of res judicata sua sponte); Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass’n, 157 Md. App. 504, 529 (2004) (“[I]n the interests of judicial economy, [a court] may sua sponte invoke res judicata or collateral estoppel to resolve a matter before …show more content…
Rule 14-207(b), that GSMC and Ocwen lack standing to pursue foreclosure, and that the denial of her motions constitute a denial of procedural due process. These arguments rest on the premise that neither GSMC nor Ocwen has an enforceable interest in Sucklal’s note. It has been conclusively determined, however, that GSMC and Ocwen do have enforceable interests in the note. The judgment rendered in Sucklal’s declaratory judgment action satisfies the elements so as to invoke collateral estoppel with respect to the issue of Sucklal’s liability to GSMC and Ocwen on the instrument. Accordingly, Sucklal is estopped from arguing that GSMC and Ocwen have no interest in her note. We share in the frustration expressed by the United States Bankruptcy Court who characterized the fillings of this disbarred attorney as “completely baseless” and “inexcusable,” and we refuse to dignify Sucklal’s abuse of process by undergoing yet another analysis as to why GSMC and Ocwen have an enforceable interest in her note. On September 26, 2013, the circuit court judge gave a competent, accurate, and thorough explanation on the record as to why judgment was rendered against Sucklal; that decision was memorialized in a written order dated October 11, 2013; that decision was not appealed; and that decision binds the parties with respect to this
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 (2012). Furthermore, “[c]ollateral estoppel may be used offensively or defensively.” Garrity v. Md. State Bd. of Plumbing, 221 Md. App. 678, 685 (2015). Additionally, the fact that the parties in the instant case have failed to raise the issue of collateral estoppel is of no consequence. See Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 59 (1983) (applying the doctrine of res judicata sua sponte); Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass’n, 157 Md. App. 504, 529 (2004) (“[I]n the interests of judicial economy, [a court] may sua sponte invoke res judicata or collateral estoppel to resolve a matter before …show more content…
Rule 14-207(b), that GSMC and Ocwen lack standing to pursue foreclosure, and that the denial of her motions constitute a denial of procedural due process. These arguments rest on the premise that neither GSMC nor Ocwen has an enforceable interest in Sucklal’s note. It has been conclusively determined, however, that GSMC and Ocwen do have enforceable interests in the note. The judgment rendered in Sucklal’s declaratory judgment action satisfies the elements so as to invoke collateral estoppel with respect to the issue of Sucklal’s liability to GSMC and Ocwen on the instrument. Accordingly, Sucklal is estopped from arguing that GSMC and Ocwen have no interest in her note. We share in the frustration expressed by the United States Bankruptcy Court who characterized the fillings of this disbarred attorney as “completely baseless” and “inexcusable,” and we refuse to dignify Sucklal’s abuse of process by undergoing yet another analysis as to why GSMC and Ocwen have an enforceable interest in her note. On September 26, 2013, the circuit court judge gave a competent, accurate, and thorough explanation on the record as to why judgment was rendered against Sucklal; that decision was memorialized in a written order dated October 11, 2013; that decision was not appealed; and that decision binds the parties with respect to this