Tort Law Chapter 18: Rylands And Fletcher Rule

Front 1

Rylands v Fletcher (1865) (HL)

=> The rule deals with damage caused by isolated escapes from a neighbour’s land.

Back 1

Here a mill owner had employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on his land to provide water for his mill. During the course of building, independent contractors discovered some old shafts and passages of an abandoned coal mine on the defendant’s land, which appeared to be blocked. When the reservoir was filled, water burst through the old shafts, which were subsequently found to connect with C’s mine. As a result, C’s mine was flooded and he sought compensation.

classic statement of principle was given by Blackburn J in Court of Exchequer Chamber:

We think that true rule of law is, that person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

Hint 1

Here a mill owner had employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on his land to provide water for his mill. During the course of building, independent contractors discovered some old shafts and passages of an abandoned coal mine

Front 2

Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] (HL)

Back 2

All four requirements must be proved to establish liability:

1. defendant brings on his lands for his own purposes something likely to do mischief

2. which escapes

3. due to a non-natural use

4. which causes foreseeable harm.

Hint 2

All four requirements must be proved to establish liability

Front 3

Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd (1947)

=> element 2: which escapes

Back 3

In this case C was employed as an inspector in D’s munitions factory. In course of her employment she was injured by explosion of a shell that was being manufactured on premises. There was no allegation of negligence on part of employers.

HL ruled that since there had been no ‘escape’ of thing that inflicted injury Rylands v Fletcher was inapplicable. In absence of negligence C’s claim failed.

Hint 3

Shell exploded in a munitions factory

Front 4

Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] (HL)

Back 4

HL in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] and Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] determined that Rylands v Fletcher rule will only apply where loss suffered is reasonably foreseeable and that it is in reality an extension of tort of private nuisance to isolated escapes from land.

In Cambridge Water, defendants, an old established leather manufacturer, used a chemical solvent, PCE, in their tanning process. PCE evaporates quickly in air but is not readily soluble in water. In course of process, before a change of method in 1976, continual small spillages had gradually built up a pool of PCE under defendants’ premises. solvent seeped into soil below and contaminated aquifer from which C drew their water.

At first instance claim in Rylands v Fletcher was dismissed because it was held that there was no non-natural user of land. nuisance action failed because at time contamination was taking place it was not foreseen that quantities of chemical would accumulate or that, if they did, there would be any significant damage.

HL held that claims in negligence and nuisance failed for lack of foreseeability. action in Rylands v Fletcher also failed because defendants had not known, and could not reasonably have foreseen, that seepage would cause pollution.

Hint 4

PCE, a chemical solvent, seeped into the soil and aquifer

Front 5

Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] (HL)

Back 5

HL in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] and Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] (HL) determined that Rylands v Fletcher rule will only apply where loss suffered is reasonably foreseeable and that it is, in reality, an extension of tort of private nuisance to isolated escapes from land.

In Transco HL confirmed that rule was in fact a subset of private nuisance. Here, council was owner of a tower block of flats and an adjacent embankment. A large water pipe serving flats leaked and water escaped into embankment and caused it to collapse. As a result, a high pressure gas main was left exposed and claimants sought recovery of substantial costs spent in taking action to prevent the pipe fracturing.

trial judge held council liable, finding that its use was not an ordinary use of land. However, CA overturned this ruling and held that provision of a water supply through a service pipe carrying water from mains to a block of flats on council’s land is an ordinary use of land under principles in Rylands v Fletcher. HL agreed with CA and held that piping of a water supply, a routine function which could not be seen as creating any special hazard, was an ordinary use of council’s land.

=> conditions to be met before strict liability is imposed for ‘non-natural’ use will not be easily satisfied unless defendant’s use of land is shown to have been extraordinary and unusual and creating a special hazard.

=> This case is particularly important because HL took opportunity to review modern scope and application of rule in Rylands v Fletcher. In favouring a restrictive approach, rule will in future be confined to exceptional circumstances where occupier has brought some dangerous thing onto his land which poses an exceptionally high risk to neighbouring property should it escape, and which amounts to an extraordinary and unusual use of land.

