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105 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Length of conflict |
Thirty year struggle against foreign domination A series of overlapping conflicts Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia had been under French domination since c19 1941 -League for Vietnamese Independence under Go Sept 1945 - Ho declared establishment of Democratic Republic of Vietnam |
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French struggle with Viet Minh |
1946-54 British had moved in and taken control of south, holding for France. War broke out after negotiations failed |
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US funding for French |
1950 - extended military and economic assistance. Providing 78% financing for war effort by 1953 |
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Geneva Conference |
1954 Decision to split Vietnam down 17th parallel Non-communist regime in south had little support. Diem regime was represented eg secret police Elections to reunify country never held US convinced that Viet Minh wrmere a front for the Soviets |
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Revival of communist insurgency |
1959 Directed by Hanoi Diem began to lose control of countryside, especially by 1961 |
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JFK policy |
The 'limited partnership's By 1963, 16,000 US advisers Nov 1963 - Diem overthrown in US-backed coup. Chronic instability ensued. |
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Johnson resistance to sending extra troops |
JCS demanded extra troops but LBJ resisted until after Nov 1964 elections |
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Gulf of Tonkin Resolution |
August 1964 - almost unanimous congressional approval for military action in SE Asia after Gulf of Tonkin incident, when 2 US ships were allegedly attacked by NV patrol boats. LBJ approved limited airstrikes . |
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When did NV combat troops join war in SV? |
Late 1964 Large parts of rural SV under communist control by early 1965 |
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Americanisation |
LBJ decided in favour of limited escalation at first to prevent collapse of SV Feb 1965 - Operation Rolling Thunder. Bombing campaign on NV. Ground troops deployed in march 1965 180,000 combat troops by end of 1965 500,00 troops by 1968 |
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Search and destroy missions |
Major disruption to Vietnamese life 1968 My Lai Massacre |
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Tet Offensive |
1968 Major effort by communists to produce an uprising in the South Deep psychological blow to US LBJ now began to reject military's demands for more troops Partial bombing halt |
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Nixon strategy |
Expand war to Cambodia. Use more heavy bombing Gradually withdraw forces |
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End of war |
Jan 1973 - Paris Peace agreement April 30 1975 - fall of Saigon |
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Death toll |
1-2 million Vietnamese deaths 58,000 US deaths |
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Quagmire thesis |
Arthur Schlesinger Accidental progression into war. Each step inadvertently sucked US in further "A tragedy without villains" Small, incremental steps Chance, not design None would have approved their own actions had they known what the eventual consequences would be |
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Stalemate thesis |
Presidents were aware of risks involved in committing troops, but felt it was better than losing Vietnam to communism. Avoiding defeat was main goal. |
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Revisionism |
Defends US involvement. US could have won with more effective campaign. |
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Postrevisionism |
Critical of US involvement, but sympathetic to dilemmas faced by presidents |
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Limitations of Saigon |
Military forces improved, but never enough. With support of US and France, always had total air superiority and superior mobility and manpower. No single, united purpose. Unable to achieve victory. Presidents Thieu and Diem never able to gather support from peasants and masses. Never earned legitimacy. |
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Strength of NV |
Viet Minh and Hanoi will to fight never diminished or compromised. Put aside differences for cause of united Vietnam. Helped by Soviet and Chinese aid whenever they needed it. |
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Saigon little incentive to improve |
As US had too much to lower from withdrawal. Weakness of Saigon was its bargaining strength - US knew it could collapse. |
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Kennedy acknowledged that war was unwinnable |
"a white man's war" (1961) But, also knew that SV would fall without US help |
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Daniel Ellsberg |
LBJ didn't want to be first president to lose a war |
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Ethnocentricity |
Failure to treat Vietnam as different a Western country |
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LBJ feeling of obligation |
To maintain US international commitments JFK had committed US to SV's defence. Failure to do so would lead to loss of prestige and open way for Soviets |
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Norman Podhoretz |
"a moral and necessary intervention" Argument for war was conceded to anti war forces - Nixon did not even try to defend Not self interested - aim was to defend SV |
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Communist brutality |
During occupation of Hue in Tet, communists killed 3000 civilians Murdered 50,000 landlords after taking power in 1954 Re-education camps after 1975 victory |
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Gabriel Kolko |
Vietnam was extension of containment policy Same vein as Greece and Turkey, 1947 US forced to draw line after 1949 Also providing aid to Turkey, Pakistan, Greece Fall of SE Asia would mean loss of world source of rubber, tin, petroleum to communists Washington convinced that communists were orchestrating the upheaval |
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Frederick lovegall |
Johnson too often let off hook by historians - made wrong decision in 1965 Pressured into decision by senior advisers and foreign policy bureaucracy Scepticism in WaPo, WSJ, NYT Congress - Dems held majorities in both houses Richard Russell, Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright Allied governments opposed LBJ had won 1964 election campaigning against sending troops. Beat Goldwater. Feb-March 1965 - every lawmaker invited to at least one WH briefing |
