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32 Cards in this Set
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Davey v Harrow Corporation [1958] (QB) |
In Davey v Harrow Corporation [1958], roots of trees which were growing on defendant corporation’s property had penetrated land of C’s adjoining property. This encroachment caused damage to C’s house. In CA Lord Goddard said: ‘… if trees encroach, whether by branches or roots, and cause damage, an action for nuisance will lie…’ No distinction is to be drawn between trees which may have been self-sown and trees which were deliberately planted on land. |
roots of trees which were growing on defendant corporation’s property had penetrated land of C’s adjoining property |
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Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] (CA) => overruled in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] |
In Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] CA held that C, who lived with her mother and had no proprietary interest in property, was entitled to an injunction to restrain a private nuisance in form of telephone harassment. However, in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] majority in HL overruled this decision and put beyond doubt principle that a propriety interest in land is required to found an action in private nuisance. Nevertheless, it has subsequently been questioned whether exclusion of family members living in home is consistent with Article 8 of ECHR. |
C, who lived with her mother and had no proprietary interest in property, applied for an injunction to restrain a private nuisance in form of telephone harassment. |
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Baxter v Camden LBC (No 2) [2001] (QB) |
In Baxter v Camden LBC (No 2) [2001], a tenant of a flat complained of noise created by her immediate neighbours, also tenants of D. day-to-day noise of tenants was made worse because property had been converted into flats without proper sound insulation. CA dismissed claim in nuisance on ground that occupants of low-cost, high-density housing must be expected to tolerate higher levels of noise from their neighbours than others in more substantial and spacious premises. => test is one of ‘reasonable user’, balancing interest of defendants to use their land as is legally permitted against conflicting interest of C to have quiet enjoyment of their land. => It should be noted that ordinary use of your home will not amount to a nuisance, even if it discomforts your neighbour due to poor soundproofing or insulation. |
tenant of a flat complained of noise created by her immediate neighbours, also tenants of D |
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Walter v Selfe (1851) and St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) => Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Damage to property or personal discomfort |
courts are more willing to find a nuisance where physical damage to property has been caused, and tend to ignore factors such as nature of locality. Personal discomfort will normally have to be substantial to merit a response: Walter v Selfe (1851) and St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) |
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Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd [1993] (QB) Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: The nature of the locality |
In this case planning permission to develop a commercial dock was held to have changed character of neighbourhood and local residents were therefore unable to claim in nuisance for disturbance it created. |
planning permission to develop a commercial dock |
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Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] |
In Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] it was held that granting of planning permission to facilitate an activity on a site already used for that purpose does not carry with it an immunity in nuisance in respect of implementation of that planning permission. D in Wheeler had obtained planning permission for two pig-weaning houses on a site already used for that purpose. In response to C’s claim in nuisance D contended that, since they had obtained planning permission, any smell emanating from pigs kept in weaning houses could not amount to a nuisance. Here, CA found D liable. |
D in Wheeler had obtained planning permission for two pig-weaning houses on a site already used for that purpose |
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Coventry v Lawrence [2014] (SC) => Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: The nature of the localityn |
Coventry v Lawrence [2014] concerned an alleged noise nuisance arising from a motor sports stadium for which planning permission had been granted. In this case SC reviewed law of nuisance and considered: 1. relationship between planning control and tort of nuisance 2. right by prescription to commit a nuisance and argument that C ‘came to nuisance’ SC reviewed extent to which a grant of planning permission might change character of a neighbourhood and considered approach to be adopted by a court when deciding whether to grant an injunction to restrain a nuisance or whether to award damages instead. |
nuisance arising from a motor sports stadium for which planning permission had been granted |
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De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd v Spicer Bros Ltd (1914) And Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolton Fireworks Ltd [1996 => Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Duration and frequency |
The longer and more frequent the interference, the more likely it will be found to be a nuisance |
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SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd v WJ Whittal & Son Ltd [1971] (QB) |
This does not necessarily exclude an isolated escape of sufficient gravity. |
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Miller v Jackson [1977] QB => Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Utility of defendant’s conduct |