=> although law of negligence has been greatly expanded since Rylands v Fletcher was decided and a claimant entitled to succeed under rule would now have a claim in negligence, their Lordships rejected abolition of strict liability rule. The rule, stated as being an aspect of private nuisance which had stood for nearly 150 years, should not be discarded.

Hint 5

large water pipe serving flats leaked and water escaped into embankment and caused it to collapse. As a result, a high pressure gas main was left exposed

Front 6

Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] (HL)

=> Who can sue?

Back 6

Before Transco, it was unclear whether claimant would need a right in land to sue. In Transco, HL reaffirmed the approach taken in Cambridge Water that only those with rights over land may sue under Rylands v Fletcher.

Front 7

Weller & Co v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] (QB)

=> Who can sue?

Back 7

in Weller & Co v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] it was held that C could not succeed under rule because they did not have an interest in the land affected by the escape.

Front 8

Ponting v Noakes [1894] (QB)

=> Defences: Contributory Negligence

Back 8

Liability will be reduced or eliminated if the escape is due partly or wholly to claimant’s fault: see Ponting v Noakes [1894] and the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s.1.

Hint 8

Open ndndn

Front 9

Rickards v Lothian [1913] (HL)

=> Defences: Unforeseeable act of stranger

Back 9

This is a well-established defence. The act must be due to actions of a third party over whom defendant has no control.

In Rickards v Lothian [1913] a malicious act by an unknown third party blocked a domestic water system. water overflowed and caused damage to C’s premises on floor below. We have seen above that Lord Cairns’ requirement in Rylands v Fletcher of ‘non-natural use’ has been established as part of rule. Here Lord Moulton defined non-natural use as ‘some special use bringing with it increased danger to others.’

defendants were not liable because overflow of water was caused by act of a stranger over whom they had no control. The third party’s actions must be unforeseeable: Northwestern Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee Co [1936] AC 108.

Hint 9

malicious act by an unknown third party blocked a domestic water system. water overflowed and caused damage to C’s premises on floor below

Front 10

Nichols v Marsland (1876)

=> Defences: Act of God

Back 10

Due to advances in modern technology and science, this defence is largely defunct.

defendant will not be liable where escape is due solely to natural causes in circumstances where no human foresight or prudence could reasonably recognise possibility of such an occurrence and provide against it.

defendant had formed artificial ornamental lakes on his land by damming up a natural stream. Following a thunderstorm there was an unprecedented rainfall which caused banks of ornamental lake to burst and destroy bridges on C’s land.

defendant was not liable because escape was caused by natural forces in circumstances ‘which no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility.’

Hint 10

defendant had formed artificial ornamental lakes on his land by damming up a natural stream. Following a thunderstorm there was an unprecedented rainfall which caused banks of ornamental lake to burst and destroy bridges on C’s land.

Front 11

Greenock Corp v Caledonian Railway [1917] (HL)

=> Defences: Act of God

Back 11

On very similar facts as in Nichols v Marsland (1876), in Greenock Corp v Caledonian Railway [1917], application of this defence was criticised by HL.

rainfall was found not to be an act of God and Corporation was held to be under a duty to make sure that owners or occupiers on a lower ground level are as secure against injury as they would have been had nature not been interfered with.

Front 12

Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co (1894)

=> Defences: Statutory authority

Back 12

This operates in a similar manner to that of private nuisance.

Front 13

Kiddle v City Business Properties Ltd (1942)

=> Defences: Consent

Back 13

Consent may be express or implied and arises generally in context of escapes from something maintained for common benefit, for example, water tank for a block of flats. In such circumstances, tenant is assumed to forgo any rights against landlord due to benefit he or she gains, provided the escape occurs without negligence.

Front 14

Hunter v Canary Wharf

Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] (HL)

=> Damages for personal injury?

Back 14

Personal injuries are not, per se, recoverable -> Hunter v Canary Wharf.

Lord Bingham in Transco affirmed that ‘the claim cannot include a claim for death or personal injury, since such a claim does not relate to any right in or enjoyment of land’.

The same rule therefore applies for all forms of private nuisance.