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More Flags programme |
May 1964 To get more allies involved. Most allies declined |
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Congress throttled aid to SV |
1972 - $2bn 1974 - $0.75bn |
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NV attempts to negotiate |
1964 - Hanoi promised UN Gen Sec that they were willing to enter into bilateral negotiations with Washington April 1965 - NV's 'Four Points' statement. Could have provided opening for talks. |
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Humphrey memo |
1965 - warned LBJ that costs of escalation were higher than of withdrawal |
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Pentagon Papers |
Aid was "tangible first step" into the crisis. Most aid went into SV army, not development |
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David Anderson |
Ike would have intervened more if he had needed to |
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Public support for LBJ over Vietnam |
July 1966 poll - 85% agreed about need to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong |
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When did Fulbright begin public hearings on war? |
1966 |
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Anti-war movement methods |
Draft-card burning, sit-ins at draft centres, demos, teach-ins |
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Morale in army |
Units were refusing combat, murdering officers, taking drugs 1968-71 - desertion rates doubled (2x peak rate in Korea) 1968-71 - subordination charges doubled 141-245 underground newspapers |
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LBJ and Nixon attitude towards peace movement |
Saw as threatening. Both tried to infiltrate and disrupt. Johnson ordered FBI and CIA to investigate, hoping to find communist influence |
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"limited incursion into the country of Congress" |
April 1971 VVAW Week long 1000 veterans camped in Potomac Park. Veterans also chucked medals over fence around Capitol April 24 1971 - 500,000 protesters Nixon appealed to 'silent majority' |
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MLK role |
By 1967, had endorsed draft resistance and protests Civil rights and peace movements became entwined - would have been highly potent if not for assassination |
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JFK reluctance |
Reluctant to send more than 16,000 advisers Nov 1961 - explicitly ruled out deploying 6-8000 combat troops Considered withdrawing after 1964 |
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JFK and LBJ attempt to downplay US involvement |
Advisers dragged into fight 1962 - 200 sorties by US pilots per month 1963 - 1000 No recognition of their sacrifice May 1964 - SV premier let slip that 300 Americans had died in Vietnam. Official Pentagon public records showed just 131 |
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LBJ dislike of idea of escalation |
"it just makes chills run up my back" But, unwilling to lose Vietnam |
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Poor advice |
Bundy - predicted a "cheap" war McNamara - convinced LBJ of "graduated pressure" that would bring communists to negotiating table. July 1965 - LBJ authorised 175,000 troops. McNamara predicted this would be enough |
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JCS demands |
500,000 troops for 5 years |
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Westmoreland strategy |
Send out patrols using helicopters to kill VC insurgents Use of mobility Search and destroy Attrition |
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Nixon withdrawal of troops by 1972 |
500,000 troops had unilaterally withdrawn Left just 20,000 1972 - just 600 casualties (16,000 in 1968). |
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1969 protests |
Oct 1969 - 50,000 in DC; 20,000 in NYC; 10,000 in Boston |
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TV focus on war |
CBS, ABC reported war in detail CBS - showed battlefield scenes and interviewed soldiers Walter Cronkite - argued after Tet that war could not be won. LBJ - "if I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America" |
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LBJ early popularity |
Late 1965 - bombing pause until early 1966 63% supported LBJ handling |
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KIA figures, 1966 |
June 1966 - KIA figures regularly above 100 per week/500 casualties Oct 1966 - 2x as many US losses as SV ones |
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Opposition to draft |
Only 10% eligible adult population entered service Compares to 70% in Korea |
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Pentagon casualty lists |
1966 - began to publish casualty list differentiated by race. Intended to display patriotism of black troops. Blacks - 11% pop, 22% KIA |
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1967 war popularity |
Oct 1967 - massive march on Pentagon 46% now considered the war a mistake (up 20% in 2 years) 57% disapproved of LBJ handling. Just 28% approved. |
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Westmoreland replacement |
June 1968 - General Creighton Adams replaced Westmoreland New strategy - protection of populated areas |
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Tet casualties |
500 Americans dying per month 1968 - as many Americans dues as in combined total of previous years Tet was Feb-March 1968 |
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Second Tet offensive |
March 1969 453 Americans died in first month |
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Nixon slogan |
"Peace with honour" |
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Operation Menu |
March 1969 Secret bombings of NV sanctuaries 3600 B52 bombings in next 14 months |
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Johnson secrecy |
Refusal to seek declaration of war No national debate No callup of reserves Wanted low-key, gradual escalation Attached announcement of escalation nomination to Abe Fortas to SC |
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Idealistic element to LBJ thinking |
Believed that US could help SV Spoke of a TVA on the Mekong Delta, which would benefit both Vietnams Hated idea of "cutting and running" |
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Lack of support from allies |
CDG - "absurd war" Wilson - only moral support |
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LBJ advisers |
McNamara, rusk, Bundy, ristiw all urged on war Humphrey barred from key meetings for a year and George ball's advice not taken |
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"credibility gap" |