In Miller v Jackson [1977] C bought a house in 1972 in such a location that it was inevitable that cricket balls from a cricket ground nearby would be hit into the garden. Cricket had been played on ground since 1905 but C contended that since the houses were built it had become a substantial interference and claimed in negligence and in nuisance. CA found that playing of cricket constituted an unreasonable interference with C’s enjoyment of land and was therefore a nuisance. majority considered that social utility of cricket could not justify a substantial interference in C’s enjoyment of their land but no injunction was granted to restrain the cricket. The court took the view that the utility of the club outweighed C’s interest. |
bought a house in 1972 and cricket balls from a cricket ground nearby were hit into the garden |
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Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Abnormal sensitivity |
Here, complaint related to hot air which affected brown paper stored in claimant’s part of building and which had come from lower part of building in which D operated a business. court refused the claim. heat was not so high that it would affect ordinary paper or even C’s workforce. damage was due to exceptionally delicate nature of the C’s trade. This would not amount to a nuisance. If, however, interference would have affected ordinary paper, C would have been able to claim the full extent of his losses: |
complaint related to hot air which affected brown paper stored in claimant’s part of building |
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Mackinnon Industries v Walker [1951] |
Recovery for harm to orchids was allowed because fumes would have damaged any flowers grown. |
Harm to orchids due to fumes |
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Christie v Davey [1893] Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Malice |
The state of mind of D would also seem to be relevant in assessing whether defendant’s use of their land is reasonable. In this case C succeeded in obtaining an injunction when her neighbour, frustrated by noise of music lessons in her home, expressed his annoyance by knocking on the party wall, beating trays, whistling and shrieking. In the words of North J: what was done by the defendant was done only for purpose of annoyance and in my opinion, it was not a legitimate use of D’s house’ |
frustrated by noise of music lessons in her home, neighbour expressed his annoyance by knocking on the party wall, beating trays, whistling and shrieking. |
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Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] => Private nuisance - Factors determining reasonable use: Malice |
Here, D’s premises adjoined C’s silver fox farm. In attempting to prevent foxes from breeding D discharged guns on his own land as near as possible to boundary of C’s land to scare the foxes. Macnaghten J considered intention of D to be relevant in nuisance and an injunction and damages were awarded. |
D’s premises adjoined C’s silver fox farm. |
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Leading case: Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] (HL) Private nuisance - Who can be sued: An occupier who has adopted or continued a nuisance |
leading case of Sedleigh-Denfield consolidated pre-existing law and applies to both private and public nuisances. Here, a local authority, without D’s permission (and therefore as a trespasser), had placed a drainage pipe in a ditch on D’s land with a grating designed to keep out leaves. grating had not been fixed in correct position, with result that, during a heavy rainstorm, pipe became choked with leaves and water overflowed onto C’s land. HL held D liable. He had adopted nuisance by using drain for his own purposes to drain water from his land. He had also continued nuisance because his manager should have realised risk of flooding created by obstruction and taken reasonable steps to abate it. It is essentially a rule of good sense and convenience. Where occupier of land is best placed to deal with nuisance, they will be liable if they are found to be at fault. |
a local authority, without D’s permission (and therefore as a trespasser), had placed a drainage pipe in a ditch on D’s land with a grating designed to keep out leaves. |
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Tetley v Chitty [1986] => Private nuisance - Who can be sued: An occupier who has adopted or continued a nuisance |
The basic rule is that court will examine purpose for which premises are let and consider whether nuisance was a necessary consequence of the letting. If so, landlord will be liable for authorising nuisance. In practice, complications arise. |
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Smith v Scott [1973] => Private nuisance - Who can be sued: An occupier who has adopted or continued a nuisance |
local authority was not found to have authorised the nuisance caused by a family they housed even when they were known to be a ‘problem family’. It could not be said that council had authorised the Scotts to commit a nuisance when it had inserted in their tenancy agreement a clause expressly prohibiting commission of such acts. This would seem unduly favourable to landlord. => Would an eviction warning be required should council have found out about the nuisance? |
authority was not found to have authorised the nuisance caused by a family they housed even when they were known to be a ‘problem family |
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two CA decisions of 2000 which are difficult to reconcile: Hussain v Lancaster CC [2000] and Lippiatt v Gloucestershire CC [2000] => Private nuisance - Who can be sued: An occupier who has adopted or continued a nuisance |