Damaged LBJ RN tried to remedy - 7 televised Oval Office appearances between 1969-71 |
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Diplomatic breakthrough |
Oct 1972 - NV delegation at Paris, under Le Duc Tho, abandoned demand that SV gov be overthrown |
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Aim of vietnamisation |
Give sv generals sufficient warming before withdrawal, while reassuring US public |
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Comparative troop figures |
1968: US - 500,000 troops SV - 700,000 NV - 250,000 Guerillas - 250,000 |
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Francis Bartor |
LBJ motivated by Great Society legislation. Believed there would be no GS without Vietnam 30 June - narrow passage of rent subsidy bill Voting rights, Medicare coming up LBJ knew he needed more congressional support for these bills, hence July 1965 decision Knew that Ike and hawkish senators would criticise him if he didn't escalate LBJ cared about nothing more than completing FDR programme 1964 - had picked up an extra 50 confessional seats. Recognised 2 year window of opportunity Just 34 votes needed to block cloture. 20 deep south senators, so just 14 conservatives needed to block GS legislation |
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June-July decision to escalate |
June - Westmoreland demanded open-ended build up. SV army had taken a beating June 21 - still unwilling to go above a ceiling of 100,000 Sent McNamara to negotiate with Westmoreland for lowest possible number of troops |
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LBJ comparison of GS and Vietnam |
"my beautiful lady" Vs "that ugly bitch" |
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LBJ paranoia |
Robert Kennedy supported war |
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Bartor on LBJ foreign policy acumen |
Bartor was his deputy national security adviser LBJ did not like to travel or read. Was perceptive, just not high brow Unlike JFK, preferred domestic legislation Not convinced by Domini theory - did not regard sv as totally vital Failed to scrutinise Westmoreland plan |
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Robert Divine |
LBJ was unlucky Unlike JFK and Ike, could not undertake limited action to save Vietnam Straight choice between committing troops and losing Vietnam and an ally Whole containment strategy was flawed - same policy used in Asia as in Europe |
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Revisionist criticisms of LBJ |
Failure to mobilise national will, as he did behind great society Too much focus on VC, not enough on NV Tet was major victory yet treated as a major defeat - communists failed to capture a single city and lost 50,000 men. No uprising. 28% deaths were civilian, compared to 70% in Korea |
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Christmas Bombings |
1972 1500 civilians died |
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Speed of Nixon withdrawal |
10% troops withdrawn by sept 1969 |
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Kissinger criticism of LBJ |
Should have gone for broke after Tet. Weakened NV would have accepted unconditional negotiations. Instead, announced bombing pause and that would not stand for re-election - lost negotiating power |
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How many US troops served in Vietnam? |
58,000 |
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Truman May 1950 commitment |
$10mn to French |
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Importance of SE Asia |
Trade with Japan and GB Stability |
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Incursion into Cambodia |
RN announced in April 1970 Aim was to destroy NV sanctuaries Lasted until June 2117 Americans died in first three weeks |
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Nixon draft policy |
Military draft based on randomness, not universality, established |
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Kent State |
4 students killed by national guard |
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1972 election |
McGovern destroyed - anti-war candidacy |
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Haiphong Harbour |
RN bombed in may 1972. Was NV major port |
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Easter Offensive |
March 1972 Launched by NV, who lost 100,000 men. Led to breakthrough in negotiations |
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Nixon approval ratings, 1972 |
70% approx at end of war |
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1950 NSC document 68 |
Had concluded that global equilibrium was at stake in Indochina |
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Kissinger critique of successive administrations |
Enough commitment to get US entangled but not enough to prove decisive |
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Formalisation of Domino Theory |
1952 |
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Truman annual spending on Vietnam by 1952 |
$200mn |
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Ike strategy |
Pressed for reform; saw Indochina as vital "United Action" - attempt to form an international coalition $1bn in aid 1500 personnel By 1960, 2500 SV officials being assassinated per year. Active guerilla campaign. |
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Dulles on Diem |
"the only horse available" |
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US at Geneva |
Refused to participate openly. Tried to be both present and absent. Geneva established neutrality of Laos and Cambodia (yet NV built 650 miles of routes through them) |
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US mistake with SV army |
Tried to form in own image. Trained for a European style war. |
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JFK overarching objective |
To make SV a nation capable of defending itself |
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Influence of bay of pigs |
April 1961 Shook JFK not to intervene? |
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LBJ visit to Saigon |
May 1961 Reported back that the poverty there was main problem |
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JFK attempt to influence Saigon |
Wanted advisory role at every level of government. Diem refused. Nov 1963 coup. |
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Kissinger on LBJ/Kennedy |
LBJ could not abandon policy if his revered predecessor |
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Impact of instability after coup |
NV took advantage. Strengthened guerilla units and accelerated infiltration 1964 - seven changes in SV gov. Nobody could equal Diem's prestige |
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LBJ bombing pauses |
16 overall 1967 San Antonio formula - bombing pause in exchange for negotiations |