They appear to reach different conclusions, CA in Lippiatt seeks to circumvent earlier decision in Hussain. The question in both cases was whether the local authority would be liable for actions of their tenants (in Hussain) or their licensees (in Lippiatt). Hussain concerned a campaign of racial harassment against a shopkeeper on defendant’s housing estate. It was alleged that council, as landlords, should have intervened to prevent their tenants from harassing the Hussains. CA rejected this claim. council’s standard form tenancy agreement had included a clause instructing tenant ‘not to discriminate against or harass any residents or visitors’. In the circumstances, council could not be said to have authorised these acts. Secondly, tenants’ actions did not involve a use of their land, which would be required to render the nuisance actionable. CA in Lippiatt took a different view. Here, travellers had been allowed to stay on council land and had caused havoc by trespassing, dumping rubbish and other acts of vandalism on neighbouring land. In finding council liable, Hussain was distinguished on two grounds. 1. travellers had used land to commit nuisance by using it as a ‘launching pad’ to commit acts of nuisance on neighbouring properties. 2. council was more likely to be liable for acts of trespassers and licensees than tenants (as in Hussain). While tenants have statutory protection, it is easier to evict trespassers and licensees from land. By failing to do so within a reasonable period of time, council found itself liable. It must be questioned whether this distinction is a convincing one. It is far from established that a private nuisance must emanate from use of land. It will in most cases, but is this the same as a rule? |
question in both cases was whether the local authority would be liable for actions of their tenants (in Hussain) or their licensees (in Lippiatt). |
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Sturges v Bridgman (1879) => Defences to Private Nuisance: 20 years prescription |
In Sturges v Bridgman (1879), defendant’s premises adjoined those of C, a medical practitioner. For over 20 years noise and vibrations from defendant’s business as a confectioner had not interfered with C’s use of land. C then built a consulting room in garden and complained of noise. Prescription was pleaded but defence failed because time ran from when new building was erected and nuisance had only commenced from that date. |
defendant’s premises adjoined those of C, a medical practitioner |
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two CA decisions of 2000 which are difficult to reconcile: Hussain v Lancaster CC [2000] and Lippiatt v Gloucestershire CC [2000] => Private nuisance - Who can be sued: An occupier who has adopted or continued a nuisance |
They appear to reach different conclusions, CA in Lippiatt seeks to circumvent earlier decision in Hussain. The question in both cases was whether the local authority would be liable for actions of their tenants (in Hussain) or their licensees (in Lippiatt). Hussain concerned a campaign of racial harassment against a shopkeeper on defendant’s housing estate. It was alleged that council, as landlords, should have intervened to prevent their tenants from harassing the Hussains. CA rejected this claim. council’s standard form tenancy agreement had included a clause instructing tenant ‘not to discriminate against or harass any residents or visitors’. In the circumstances, council could not be said to have authorised these acts. Secondly, tenants’ actions did not involve a use of their land, which would be required to render the nuisance actionable. CA in Lippiatt took a different view. Here, travellers had been allowed to stay on council land and had caused havoc by trespassing, dumping rubbish and other acts of vandalism on neighbouring land. In finding council liable, Hussain was distinguished on two grounds. 1. travellers had used land to commit nuisance by using it as a ‘launching pad’ to commit acts of nuisance on neighbouring properties. 2. council was more likely to be liable for acts of trespassers and licensees than tenants (as in Hussain). While tenants have statutory protection, it is easier to evict trespassers and licensees from land. By failing to do so within a reasonable period of time, council found itself liable. It must be questioned whether this distinction is a convincing one. It is far from established that a private nuisance must emanate from use of land. It will in most cases, but is this the same as a rule? |
question in both cases was whether the local authority would be liable for actions of their tenants (in Hussain) or their licensees (in Lippiatt). |
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Sturges v Bridgman (1879) => Defences to Private Nuisance: 20 years prescription |
In Sturges v Bridgman (1879), defendant’s premises adjoined those of C, a medical practitioner. For over 20 years noise and vibrations from defendant’s business as a confectioner had not interfered with C’s use of land. C then built a consulting room in garden and complained of noise. Prescription was pleaded but defence failed because time ran from when new building was erected and nuisance had only commenced from that date. |
defendant’s premises adjoined those of C, a medical practitioner, who erected a consulted room in garden after more than 20 years. |
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Bliss v Hall (1838) => Ineffective Defences to Private Nuisance: Coming to the nuisance |
It is a well-established rule that C may sue even though nuisance was, to C’s knowledge, in existence before they arrived at premises. In Bliss v Hall (1838) C occupied a property adjoining premises of defendant candle-maker. C alleged nuisance in emission of smells and noxious vapours which resulted from candle-making process. fact that business had been carried on in same premises for three years before C came to adjoining property did not defeat C’s claim. justification for rule is that it would be unreasonable to expect someone not to purchase land because a neighbour was abusing their rights. |
C occupied a property adjoining premises of defendant candle-maker |
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Adams v Ursell [1913] => Ineffective Defences to Private Nuisance: Social Utility |
This is not a defence, although it may encourage court to be more flexible in deciding a remedy. In Adams v Ursell [1913] utility of a fish-and-chip shop to local poor inhabitants could not justify its presence in a fashionable street. |
Fish-and-Chips shop in a fashionable street |
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Lambton v Mellish [1894] => Ineffective Defences to Private Nuisance: Nuisance due to many |
It is no excuse that defendant was simply one of many causing nuisance in question: in Lambton v Mellish [1894] Chitty J held that if acts of two persons, each being aware of what other is doing, amount in aggregate to what is an actionable wrong, each is amenable to remedy against aggregate cause of complaint. |
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Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Injunction |
Injuction is a discretionary remedy and claimant has no right to an injunction. court may decide to give damages ‘in lieu’ of an injunction: s.50, Supreme Court Act 1981 and Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895]. This case sets out conditions for awarding damages rather than an injunction in nuisance cases. City of London Electrical Lighting Company set up powerful engines and other works on land near a house which was being leased by Shelfer. Due to vibrations and noise caused by work, structural damage appeared in the house and caused annoyance and disturbance to Shelfer. He brought an action for an injunction and damages for injury and nuisance caused thus far. trial judge refused to grant an injunction and instead awarded damages. => Shelfer rules are commonly seen as a starting point in considering an award of damages instead of an injunction. Shelfer rules provide that whether for a mandatory injunction or to restrain a continuing nuisance, appropriate remedy may be damages in lieu of an injunction if: 1. injury to C’s legal rights is small 2. it is one which is capable of being estimated in money 3. it is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment 4. it would be oppressive to D to grant an injunction. |
rules provide that whether for a mandatory injunction or to restrain a continuing nuisance, appropriate remedy may be damages in lieu of an injunction if 4 conditions are fulfilled |
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Coventry v. Lawrence (2014) (SC) => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Injunction |
SC in Coventry v Lawrence took opportunity to review court’s power to award damages in lieu of an injunction and to remind judges of their broad discretion beyond boundaries of Shelfer rules. Lord Neuberger identified ‘public interest’ as a relevant consideration in reaching this decision and Lord Sumption said: “In my view, decision in Shelfer… is out of date, and it is unfortunate that it has been followed so recently and so slavishly.” |
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Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] (HL) => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Abatement |
This is a self-help remedy and thus to be exercised with caution. An example is where your neighbour’s branches grow over your fence and you cut them back. It is a remedy of limited utility and realistically only worth considering in relation to minor problems such as encroaching roots and branches. |
This is a self-help remedy and to be exercised with caution. |
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Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] (HL) => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Damages |
Private nuisance, as a tort to land, is considered to protect proprietary interests. rule therefore, as suggested by leading case of Hunter v Canary Wharf, would seem to be that householder may obtain damages for interference with their interest in land, be it physical or non- physical, but not for personal injury. Damages will be awarded for diminution in value of land or lesser enjoyment of use of land or its fixtures. |
Leasing case deciding when damages will be awarded |
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Andreae v Selfridge & Company Ltd [1938] => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Damages |
Consequential economic loss is recoverable. Provided that claim satisfies rules of remoteness, which is same test as used in negligence: are damages of a type which can be reasonably foreseen? |
Consequential economic loss |
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Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] => Remedies for Private Nuisance: Damages |
Damage to personal property would appear to be recoverable: damage to laundry hanging in garden. Provided that claim satisfies the rules of remoteness, which is the same test as used in negligence: are damages of a type which can be reasonably foreseen? |
Damage to personal property |
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Romer LJ in A-G v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] => Definition of Public Nuisance |
Any nuisance is ‘public’ which materially affects reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects. sphere of nuisance may be described generally as ‘the neighbourhood’; but question whether local community within that sphere comprises a sufficient number of persons to constitute a class of public is a question of fact in every case. |
sphere of nuisance may be described generally as ‘the neighbourhood’ |
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Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd v Greater London Council [1983] (HL) => Public Nuisance |
Ferry terminals constructed by D in River Thames caused excessive silting. This disrupted C’s business by obstructing access to their jetty and they had to spend large sums on dredging operations. Their claim in private nuisance was dismissed because: 1) jetty itself was unaffected and (2) they had no private rights of property in river bed. However, it was their public right to use river which had been damaged and HL held that their claim lay in public nuisance alone. expenditure incurred by C on dredging constituted particular damage over and above ordinary inconvenience suffered by public at large, and was therefore recoverable. |
Ferry terminals constructed by D in the River Thames caused excessive silting. |
